Afghanistan Terrorism Report: April 2022

Afghanistan Terrorism Report April 2022 

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

Following is the April 2022 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.

April 2022 was characterized by growing levels of violence in Afghanistan, primarily perpetrated by ISIS-K. As highlighted by the various online propaganda channels of ISIS-K, attacks by the terror group were concentrated in the north and east of the country. Significantly, ISIS-K propaganda claimed an attempt to attack installations with rockets in Termez, Uzbekistan. Although ISIS propaganda released videos of rockets being fired, both the Taliban and the Uzbek government announced that no rockets had reached Uzbek territory. Nevertheless, an attempted attack on Uzbek territory signifies a potential strategic shift. Over the past two decades, apart from violence related to the illegal drug trade, the regions north of Afghanistan’s border with Central Asia did not experience direct attacks by terror groups operating from within Afghanistan. Therefore, this situation requires further monitoring in order to ascertain whether terrorist spillover effects in Central Asia will begin to emerge, as they have already with Pakistan.

In addition to attacks on Shiite and Sufi individuals and mosques in Afghanistan, including once again in the city of Herat in western Afghanistan, ISIS-K propaganda also highlighted frequent attacks in Pakistan, particularly in Bajaur District and in the city of Peshawar. These ISIS-K attacks in Pakistan seem to be part of a wider trend. In addition to ISIS-K attacks, since the takeover of power by the Taliban, particularly the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has carried out a significantly higher number of attacks in Pakistan’s Western regions than in previous years. Furthermore, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a violent separatist terror group, has begun to target Chinese nationals and interests in Pakistan. Pakistani security forces regularly confiscate U.S. weapons in the possession of TTP and BLA fighters, indicating that arms and ammunition left behind after the withdrawal of international forces are now being sold to violent groups within the region. Furthermore, although not claiming direct responsibility for the attack, ISIS-K propaganda praised the attack on Shiite clerics by an Afghan in Mashad, Iran, as justified. As expected following the Taliban takeover in 2021, arms, ammunition, and terrorist violence seem to have begun to permeate outwards from Afghanistan into the wider region.

Map of Incidents Highlighted by ISIS-K Social Media Propaganda in April 2022

Source: https://www.mappr.co/political-maps/afghanistan-provinces-map/

To augment its sectarian violence in Afghanistan and beyond, pro-ISIS-K propaganda continues to highlight the supposedly missing “Islamic character” of the Taliban regime. Since the Taliban had officially banned drug production, transport, and sale in the country at the beginning of April, pro-ISIS-K propaganda reported on the continuing cultivation and sale of drugs in Afghanistan, particularly in Kunar, Nangarhar, and Helmand. Helmand is one of the largest drug-producing provinces in Afghanistan. Although it is a theme used in ISIS-K propaganda, outside observers have also doubted the seriousness of the Taliban ban. Despite military and political upheaval in the country and a severe drought, the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) documented a significant increase in drug production in Afghanistan in 2021. In addition to poppy cultivation, this also included a massive spike in methamphetamine production. According to the latest available data, seizures of this synthetic drug in Afghanistan increased from around 47 kg to 1.2 tons between 2016 and 2020. This growing new production capacity in Afghanistan requires obtaining precursor chemicals and building laboratories rather than large-scale cultivation of poppy plants. Therefore, remote monitoring of production capacities will be a challenge. Laboratories are more challenging to identify than poppy fields. This will enable the Taliban to publically “demonstrate” a reduction in drug production by eradicating poppy fields while substituting any reduced income through further increases in methamphetamine production. Methamphetamine has higher profit margins than heroin. Given the significance of drug income for the Taliban and that the movement has financed itself via drug money since its creation, it remains doubtful that this current ban will be more sustainable than the movement’s prior bans in the late 1990s and 2000. These past restrictions primarily resulted in a global price hike in heroin and, therefore, higher profit margins for the Taliban rather than a serious reduction in production in the country.

Furthermore, in April, pro-ISIS-K propaganda continued highlighting the religious deviance of the Taliban regime, which they accuse of nationalism, tribalism, and befriending what ISIS calls the “enemies of Islam.” Within their propaganda messages in April, pro-ISIS-K propagandists highlighted increasing poverty in Afghanistan and the Taliban banning of secondary education for girls in the country, contrasting this with the lavish lifestyle of the Taliban leaders in Gulf states, where their daughters attend schools. This is a reference to the Doha office of the Taliban in Qatar, where around 500 families of Taliban leaders have been living rather lavishly since the opening of the office in 2013.

Furthermore, in a Telegram post at the beginning of April, pro-ISIS-K propagandists also criticized the lack of enforcement of female religious dress in Afghanistan, the hijab. This post came a day before the release of a new video by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri on April 5,  in which Zawahiri criticized countries that ban the wearing of the hijab. As expected, both the ideological competition by ISIS-K and al-Qaeda’s harsh interpretation of Islamic rules offer opportunities for the Taliban to reinforce their own extremist views on women’s rights in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is no surprise that on May 6, Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada decreed that women in Afghanistan have to wear burqas once again and advised them to stay home unless they have important work outside. This latest measure is in addition to restrictions on work for women from September 2021, the ban for women traveling alone in the country, enacted in December 2021, as well as the restrictions on Afghan women traveling on an airplane without a male chaperone as well as the recent ban of female secondary education, both in force since March this year.

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