No images? Click here [link removed]
Russian sailors stand on the bridge of the Russian Navy’s Kilo-class submarine Rostov-na-Donu B-237 as it transits the Bosphorus Strait en route to the Black Sea on February 13, 2022 in Istanbul, Turkey. (Photo by Burak Kara/Getty Images)
Moscow is holding the global food supply and Ukraine’s economy hostage. Western leaders should not expect Putin to abandon his blockade of Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea, write Hudson Senior Fellows Bryan Clark [[link removed]] and William Schneider [[link removed]] in their recent op-ed, “ Arm Ukraine to Win the War at Sea [[link removed]].” They argue NATO must equip Ukraine. See below for key excerpts from their analysis.
Read the Article [[link removed]]
Key Insights
1. Current Armaments are Insufficient
Newly arriving Danish Harpoon missiles will not make a difference against Russia’s two-dozen warships and civilian support ships without real-time targeting to guide them. Even with usable targeting, the 70-mile Harpoon will only reach the approaches to Odessa’s ports, leaving Ukrainian vessels vulnerable as they transit the remaining 230 miles between Ukraine and Turkey’s Bosporus Strait. The small supply of Harpoons will also not address the most significant challenge facing Ukrainian shipping—Russia’s four Improved Kilo submarines that remain in the Black Sea.
2. Workarounds Still Leave Ukraine—and the Food Supply—Vulnerable
The United States and other NATO allies are pursuing other paths to connect Ukrainian grain silos and factories to hungry nations abroad. But these rail and road routes through Romania and Poland can carry only a fraction of what could travel by sea and are vulnerable to Russian attacks. Another option proposed by some European politicians and former U.S. commanders is escorting Ukrainian commercial vessels through the Black Sea. This approach is unlikely to pass muster with U.S. or NATO leaders because it almost guarantees NATO and Russian forces will come into direct conflict, an escalation President Biden said he wants to avoid.
3. Exploit U.S. and Allied Technological Advantage to End the Blockade
Rather than putting warships and crews in harm’s way and risking a direct confrontation with Russia, NATO should enable Ukraine to arm unmanned aircraft like the MQ-1 Gray Eagle or MQ-9 Reaper reportedly being provided by the United States. These drones could complement Ukraine’s existing fleet of Bayraktar TB2s to provide targeting for Harpoon or Neptune batteries ashore and attack Russian warships in defense of Ukrainian shipping beyond the reach of ground-based missiles. Critically, MQ-9 Reapers could also deploy sonobuoys and bombs to help Ukraine fend off Russian Kilo submarines that constitute Russia’s most capable anti-shipping threat.
Quotes may be edited for clarity and length.
Read the Article [[link removed]] Go Deeper
What We Must Do to Help Ukraine Win [[link removed]]
The goal of U.S. aid should be to help Ukraine win—not simply survive—the war with Russia. Hudson Senior Fellows Rebeccah Heinrichs [[link removed]] and Bryan Clark [[link removed]] layout a plan that would equip Ukraine to wage a punishing counteroffensive and compel Russia to contrive an off-ramp.
Read [[link removed]]
Virtual Event [[link removed]] | [[link removed]] NATO and Russia’s War on Ukraine: A Conversation with NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoana [[link removed]]
The conflict in Ukraine has reinvigorated the transatlantic alliance and is shaping its response to future threats, such as cyber threats, China’s ascent, and future Russian aggression. NATO Deputy Security General Mircea Geoana discussed these topics with Distinguished Fellow Ken Weinstein [[link removed]] in advance of the upcoming Madrid Summit.
Watch [[link removed]]
Counterbalance—Ukraine & Iran Demonstrate the Need for True American Deterrence [[link removed]]
U.S. foreign policy failed to prevent Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, argues Senior Fellow Michael Doran [[link removed]] on Counterbalance, because the Biden administration does not believe in classical military deterrence as a tool of statecraft, preferring instead economic deterrence and “moral-suasion.”
Listen [[link removed]] [[link removed]] Share [link removed] Tweet [link removed] Forward [link removed] Hudson Institute
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Fourth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20004 Preferences [link removed] | Unsubscribe [link removed]
