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CRITICAL STATE
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Your weekly foreign policy fix.
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If you read just one thing…
...read China’s detailed plan for repression in Xinjiang.
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The leaves have changed, the weather has turned and now it’s apparently leak season. Two weeks ago, Iranian intelligence reports leaked, and last week brought a treasure trove of how-to documents from the Chinese security state. The leaks, which date back to 2017, offer new details about the Chinese government’s plans for its vast indoctrination program aimed at Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang province. In the internment camps at the center of the program,
detainees, who the government refer to as “students,” are barred from leaving and are required to take a “vocational skills improvement class.” The class is actually training for manufacturing jobs that detainees are required to accept upon release, where they are closely monitored by police on the factory floor.
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Taliban governance
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A new report from the US Institute of Peace examines how the Taliban actually governs in the areas of Afghanistan that it controls. Based on interviews with Taliban leaders and functionaries, the report shows a group pulled in multiple directions by its interest in international legitimacy and the practical concerns of fighting a brutal insurgency.
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For example, the Taliban began engaging with humanitarian aid organizations largely out of a desire for international recognition and an improved public image, and that engagement has grown over time. But other Taliban policies, including an explicit policy to destroy health facilities, if necessary, to achieve military gains, make improving health access difficult.
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The Taliban’s civilian casualty reporting has evolved in conversation with the international community. The Taliban’s monthly civilian casualty reports began in 2013 as a challenge to United Nations narratives of Taliban misdeeds and then gradually moved toward UN norms, in terms of both the report format and acknowledgement of some of the harm done by Taliban military operations.
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The things you can learn sitting in Washington cafes
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The Colombian ambassador to the US is in hot water this week after he was recorded speaking frankly with Colombia’s foreign minister-designate at a Washington, DC, coffee shop about US-Colombian relations.
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The ambassador, Francisco Santos, said the State Department has been “destroyed” in the Trump administration and that America’s foreign policy-making discussions were taking place at the National Security Council instead.
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Claudia Blum, the foreign minister-to-be, speculated that a negotiated solution may be the only option left in Washington and Bogotá's confrontation with Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro. A coup against Maduro, she said, is too much for Colombia to hope for “because the [Venezuelan] military is never going to oust him. The United States [ousting him] also won’t happen.”
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AID IN TIMES OF WAR: PART I
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There is a near-consensus in social science that humanitarian aid makes civil wars longer-lasting, more likely and more lethal. Insurgents sometimes target civilians who receive humanitarian aid in an attempt to take the resources for themselves, forcing civilians to rely on insurgents for their livelihoods. States sometimes see humanitarian assistance as direct aid to insurgents and attack civilians who are involved in its distribution. In all, research suggests that humanitarian aid in certain conflict settings may not be worth the trouble.
There is some new evidence challenging that consensus, though. For the next two editions of Deep Dive, we’ll be looking at emerging research on how humanitarian aid does and doesn’t drive conflict, and what opportunities there may be for improved humanitarian assistance in civil war zones.
In a new article in International Organization, Dartmouth political scientist Jason Lyall looks at a particular type of humanitarian aid in civil wars: aid tied to civilian casualties. In Afghanistan, the US government launched a program that offered assistance to communities where civilians had been accidentally hurt by either the international anti-Taliban coalition known as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or the Taliban itself. The program, known as
Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP), paid out the equivalent of about $195 per beneficiary to affected civilians in hopes that the compensation would limit future violence that might arise as a result of damage caused by the war.
Lyall tracked the performance of ACAP II, the second edition of the program, which ran from 2011 to 2015 and sent assistance to 41,141 Afghans across the country. ACAP II was notable not just because it was a case of humanitarian aid in a civil war but because it was also a bureaucratic disaster. ISAF lacked the resources to confirm if incidents of civilian harm were actually the result of ISAF actions, and as a result, claims were approved haphazardly. Due to this bureaucratic bottleneck, of the 1,061 incidents that were identified as meeting the requirements for ACAP II compensation, only 592 were actually approved. The approval process was so broken that it created an accidental experiment: approvals were distributed basically randomly, creating clear treatment and control groups for humanitarian assistance in the wake of civilian casualties.
The difference between the treatment and control groups was striking. In locations that received ACAP II aid, there were, on average, 23% fewer Taliban attacks against ISAF forces in the two years following incidents of civilian harm than in locations that got no ACAP II assistance. The aid also seemed to make no real difference in the Taliban’s targeting of civilians in those areas, contra previous studies suggesting that aid in conflict zones makes insurgent attacks against civilians more likely. Yet, these gains were limited to instances where the original harm was done by the Taliban; in locations where ISAF was issuing compensation for its own mistakes, the effect disappeared.
More research is necessary to explain the mechanisms that generated these results. But overall, Lyall’s work suggests that, in the right circumstances, humanitarian aid in civil wars can limit violence while still protecting civilians from the privations of war.
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Kelly Kasulis examined the South Korean government’s recent decision to send two North Korean defectors back to North Korea. The two men, who arrived in South Korea on a fishing vessel, are accused of murdering their 16 shipmates. But other defectors and human rights advocates say the allegations were not adequately investigated before the men were repatriated. Typically, South Korea grants asylum to North Korean defectors.
Caroline Dorminey, Kate Kizer, and Sumaya Malas showed the evolution of Democratic rhetoric on the US defense budget. For many years, the preferred way for Democrats to find savings in the Pentagon was by rooting out “waste, fraud, and abuse.” Today, however, presidential candidates are releasing plans that would reallocate funds from military spending to other priorities, such as health care, education and climate change prevention. That shift is popular among voters and, the authors argue, smart policy. Studies show that government spending on education and health care is over twice as
effective at creating new jobs than spending on defense.
Lydia Emmanouilidou reported on the troubles that small broadband carriers will face if the Federal Communications Commission goes through with its proposal to force American companies to replace equipment made by the Chinese telecom Huawei with tech from a company that is not considered a national security threat. The FCC on Friday voted to ban the use of federal funds to buy Huawei products, but have not yet forced companies already using Huawei equipment to jettison it.
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Until last year, a kilogram was whatever a platinum-alloy cylinder in a Parisian vault said it was. The International Prototype of the Kilogram, created in 1879, served as the basis for measuring mass in the metric system for over a century before physicists finally decided the world needed a better standard than saying, “Oh, the moon? That’s basically 7.35 sextillion of that thing,” while gesturing vaguely at a hunk of metal no one is allowed to touch. The new kilogram definition relies on the speed of light, but there are still some areas where measurement by prototype remains the standard.
If the whole concept of your magazine is male aristocracy, you’re liable to miss some things.
Don’t bother this adorable missile family.
University of Miami professor Bruce Bagley, who edited a book about organized crime in Latin America and the US, was indicted last week on charges of using his American bank account to launder money from a Venezuelan corruption scheme. The Justice Department, masters of the tired dad joke, announced the indictment by saying, “About the only lesson to be learned from Professor Bagley today is that involving oneself in public corruption, bribery, and embezzlement schemes are going to lead to an indictment.” Fellow professors, though, were more impressed, since allegedly engaging in massive money laundering is nothing if not an innovative research design.
Last week in impeachment: a folk hero emerges.
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Critical State is written by Sam Ratner and is a collaboration between The World and Inkstick Media.
The World is a weekday public radio show and podcast on global issues, news and insights from PRX, BBC, and WGBH.
With an online magazine and podcast featuring a diversity of expert voices, Inkstick Media is “foreign policy for the rest of us.”
Critical State is made possible in part by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
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