Following is the May 2022 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The
authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist th





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Afghanistan Terrorism Report: May 2022



Afghanistan Terrorism Report May 2022

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

Read CEP’s Latest Afghanistan Terrorism Report
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Following is the May 2022 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The
authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat
in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and
ISIS-K propaganda.



ISIS-K propaganda channels continued to highlight the high tempo of operations
within Afghanistan. Similar toApril 2022
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, incidents were concentrated in the North and East of the country, potentially
indicating that ISIS-K cannot sustainably widen its operational reach to the
rest of Afghanistan. Various ISIS-K outlets linked these activities to the
overall ISIS campaign “vengeance for the two sheikhs,” which was announced by
ISIS-linked propaganda outletson April 17, 2022
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, as a response to the killing of ISIS leaderAbu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi
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and ISIS spokesmanAbu Hamza al-Qurashi
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in a U.S. raid inSyria in February 2022
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. Several ISIS affiliates carried out the campaign which, according to ISIS
propaganda, resulted inseveral hundred attacks
<[link removed]>. In
addition to frequent attacks in Pakistan, ISIS-K propaganda continued to
highlight the group’s alleged attack on theterritory of Uzbekistan
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in April 2022 and claimed a second cross-border attack, this time on the
territory of Tajikistan. The government of Tajikistan did not deny the attack
but reported thatbullets, not rockets
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, were fired on its territory in a firefight at the border. Despite the
disputed nature of both attacks, the fact that ISIS-K propaganda continues to
highlight these demonstrates the group’s apparent intent to reach into Central
Asia and to demonstrate that the Taliban are unable to prevent cross border
attacks.



During the month of May, ISIS-K propaganda indicated that the group now uses
some of the attack methodologies previously employed by the Taliban. ISIS-K’s
propaganda narratives regularly highlighted attacks on electricity towers in
the country. Similar disruption of civilian infrastructure was part and parcel
ofTaliban tactics
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until the summer of 2021. Similarly, ISIS-K repeatedly emphasized an attack on
a large hotel near Kabul airport in May. Until the Taliban takeover in August
2021, hotels were frequently the target ofTaliban attacks
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. In 2014, increasing Taliban threats to hotels and an attack on aLebanese
restaurant in Kabul
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, which left four U.N. staff members dead, forced the United Nations and
foreign embassies to progressively restrict international staff members from
frequenting hotels and restaurants in Kabul due to security concerns.



Furthermore, pro-ISIS-K propaganda highlighted the fighting between Taliban
forces and opposition forces in the Panjshir valley several times, despite
these opposition forces not being linked to the group. These opposition
fighters were most likely part of theNational Resistance Front
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, which formed following the Taliban takeover of the country in August 2021.
Although theTaliban denied
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any incidents in the valley, independent reportingconfirmed ongoing clashes
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between Taliban and opposition forces. However, given the fact that the valley
is far from any of the borders of Afghanistan (see the red star with blue
center on the map below), which significantly complicates resupply, it seems
currently unlikely that these opposition forces will be able to present a
serious challenge to Taliban rule in the country any time soon.



Finally, the pro-ISIS-K Voice of Khurasan web magazine took responsibility for
the attacks in Israel during Ramadan. In March 2022, severallone actor attacks
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occurred in Israel, which ISIS-core had already taken responsibility for.
These were the first of these types of attacks in the country. Given thestrong
security architecture
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in Israel, these attacks were a major propaganda success for ISIS, explaining
why the ISIS-K web magazine felt the need to highlight them once more,
demonstrating the reach of the ISIS global network.



Map of Incidents Highlighted by ISIS-K Social Media Propaganda in May 2022



Source: [link removed]



Pro-ISIS-K propaganda channels also continued their ideological criticism of
the Taliban regime, arguing that its behavior and international contacts amount
to religious deviancy. Although these narratives had alsopreviously targeted
al-Qaeda
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due to the group’s symbiotic relationship with the Taliban regime, this
criticism was less pronounced than the attacks on the Taliban’s religious rule.
However, this month, several ISIS-K posts and magazine articles noticeably
stepped-up the ideological criticism of al-Qaeda, claiming that the United
States had tamed the group, going as far as declaring that al-Qaeda had
abandoned the ideology of its former leaderOsama Bin Laden
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Part of ISIS-K’s ideological criticism of the Taliban regime continues to
focus on the drug economy in Afghanistan. This topic had already been
highlighted inApril 2022
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, following the Taliban’s announcement that they banned drug production in the
country. Pro-ISIS-K online chatter claimed that the ban was announced for
commercial reasons and reports on increasing drug prices as a result of the ban
in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. This mirrors independent reporting that
highlightsrising opium prices
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country. This potential financial windfall for the Taliban regime is
exacerbated by recent reporting by the United Nations, indicating that members
of the Haqqani network haveassumed key positions
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in the central bank of Afghanistan, Da Afghanistan Bank. The leaders of this
network, which remains themain contact point
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between the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda, already control the AfghanMinistry of
Interior
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and theMinistry of Refugees
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, which would be critical institutions in the fight against terrorist groups in
the country. Given the relaxation of international sanctions, including
financial restrictions against the Taliban through U.N. Security Council
resolution 2615 (2021)
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, theEuropean Union
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, and a range of General Licenses issued by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury’sOffice of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
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since the Taliban takeover of the country, this positioning of members of the
Haqqani network within the central bank is concerning. This allows the network
access to data housed withinFinTRACA
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Investigation Unit (FIU). FinTRACA is tasked with preventing the financing of
terrorism and money laundering and, among other data, maintains a database of
suspicious transaction reports provided by Afghan financial institutions,
including Hawaladars <[link removed]>.
Therefore, the external relaxation of financial controls via sanctions
provisions in combination with the weakening of the internal control system
through the access of the Haqqani network to sensitive control data will
present a major challenge in the prevention of the financing of terrorism or
the laundering of drug-related money in Afghanistan.

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