When insurgency erupts in a state, how it operates and endures hinges largely on where it feels threatened. The history of insurgency in the 20th century reads like a history of rural rebellion. That is where insurgent forces like Mao’s communists or the Mau Mau in Kenya were able to operate for a long time. But, argues Anthony King in “Urban insurgency in the twenty-first century: smaller militaries and increased conflict in cities,” those 20th-century wars had major urban campaigns. Instead, they just ended in defeat for the insurgents because state security forces could use superior numbers and coordination to quash urban rebellions.

King’s work looks at insurgency and counterinsurgency as a kind of arithmetic of brutality. For insurgents looking to oust a local government, operating in cities where the government is, especially capitals, is a path to victory. Suppose the insurgency is instead trying to drive out a foreign occupier. In that case, the ability to attack its bases in cities and threaten violence more distantly can allow them to increase the costs of continuing occupation. To some extent, all of this can be threatened through rural operations. But being able to occupy, hold, and control cities, or at least parts of cities, gives insurgents a powerful base of operations to acquire, maintain, and wield more advanced weaponry.

To counter that, King points to the success of massive deployments of security forces, especially relative to the size of the city being contested. In Algiers in 1957, for example, the low estimate of security forces was 14,000 among a population of 900,000 or a ratio of 64:1. (Algiers may have had twice as many security forces, halving that). By contrast, in 2013, Syria’s government only had 7,000 security forces to Aleppo’s population of 1.5 million, which is 214:1. King argues that this goes a long way to explain the slow and brutal course taken by Syria in the years of the siege.

While it is unlikely that many modern states will revert to conscription-heavy models in the face of new insurgencies, there’s an alternative to increasing the number of bodies patrolling and fighting: proxy forces.

“Partnerships with local state, militia, or irregular forces have played an increasingly important role in urban conflict, providing additional mass,” writes King. “Weaker states fighting for their sovereignty, such as Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine, have been increasingly forced to mobilize irregular troops.”

Understanding the labor needs of military efforts makes it easier to understand how and why they reach out to other groups of “armed friendlies” to bolster their numbers and fighting power. Urban warfare is dangerous and increases the shape of conflicts to come. While security forces, like armed militias or patrolling local police, may be unwilling to risk harm to themselves in the same way as professional soldiers, when the opportunity arises to inflict violence against perceived enemies, well, there can be strength and protective anonymity in numbers.

Bridget Moix implored the Biden administration to use its leverage and influence to start guiding Ukraine and Russia towards a peace process. Emphasizing the sizable funding the US has provided for Ukrainian military equipment and the punishing sanctions levied against Russia, Moix highlights how US decisions have already shaped the conflict. Moix presents a compelling overview of US policies and actions that could change and steps Ukraine and Russia could take to end the war and suffering it caused. Pushing for the US to join the ICC so that Putin might be brought before it promises justice but might make a negotiated end further away. 

Ridwan Karim Dini-Osman reported on Ghana removing protections from Achimota Forest, the last greenbelt surviving for the capital of Accra. Deliberately created a century ago under colonial rule, the preserved area has become vital infrastructure, providing a home to wildlife and offering the city protection and resilience against flooding. Daryl Bosu, deputy national director of conservation organization A Rocha Ghana, told Dini-Osman that “the decision to declassify the forest as a reserve casts doubt on Ghana’s commitments to climate action — especially in the area of adaptation.” 

Kate Kizer excoriated the Biden administration's decision to return US troops to Somalia. Instead, they will continue to participate in an undeclared war that the United States has waged against various armed factions in the country for over three decades. Writes Kizer, “This recycling of past failed strategies once again misses why there is no US military solution in Somalia: a state’s legitimacy does not come from foreign military training, and it certainly won’t come from a security force trained by the very foreign military that continues to kill the very people Somali forces are supposed to protect.”

When the material in question is abundant gun supply, maybe the simplest answer is the best.

EOD versus Adams Morgan

I’m shocked, shocked to find that politics is going on in this polis!

I would do anything about guns, but I won’t do that.

The first assassination is on the house, with no charges.

Kirb your reunification.

Checkmate, Machiavelli.