August 2, 2022

Speaker Pelosi Visits Taiwan

Today, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi arrived in Taiwan as part of her Asia tour. Speaker Pelosi is the highest-level U.S. official to visit Taiwan since 1997. In the days leading up to the trip, Beijing warned of “serious consequences” and “firm and resolute measures” should House Speaker Nancy Pelosi follow through with her plans. The Chinese Communist Party can’t help itself. Like so much of what China has done in the past 10 years or so, these pronouncements only help to bring about the thing that it’s trying to prevent.

Heritage ASC Director Walter Lohman writes that her interest in going to Taiwan before she relinquishes the speaker’s gavel for the final time is no surprise. What is a surprise is that the president of the United States would try to dissuade her from doing it. She is not the first House speaker to visit Taiwan. Congressional delegations go to Taiwan all the time. Cabinet members go, although not nearly as often as they should. Just two years ago, then-Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar visited Taiwan and met with its president.  

What President Joe Biden should be doing is making clear that the U.S. will continue to make these demonstrations in support of Taiwan, and that he will do nothing to stand in the way of Pelosi or any other member of Congress from visiting.

The administration is making good noises in this regard, leaving the decision up to Pelosi—as if it has a choice. Its public statements, however, make clear to Beijing that if she does go, the president and his team are not to blame.     

This appears to be part of a broader trend. The Biden administration got off to a solid start on China policy. Taiwan’s Washington representative was at the president’s inauguration for the first time since the U.S. ended diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in 1979. The administration endorsed the Trump administration’s determination of genocide in Xinjiang. In March, on the eve of its first high-level talks with Chinese officials, it imposed its first sanctions on China, for abuses committed in Hong Kong. That was followed by sanctions coordinated with the European Union, United Kingdom, and Canada for abuses committed in Xinjiang. Then, in June of 2021, Biden expanded a blacklist of Chinese military and surveillance-linked companies first barred from U.S. investment by President Donald Trump. Privately, that summer, even former Trump officials talked about the remarkable continuity between the two administrations.   

Yet, in retrospect, that’s when the administration’s resolve on China seems to have peaked. Some of the things that have occurred since include the administration’s failed effort to scuttle passage of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and a series of anemic arms sales to Taiwan.

On the latter, the administration has formalized a policy of selling Taiwan only the most defensive weapons. It portrays that as an effort to help Taipei prioritize its needs and become a harder target. Of course, it also means providing Taiwan weapons that are the least objectionable to Beijing.

This turn away from continuity with the previous administration’s China policy to one of greater deference to China was brought home in a report by Nikkei Review in June that the Department of Treasury had given investors in the aforementioned blacklisted companies a green light to hold on to their shares.

So maybe the Biden administration carrying Beijing’s water in opposition to the Pelosi trip shouldn’t be so surprising after all.

Why State Legislatures Must Confront Chinese Infiltration

The federal government is just starting to understand the risks posed by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) infiltration of American political, economic, and social life. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to access a backdoor to America’s political system largely undetected. China’s influence operations against the United States target not only Congress and the executive branch, but also political and social organizations at the state and local levels. Many of these subnational targets are either unaware of these threats or do not know how to address them.

In a Heritage Special Report, Heritage Visiting Fellow Michael Cunningham writes that states are unprepared for the magnitude and persistence of PRC influence operations is understandable: Never has a foreign adversary had such deep inroads in U.S. state and local politics.

The range and persistence of China’s operations far surpass those of previous geopolitical rivals, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Beijing targets schools, churches, and community organizations. Its influence is felt on university campuses, in board rooms, and in governors’ mansions. Its agents cultivate aspiring politicians, business elites, and academics early in their careers and use these relationships to influence policymaking decades later, largely unbeknownst to their victims.

State and local policymakers—particularly state legislators—need a far greater understanding of the threats they face and how to respond to them.

General Recommendations. State lawmakers should:

• Chart their own course and avoid replicating approaches that consistently fail at the federal level.
• Ensure that laws contain clear definitions.
• Make legislation targeted and actionable.
• Make a reasonable attempt to avoid wording laws in ways that could be misconstrued as being xenophobic toward Chinese Americans.

Recommendations for Addressing Chinese Infiltration of Critical Infrastructure and Government Offices. State lawmakers should:

• Craft legislation to protect U.S. infrastructure and state government offices from Chinese infiltration.
• Ensure that all technology purchased or employed in government offices or by operators of critical infrastructure is free from the influence of foreign adversaries, such as China.
• Ensure that bans and prohibitions target not only Chinese companies, but their technologies as well.
• Ensure that whatever measures are developed apply not only to state contracts, but also to any projects touching critical infrastructure, including but not limited to privately run transportation systems and energy firms.
• Prohibit China and other foreign adversaries from bidding for state contracts.

Recommendations for Stopping China’s Infiltration of Academic Institutions. State lawmakers should:

• Take direct action to end funding of academic institutions by foreign adversaries.
• Require detailed reports of these inflows—at the very least—if an outright ban on gifts and grants from foreign adversaries proves politically infeasible, and follow Florida’s example in banning contributions and contracts that give the foreign adversary influence over teaching or research.

Recommendations for Addressing State Funds’ Investments in China. State lawmakers should:

• Avoid using negative lists of companies that are banned for investment when crafting legislation aimed at preventing state funds from investing in China.
• Ban investments in China’s technology sector and other sectors that pose national security risks. 
• Stop investing in managed funds (such as mutual funds) with exposure to problematic sectors or businesses in China.

Recommendations for Stopping Chinese Lobbying in States. State lawmakers should:

• Exercise vigilance and, at the very least, be aware of Beijing’s lobbying practices within their jurisdictions and report any concerns or failures of lobbyists to register as foreign agents to the federal authorities.
• Learn to recognize and resist Beijing’s attempts to influence their policymaking.

Infiltration by the Chinese government is a long-term fixture of U.S. state and local politics, and federal laws are often insufficient to address this threat. State legislatures must confront China’s influence within their borders head on, developing laws that are both effective and constitutional.

August 4, 2022 @ 2:00 pm EDT - A Matter of Survival: The Future of Taiwan Arms Sales

The U.S. is Taiwan’s lifeline, not least because it is the only nation in the world that dares to sell it arms. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and concern about Taiwan’s central node in global supply chains, these sales have assumed renewed and intense attention. Virtually everyone in Washington agrees Taiwan’s security is important to the U.S. Differences, however, have peaked over how best to protect it. Join us as we discuss the best way forward.