Following is the June 2022 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The
authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist t
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Afghanistan Terrorism Report: June 2022
Afghanistan Terrorism Report June 2022
By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch
Read CEP’s Latest Afghanistan Terrorism Report
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Following is the June 2022 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The
authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat
in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and
ISIS-K propaganda.
ISIS-related propaganda continues to portray an image of high operational
tempo in Afghanistan. In June, highlighted incidents concentrated on the east
of the country, the capital Kabul, as well as Peshawar and Bajaur in Pakistan,
illustrating that ISIS-K’s operational area continues to extend into Pakistan.
Furthermore, Kunduz and Mazar-e Sharif in the north remained consistent targets
for ISIS terror attacks. ISIS propaganda outlets highlighted two incidents in
June. Both were attacks on government officials and individuals working in
government facilities: airport staff in Mazar-e Sharif and prison guards in
Kabul. While in previous months, ISIS propaganda outlets mainly claimed attacks
on what they termed “Taliban militia,” and in May, attacks onelectricity
infrastructure
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were conducted. Therefore, it seems possible that ISIS tactics will attempt to
disrupt government functions in the country and continue targeting Taliban
fighters and security officials.
Map of incidents highlighted by ISIS-K social media propaganda in June 2022
Interestingly, one of the most significant incidents in Afghanistan was hardly
featured in ISIS-linked propaganda. On June 22, one of the most severe
earthquakes
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in nearly two decadesaffected
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in the east of Afghanistan, killing around 1,000 individuals and injuring
nearly 3,000 individuals. This tragedy could have been an opportunity for ISIS
to demonstrate that apart from violence, it is also interested in garnering
public support by providing aid to locals in the affected area. The fact that
pro-ISIS propaganda did not highlight this demonstrates that the group
continues to identify itself purely as a destructive terror movement and,
despite its criticism of the Taliban regime as illegitimate, does not attempt
to compete with it within the realm of civic governance. The only significant
mention of the incident in pro-ISIS propaganda outlets located by the Counter
Extremism Project (CEP) was a short criticism that India allegedly provided
more support to the victims than other Muslim countries. This emphasis on
terrorist operations is also highlighted again by the June 17 issue of the
Voice of Khorasan web magazine, which devoted several articles to summaries of
attacks and explained the importance of fighting as a core element of ISIS
ideology.
In June, ISIS propagandists covered the brutal attack on a Sikh Temple
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in Kabul, killing two and injuring several others. This attack was allegedly
in response to an Indian politician’s offensive comments about the Prophet
Muhammad and occurred while India was in the process ofreopening its embassy
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in Kabul. The violence can be seen not only as a message to the Indian
government—which as a consequence of the attack, issued over100 emergency visas
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to Hindus and Sikhs wishing to leave the country—but also to other governments
planning to reopen their embassies that the security situation in Kabul remains
challenging. Nonetheless, India reopened its embassy with a “technical team”on
June 23, 2022
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, mainly to coordinate humanitarian assistance.
Similarly, pro-ISIS propaganda criticized the visit of Iranian officials
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to the province of Khost as an example that the Taliban regime is eager to
cooperate with countries that ISIS perceives as hostile to its version of true
Islam. Khost province is the home of theHaqqani clan
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takeover in August 2021, was a center of insurgent and al-Qaeda activity,
including the famous attack onForward Operating Base Chapman
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by an al-Qaeda double agent in 2009. This official visit also indicates that
Iran—which previously concentrated its activities on the west of Afghanistan,
particularly in Herat—is examining an increased geographic scope of its
activities. During the visit, the Iranian Deputy Ambassador to KabulHassan
Mortazavi
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discussed the delivery of humanitarian aid and trade opportunities.
As part of its broad delegitimization campaign against the Taliban regime,
pro-ISIS propaganda outlets continue to highlight Taliban infighting and the
killing of suspected ISIS members. In June, tensions between Pashtun and Hazara
factions of the Taliban flared up. To gain increased control over some of the
country’s coal mines, the Taliban challengedMehdi Mujahid
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, a Hazara leader and senior Taliban figure in Sar-e Pol Province, in the north
of the country. Consequently, thismilitary operation
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seems to havedisplaced
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a significant number of Hazaras in the country, creating additional
humanitarian challenges for this ethnic group.
The brutality of the Taliban regime’s countermeasures against ISIS in the
country was highlighted at the beginning of July whenreports emerged
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that the Taliban may have summarily executed over 100 suspected ISIS members
in the east of the country. The issue of extrajudicial killings was also taken
up by the regular report of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the
U.N. Security Council concerning the situation in Afghanistan and the
activities of theUnited Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)
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.
As in previous months, pro-ISIS propaganda highlighted the close connection
between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and therefore emphasized that al-Qaeda has
delegitimized itself. The pro-ISIS web magazine released on June 17
characterized both the Taliban and al-Qaeda as American creations. ISIS’s
continued obsession with the U.S. government as well as actual and potential
U.S. actions regarding Afghanistan was demonstrated with pro-ISIS outlets not
only featuring a recent report of theRAND Corporation
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update report of theSpecial Inspector General for the Reconstruction of
Afghanistan (SIGAR)
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April 2022.
As in previous months, ISIS continues to highlight that despite the Taliban ban
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on drug production in Afghanistan in April, the production of opium in the
country continues, regardless of someeradication efforts
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being showcased by the Taliban. Pro-ISIS propaganda outlets explained that the
ban was not only introduced following the poppy harvest in Afghanistan but also
resulted in the Taliban's monopolization of drug production in the country.
Outside observers also aredoubtful
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about the ban’s impact on the country’s overall level of drug production.
Additionally, a video released by ISIS West Africa Province on June 14
explained that the Taliban in Afghanistan are apostates, elevating the standing
of ISIS’s Afghanistan affiliate within the terror group’s global network.
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