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Ukraine Needs US Tech to Gain the Upper Hand in Donbass
1. US Military Should Exploit Russia's Electronic Warfare Weaknesses [ Bryan Clark [[link removed]]]
Despite having a robust electronic warfare corps, the Russian military continues to avoid significant jamming or exploitation of Ukrainian sensors or radios. This is in large part because Russian forces need long-range radio communications to coordinate operations over the plains of Eastern Ukraine and Ukrainian forces continue to use civilian mobile networks or NATO-supplied systems that are harder to detect and jam. Unfortunately, Ukrainian forces lack the electronic warfare systems to take advantage of Russia’s vulnerabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum.
The U.S. military could use systems like the U.S. Marine Corps’ Intrepid Tiger and EA-18G Growler to jam Russian communications in the Donbass from international airspace over the Black Sea. And Western companies could expand their support to Ukrainian forces in ways that circumvent [[link removed]] the few Russian electronic attacks that have occurred.
2. More Aggressive Military Aid from US Pivotal for Ukraine in Advance of Russian “Victory Day” [ William Schneider [[link removed]]]
President Biden’s remarks [[link removed]] this morning indicate a more aggressive military aid effort, though a complete list of the equipment to be transferred has not been announced apart from a significant increase in artillery systems and ammunition. The President indicates that he has exhausted his “draw-down” authority and will be seeking a supplemental appropriation bill. This development offers Congress an opportunity to come up with an appropriate aid package that will enable Ukraine to not only prevent a Russian conquest of Ukraine, but also expel Russia from its current holdings in Ukraine.
Russia’s successive ultimatums to the defenders of Azovstahl Steel Plant in Mariupol to surrender have been rejected. After heavy bombing raids delivering numerous FB-3000 (6,600-lb) high explosive munitions on the large steel plant (4.24 sq. miles), Russia has abandoned its effort. Instead, it is seeking to declare victory in Mariupol and will settle for blocking Ukraine’s ability to use the Port of Mariupol and preventing resupply of the beleaguered Steel plant. Putin’s instruction to Russian Minister of Defense Gerasimov are: “Block off this industrial area so that a fly cannot not pass through.” This is not a winning approach as Russian forces besieging Mariupol are now vulnerable to cut off and subject to Ukrainian counterattack.
This personal decision taken by President Putin underscores the political importance to him of the May 9 “Victory Day” event for his aims in Ukraine. These developments suggest the possibility that Russia’s war aims in Ukraine are evolving. It could also permit a more aggressive Ukrainian posture to expel Russian forces entirely from Ukraine if U.S. and allied support allows.
3. Give Western Ukraine Better Air Defenses [ Bryan Clark [[link removed]]]
NATO countries are now beginning to send [[link removed]] missile defense systems like the S-300 to Ukraine, which are needed in Eastern Ukraine to defend against air attacks. But western Ukrainian cities like Lviv and Kyiv continue to be attacked by long-range missiles launched from Russian air space or territory to prevent Ukraine from recovering. To protect these cities, NATO countries should send systems like the Patriot and the Norwegian National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System ( NASAMS [[link removed]]) to Ukraine. If the West is willing to train Ukrainian forces to use howitzers, NATO countries can prepare Ukrainian troops to operate these air defenses, which will be needed well after the fighting in the Donbass ends.
4. Ukraine Needs Self-Propelled Artillery [ William Schneider [[link removed]]]
The widespread destruction of civil transportation infrastructure in Ukraine has made self-propelled, not towed, artillery a critical need. Moreover, as the current Russian assault is spread over a 300-mile front, towed artillery is difficult to reposition. In the most recent tranche of DoD drawdowns, the U.S. transferred 18 M177-towed 155-mm howitzers and 40,000 rounds of ammunition. The U.S. will also provide 12 counterbattery and radar surveillance systems which will improve Ukraine's ability to detect and track Russian tube, missile, and rocket artillery.
However, Ukraine's dearth of artillery will limit the effectiveness of its armed forces against Russia’s mechanized infantry forces. The United States' arms transfer policies have limited the transfer of medium altitude unmanned aerial vehicles. Ukraine is using the small number (<24) of Turkish unmanned aerial systems effectively, but their numbers are insufficient to affect the outcome. The U.S. Air Force has 300 MQ-9 UAVs that it intends to retire. However, only short-range systems have been approved for transfer, such as the hand-held Puma and the loitering Switchblade 600 anti-armor munition. As a result, detecting, locating, and tracking targets will be difficult in advance of their operation by adversaries.
5. Russia Moves Closer to Achieving its Land Bridge Objective [ William Schneider [[link removed]]]
With the Battle of Donbass underway, the immediate targets of the Russian armed forces are three cities in the Donetsk Oblast–Popasna, Rubizhne, and Severopdonetsk. Russia seeks to encircle the Ukrainian military forces that are defending parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. Russia claims that it controls 54% of Donetsk and 93% of Luhansk as the result of its operations through an offensive over a 300-mile front. Achieving this objective after seizing Mariupol will enable Russia to create a land-bridge between southeast Ukraine and Crimea. Subsequent objectives include seizing the entire Ukraine Black Sea coast rendering Ukraine landlocked. If Russia is successful, it would enable Russia to complete the absorption of the remainder of Ukraine and Moldova.
6. What the US Navy Can Learn From the Sinking of the Moskva [ Bryan Clark [[link removed]]]
The U.S. Navy issued its shipbuilding plan [[link removed]] this week as Russia grapples with the loss of Moskva to Ukrainian anti-ship missiles. Although the Russian cruiser was likely not prepared [[link removed]] for an attack, its sinking by a couple of homegrown missiles puts into stark relief the need for ship air defenses to work every time. But perfect air defenses are impossible, and ships will be lost in future wars. Under its new plan, the Navy’s surface fleet will remain at today’s size for the next decade, three-quarters of which are large multimission ships like Moskva. Only one missile needs to get through to put any of these $2 billion vessels out of action. The Navy should take a lesson from Russia’s experience and pursue a larger, more distributed fleet [[link removed]] that can fight through losses, including smaller ships like missile corvettes and light amphibious warships that can move Marines around Pacific islands or Scandinavian fjords.
7. Personnel and Logistics Problems Still Plague Russia [ William Schneider [[link removed]]]
Russia faces acute personnel and logistics problem that have intensified as the conflict progressed. Russia has postponed the annual Syria rotation. The annual conscription call is now underway which aims to increase Russia’s end-strength by 123,000. However, the limited training and low level of performance by Russian conscripts has been taken into account. This has led Russia to advertise for 3-month contract tours for military personnel in the Moscow subway system. Russia has deployed 18,000 Syrian army troops to Belarus and will likely join other Russian units as they are refitted and committed to the campaign in Eastern Belarus. It is also using private military contractors, including the Wagner Group in Donetsk Oblast. Its leader, Yevgeni Prigozhin, appeared there over the weekend.
Russia’s logistics difficulties, especially with the movement of fuel and ammunition, have been particularly damaging to Russian military operations. Russia’s vast consumption rate of free rockets to strike urban-industrial targets is reflected in a shipment 15 truck-mounted Grad BM-21 multiple rocket launchers from a depot in Tyumen in Siberia. Russian mechanized forces have been subject to “pauses” as they wait for days for the fuel supplies catch up to them, often delaying the refilling of Ammunition Supply Points that have left its vehicles subject to relentless—and effective —Ukrainian ambushes. There is no evidence that these shortcomings have been mitigated.
Go Deeper
In Breaking Defense, Nadia Schadlow [[link removed]] and Brayden Helwig examine how the United States has fallen behind its adversaries on the production of munitions and energetics [[link removed]], and what should be done to ramp up production of these vital materials.
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