CF-5 FLT 218 on the USS George Washington on August 18, 2016. (Todd R. McQueen)

The threat from China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and missiles could prevent U.S. forces from defending Taiwan or Japan against Beijing’s aggression. U.S. naval aircraft are vital to countering the PLA in the air and on the water. In their new report Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade, Hudson's Bryan Clark and Tim Walton outline a strategy to expand the reach, adaptability, and capacity of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps airpower to deter Chinese adventurism in the Western Pacific.

See their key recommendations below and join us next week for a discussion on the Pentagon's new defense strategy with Congressman Mike Rogers (R-AL).

Key Recommendations

1. The US Must Adapt to Overcome China's Anti-Ship Missiles

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face growing challenges ranging from China and Russia to regional threats such as Iran and North Korea, all of whom seek to undermine their neighbors’ stability and revise geopolitical relationships in their favor. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn, each of these potential adversaries continued to improve its military capabilities, especially the number and reach of precision missiles able to strike U.S. allies and slow or prevent intervention by U.S. naval forces. Supported by commercial and military surveillance networks in every domain, weapons located on adversary territory are capable of threatening U.S. and allied ships, troop formations, and aircraft hundreds of miles away.

The greatest threat to U.S. naval forces in the Western Pacific comes from PLA aircraft that can launch large salvos of cruise missiles and bombs, rather than long-range missiles launched from the Chinese mainland. To address PLA bombers and cruise missile-equipped ships, U.S. naval forces will need to 'kill the archer before it launches its arrows.' But unlike the Cold-War tactic in which carrier-based fighters would intercept Soviet bombers, naval forces today will need to use a combination of shore, sea, and airborne air defense systems to attack PLA platforms due to extreme ranges of modern anti-ship missiles. Assuming they field anti-ship versions of weapons like the DH-10 cruise missile or the U.S. Navy’s BGM-109 Tomahawk, PLA ships and aircraft will need to be engaged 1,000 nm away from naval forces, which will be difficult to accomplish with only carrier-based fighters.

2. Extending Aircraft Carrier Reach and Capacity is Critical

Rebalancing naval aviation primarily involves force management, supported by additional procurement or modification of existing aircraft and payloads. This contrasts with prevailing Navy and Marine Corps plans, which sustain the existing force with minimal improvements while prioritizing development of next-generation capabilities. Not only does this approach fail to address the urgent nature of Russian and Chinese threats, but it also perpetuates the Navy’s expectation that revolutionary new capabilities will fix problems that demand tactical, organizational, or adaptive technical solutions. That strategy failed to deliver in the cases of the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class carrier. F/A-XX—even if successful—is unlikely to transform naval aviation but could consume resources needed to address peer adversaries during the next decade.

The shortfalls facing naval airpower against the People's Republic of China are significant, but not insurmountable. Analysts have pronounced the death of the aircraft carrier several times since the end of World War II, but by exploiting its adaptability and mobility, U.S. naval forces could remain relevant against peer opponents despite the emergence of long-range sensor and precision weapon networks. However, achieving the reach and capacity necessary to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific will depend on carriers focusing on the mission only they can do sustainably and at scale—long-range counter-air and strike warfare.

3. Recompose Maritime Airpower for Maneuverability

Navy and Marine Corps leaders have an opportunity to substantially improve the ability of maritime airpower to influence events in the Indo-Pacific. However, rebalancing naval aviation will require overcoming cultural, organizational, and programmatic hurdles. The necessary changes are possible and affordable, but only if naval leaders embrace the urgency of their challenges and do not continue to hope they can continue to push their problem—and solution—out into the future. 

By recomposing carrier air wings to consist almost entirely of strike-fighters and ISR&T/tanker aircraft, naval forces can deliver effects at 1,000 nm to more than 2,000 nm away and dramatically expand the maneuver space they can exploit at sea. The counterintuitive benefit of this change is that by shifting all or some electronic warfare, airborne early warning and control systems, anti-submarine warfare aircraft, and ISR&T to other ships, space, or shore, the naval air force would become more adaptable and present a more diverse array of challenges to opponents like the PLA.

The costs for these changes will be substantial, as additional unmanned systems will need to eventually be procured at scale for new approaches to succeed. But unmanned systems can be more flexible organizationally than manned aviation squadrons, allowing a small vanguard force of MQ-9s, MQ-25As, attritable UAVs, and ALE to remain deployed in the Indo-Pacific as the Navy and Marine Corps build their inventory. And the delays necessary in future capabilities to pay for additional procurement and payloads would enable naval aviation to embrace new airpower concepts sooner instead of betting new manned aircraft will solve its problems.

Quotes may be edited for clarity and length. 

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