No images? Click here [link removed]
An Irrevocable Blow: What Happens if Russia Conquers Odesa?
As Russia intensifies its assault on Odesa and Ukraine's southern coastline, it's useful to revisit the analysis which Hudson guest contributor Dr. Can Kasapoğlu [[link removed]] produced earlier in the war. Kasapoğlu emphasizes the irrevocable consequences if this strategically critical port city falls under Russian control. Preserving Odesa as a Ukrainian city is as important as preserving Kyiv.
1. If Odesa Falls, Ukraine Will Become Landlocked and Economically Crippled
"The way is now open for Russian leader Vladimir Putin to conquer Odesa. A huge armada is already positioned offshore, ready to strike. If Putin gives the order to take Odesa and the city falls, the blow to Ukrainian independence will be every bit as great as the conquest of Kyiv, and in some ways even greater.
"If the Russians conquer Odesa, which is Ukraine’s busiest international port, thorough which most of its exports flow, the blow would be irrevocable. Ukraine would become a landlocked country. Simultaneously, the power of Putin would increase dramatically. Not only would a revived Odesa become an economic jewel in the crown of the Russian Federation, but Russian forces would control the entire Black Sea coastline down to Romania and Moldova, both of which would become targets of coercive diplomacy. Without Ukraine to counterbalance Russia, the Black Sea would almost become a Russian lake. In sum, a Russian Federation in control of Crimea, much of Eastern Ukraine, the Sea of Azov and Odesa would be a much more powerful and dangerous beast than we have known since the end of the Cold War."
2. Russia Is Likely to Conduct an Amphibious Landing at Odesa's Main Port or Dofinivka Beach
"We can assume that the Russians do indeed have the available capabilities to conduct the landing, especially when a substantial part of Ukraine’s coastal defense elements, namely the Ukrainian naval infantry, is overstretched due to the additional requirement of defending the besieged Azov coastal city of Mariupol. When Mariupol falls, it would be extremely difficult to send these units, or what is left of them, back to Odesa. In sum, the organic defenses of Odesa, the military and mobilized volunteer formations, will have to defend the city on their own.
"For the site of the landing, the Russians can opt either for the main port area, or the Dofinivka beach in the east. After one analyzes the specific capabilities of Russian amphibious assault forces, it becomes likely that a Russian landing will take place together with an assault from the air on Odesa Airport, which indeed has already been hit. These operations will be carried out by highly skilled Russian troops, but they are inherently risky, leaving the invaders vulnerable before and during the establishment of the beachhead. Afterward, they will be forced into urban warfare, which is particularly hazardous for ground troops."
3. Surface-to-Air Missile Systems Are Crucial to Hold Off Russian Forces in Odesa
"Open-source intelligence documents a massive buildup of [Russian] amphibious forces between Crimea and Odesa. From a military standpoint, the silver-bullet solution for halting an amphibious offensive is to do it before the landing takes place: either by sinking ships and landing craft, or credibly threatening to do so. This requires high-end, real-time intelligence and adequate anti-access and area denial capabilities, such as anti-ship missiles fired from on shore. To be successful, the Russians must ensure that they enjoy at least local air superiority over the landing zone and the route to it. Thus, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems would also be of great value in stopping an amphibious assault.
"Ukraine developed the Neptune anti-ship missile program before the war. The shape of the program and the number of available missiles are not available to those of us who rely on open-source intelligence. Nevertheless, the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Kalibr cruise missiles, as well as the Crimea-based 27th Air Division, can eliminate the missile batteries in a short order, if they have not done so already. Ukraine does not possess a naval deterrent to counter this threat. Likewise, Ukraine has no submarine force, so intercepting the landing party from the silent depths is not an option."
4. The Ukrainian Military Needs Real-time Intelligence and Command and Control Assistance from NATO
"As important as weaponry to the defenders will be knowledge of when the amphibious assault will begin and where the beachhead will be. Therefore, the most important kind of assistance that NATO members can offer the Ukrainian defenders is real-time intelligence and command and control assistance.
"In addition, in an assault, the Russian amphibious forces’ light-armored vehicles are susceptible to anti-tank arms, including Javelins, and the supporting air platforms flying at low altitudes are exceptionally vulnerable to MANPADS [man-portable air-defense systems]. When delivering this assistance, NATO should work to ensure that Odesa gets a share of the supplies commensurate with its strategic importance."
5. Ukraine's Dneiper River Could Become the 'New Berlin Wall'
"[Putin] seeks to take geopolitical and economic control [of Ukraine,] almost certainly through the conquest of Odesa. He does not have sufficient forces to control the country west of the Dnieper River. But the domination of the capital and the Black Sea coastline will turn the independent rump of the country into a landlocked and impoverished buffer zone, living perpetually under threat of further invasion.
"In this scenario, the Dnieper River will become the new Berlin Wall. West Ukraine will become the new West Germany. If, however, it can retain Odesa, then the future trajectory of the two Ukraines will likely trace the political arc of the two Germanies, with the Russian-backed East Ukraine eager to rejoin its sister at the earliest opportunity. However, if West Ukraine becomes landlocked and economically crippled, then it risks becoming politically insignificant."
Excerpts are drawn from " A Winning Strategy in Ukraine [[link removed]]"
by Hudson guest contributor Dr. Can Kasapoğlu
Quotes have been edited for clarity and length.
Forwarded to you by a friend? Sign up to receive Re: Ukraine here. [[link removed]]
[[link removed]] Share [link removed] Tweet [link removed] Forward [link removed]
Hudson Institute
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Fourth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20004
Preferences [link removed] | Unsubscribe [link removed]