Following is the May 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in cen
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In May 2022
Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In May 2022 by clicking here
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In May 2022
By Gregory Waters
Following is the May 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2021 can be found here
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, and previous editions in 2022 can be viewed through the following links:
January
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, February
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, March
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, and April
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. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also be explored here
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, here
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, and here
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ISIS militants carried out at least seven confirmed attacks in May in the
Homs, Deir Ez Zor, and Hama governorates. These attacks killed at least three
pro-Assad regime fighters and one civilian, while wounding six others.
Confirmed ISIS activity in central Syria continued to be very low in May, in
line with the historic lows of April. As with April, this reduced level of
activity occurred despite no changes in the Syrian regime’s security posture or
any significant anti-ISIS operation. Therefore, ISIS’s quietness in May is
likely a result of the group’s own strategic calculations, rather than
something imposed on them by regime pressure.
As in April, there was no confirmed ISIS activity in Raqqa or Aleppo in May.
High quality* attacks dropped for the second month in a row, with ISIS
conducting only one such attack: the killing of a colonel in Homs. ISIS
activity in May was sporadic, with one or two incidents reported each week.
However, the vast majority of attacks were conducted using mines or improvised
explosive devices (IED). May was therefore the most passive month for ISIS
since this author began tracking the insurgency in detail in 2019. It should be
reiterated, however, that this passivity is not a sign that ISIS has been
defeated in central Syria. As if to underscore this point, ISIS cells ambushed
a civilian transport bus on the major Palmyra-Deir Ez Zor highway on June 2,
killing the three soldiers on board.
Compared with April, ISIS activity remained the same in Homs (2), Aleppo (0),
and south Raqqa (0), decreased in Deir Ez Zor (1), and increased in Hama (4).
As is currently the norm, all incidents in east Hama involved mines. It is
unclear how recently these mines were placed.
Homs
There were only two confirmed ISIS attacks in Homs in May, both likely carried
out with mines or IEDs. On May 18, a soldier was reported killed in the Bayarat
area, west of Palmyra. This was the second death in the Bayarat area in as many
months. ISIS cells have targeted civilians and local security in this area in
the past using mines and IEDs, though most of this type of activity occurred in
2020. On May 23, a colonel was reported killed “in the Badia.” The colonel was
from the town of Qaryatayn, in southern Homs, and his death coincided with
reports from pro-regime sources about mine threats in the Qaryatayn
countryside. It is therefore likely that the colonel was killed somewhere in
this area.
Deir Ez Zor
ISIS activity in regime-held Deir Ez Zor continues to fluctuate in 2022. After
a moderate increase in activity in March, only two attacks were confirmed in
April and only one attack in May. A military intelligence soldier from the
local branch 243 was reported killed somewhere in the province on May 5.
Hama, Raqqa, and Southeast Aleppo
There were no confirmed attacks in Aleppo or regime-held Raqqa in April. There
were four incidents in east Hama in May, all involving mines and all hitting
civilians. As usual, it is unclear how recently the mines were planted. The
consistency of mine incidents in east Hama targeting civilians despite the
continual demining operations being carried out by local security forces may
indicate that ISIS cells are still operating in this area, though focusing
solely on laying mines. However, two regime soldiers who deployed to separate
parts of east Hama in May each told this author that their units encountered no
evidence of recent ISIS activity.
Regime Operations
There continues to be no major ongoing anti-ISIS operations this year in
central Syria. The bulk of current operations are focused on demining and
conducting limited patrols. Security forces continue to emphasize east Hama,
conducting both demining operations and community outreach programs through the
local National Defense Forces and Liwa al-Quds. The Tiger Forces, now called
the 25th Division, launched a larger sweeping operation on May 18 that moved
from Ithriya in east Hama, to Resafa, in south Raqqa. Unlike past 25th Division
sweeps that relied mostly on newer recruits from east Aleppo, this operation
drew on the veteran Tiger Forces unit ‘Zarif Regiment’ based out of Salamiyah,
Hama. The operation reportedly found no evidence of recent ISIS activity in the
Resafa-Zakia area of southwest Raqqa.
Looking Ahead
Little has changed since April. It remains unclear what ISIS’s long-term plans
are in the Badia. The lack of any significant anti-ISIS operations in central
Syria raises interesting questions as to why ISIS has chosen to be so quiet
here as of late. It is possible that ISIS is still taking time to integrate
prisoners it freed during the January Hasakah prison attack into cells across
central Syria, that they continue to focus resources on northeast Syria or
Iraq, or that its fighters are simply taking this time to rest and regroup. It
is worth noting that ISIS attacks in Iraq have been at an all-time high for
2022 since mid-April, averaging 22.5 claimed attacks per week compared to just
10 per week over the preceding months. However, it remains obvious that the
reduced level of activity in the Badia is not from any significant degradation
caused by regime operations. There have been no reports of killed or captured
ISIS fighters in central Syria since 2021, and no recently used ISIS camps
uncovered. ISIS will undoubtedly heavily pressure regime forces again, it is
only a matter of when.
Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted dots) in May 2022. Not pictured are
two attacks: one that occurred somewhere in the Deir Ez Zor countryside and one
somewhere in Homs. To view an interactive version of this map, please click here
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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.
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