From Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control <[email protected]>
Subject Iran Watch Newsletter: March 2022
Date March 31, 2022 4:29 PM
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[1]

March 31, 2022

This month's newsletter features updates to a table tracking Iran’s
centrifuges and a report estimating Iran’s ability to make a dash to
produce fuel for a small nuclear arsenal. The centrifuge table sets out the
capacity and primary materials of each of Iran’s currently-deployed
centrifuge models as well as the number of each model installed and/or
enriching uranium. Both updates are based on the latest International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports released earlier this month.

The newsletter also features profiles of two entities that contributed to
Iran's nuclear advances in the past year, as well as a new Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI) research center. Documents from the Iran Watch
library include the latest IAEA reports on Iran’s nuclear program,
statements about negotiations to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA), activity in the U.S. Congress related to a possible JCPOA
revival, and several risk assessments released by the U.S. Treasury
Department, as well as news about a satellite launch and an Iranian
ballistic missile strike in Iraq.

[2]View the newsletter in your browser and [3]subscribe to receive it in
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PUBLICATIONS

[4]

Image source: Tasnim News

Table Update | [5]Iran’s Centrifuges: Models and Status

Iran possesses thousands of gas centrifuges that are the mainstay of its
nuclear program. Gas centrifuges spin uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to
separate uranium isotopes suitable for nuclear fuel, a process known as
enrichment. The number and capacity of these machines determine Iran’s
"breakout" time: how long it would take Iran—if it decided to do so—to
produce the fuel for a small nuclear arsenal. The machines are also key to
Iran's ability to "sneakout" by producing nuclear weapon fuel at secret
sites.

This table sets out the capacity and primary materials of each of Iran’s
currently-deployed centrifuge models. Using data from the latest IAEA
reports, it also describes the quantity and types of centrifuges installed
and/or enriching uranium at Iran’s three declared enrichment sites: the
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at
Natanz and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP).

[6]SEE THE UPDATED TABLE

[7]

Image source: Shutterstock

Report Update | [8]Iran’s Nuclear Timetable: The Weapon Potential

Iran’s nuclear program has reached the point at which, within a few months,
Iran could enrich enough uranium for five fission weapons using its known
capacity. For that uranium to pose a nuclear weapon threat, however, it
would have to be processed further, and the other components of a
successful weapon would have to be ready to receive the processed uranium.
These additional steps, together with the several months for enrichment,
mean that Iran cannot yet make a dash to a small nuclear arsenal within a
practical length of time. Instead, the main nuclear weapon risk comes from
secret sites. That risk will increase as Iran expands its use of more
powerful centrifuges, allowing sites to be smaller and easier to hide.
Perfecting such centrifuges is a vital step in the long nuclear game Iran
has been playing for decades.

[9]READ THE UPDATED REPORT

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

In 2021, Iran made advances in manufacturing advanced centrifuges and
producing uranium metal, a necessary component of a nuclear weapon. It also
refused to replace damaged IAEA monitoring cameras at a centrifuge
component production plant for several months.

[10]Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA)

An Iranian company linked to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
that manufactures centrifuge parts; operates the TESA Kashan Complex, a
facility responsible for gas centrifuge machine assembly, installation, and
startup at Natanz; operated the TESA Karaj Complex, a centrifuge component
manufacturing facility that reportedly was the target of a drone attack in
June 2021.

[11]LEARN MORE

[12]Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP)

A facility used by Iran to convert uranium and produce fuel plates for the
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR); has produced uranium metal in violation of
the JCPOA.

[13]LEARN MORE

[14]Rasa Technology and Innovation Center

A new research center subordinate to the Nuclear Science and Technology
Research Institute (NSTRI), which is part of the AEOI. Established in July
2021.

[15]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

[16]

Image Source: Tasnim News

[17]Iran's Revolutionary Guard Says It Launches Second Satellite |
Associated Press

March 8, 2022: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force
claimed it successfully launched a reconnaissance satellite into orbit on
March 8. The three-stage, solid- and liquid-fueled Qased space-launch
vehicle (SLV) carried the Noor-2 satellite into low-earth orbit. Iranian
state media footage showed that the SLV was launched from a mobile launcher
on a concrete pad near Shahroud. It was the IRGC space program's second
launch; the Aerospace Force launched the first Noor satellite on the Qased
SLV in 2020. The IRGC space program is distinct from the Iranian Space
Agency, which reportedly experienced a failed launch in early March.

[18]Watchdog: Iran Converts Sliver Of Its High-Enriched Uranium |
Associated Press

March 18, 2022: According to a confidential International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) report, Iran has taken the first step in converting 2.1
kilograms of its 60%-enriched uranium into a form used for medicine. The
isotope that will result once the process is completed, molybdenum-99,
cannot be processed further into nuclear fuel. Iranian media outlet Mehr
News publicly reported the conversion. The IAEA estimated Iran's stockpile
of 60%-enriched uranium to be 33.2 kilograms as of February 19.

[19]Iran's Attack Was Response To Secret Israeli Attack On Drone Site | The
New York Times

March 16, 2022: An Iranian missile strike on a residential compound in
northern Iraq was meant to retaliate against an Israeli airstrike on an
Iranian drone factory in February, according to unnamed intelligence
officials. Israel reportedly sent six "suicide drones" to detonate on the
Iranian military's main drone manufacturing facility in Kermanshah, Iran.
The attack destroyed dozens of Iranian drones, according to the officials.
Iranian officials have said that the Kermanshah facility is an Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) base. Iran has not publicly stated that
its missile strike on Erbil was linked to the Kermanshah attack.

FROM THE LIBRARY

The IAEA released its latest reports on Iran’s nuclear program at its
quarterly board meeting and announced an agreement with Iran to address the
presence of nuclear material at three undeclared sites.
* The [20]IAEA Director General, the [21]E3, and the [22]European Union
delivered statements to the Agency's board of governors - March 8
* The NPT Safeguards Report [23]noted that the Agency had made a
sufficient verification to close the issue of an unaccounted-for uranium
metal disc - March 5
* The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the IAEA [24]agreed
to work to resolve issues regarding three undeclared sites - March 5
* The Verification and Monitoring Report [25]noted that Iran had shut
down the Karaj centrifuge plant and relocated its operations to a new
facility in Esfahan. Iran also began enriching uranium with a cascade of
IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow. - March 3

Diplomacy surrounding the JCPOA continued after Russia shook up the talks
by demanding an exemption from sanctions imposed in response to its
invasion of Ukraine.
* Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Israel’s Foreign Minister Yair
Lapid [26]spoke to the press at a bilateral meeting in Jerusalem - March 27
* U.S. officials addressed [27]Russia’s role in the future deal as well
as [28]trilateral security discussions between Israel, Egypt, and the UAE -
March 23
* U.K. nationals Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and Anoosheh Ashoori were
[29]released from prison in Iran and repatriated after years of confinement
- March 16
* Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian [30]met again with his
Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. Both [31]promised deeper economic
cooperation and an end to “illegal” U.S. sanctions - March 15

Members of Congress weigh in on nuclear negotiations with Iran and the U.S.
military posture in the Middle East.
* Senators Chuck Grassley (R-IA) and Roger Marshall (R-KS) [32]proposed a
bill that would allow Congress to block Foreign Terrorist Organization
delistings - March 18
* The Senate Armed Services Committee held a [33]hearing on U.S. military
posture in the Middle East and Africa - March 16
* A bipartisan group in the House of Representative [34]wrote the Biden
administration a letter with 16 questions concerning the JCPOA negotiations
- March 10

The U.S. Treasury Department released National Risk Assessments for money
laundering, proliferation financing, and terrorist financing.
* The [35]money laundering assessment connects Iran to ransomware
attacks, sanctions evasion, and wire fraud - March 1
* According to the [36]proliferation finance assessment, Iranian and
North Korean networks pose the greatest risk to the U.S. financial system -
March 1
* The [37]terrorist financing assessment describes the current state of
Iran’s financial support to Lebanese Hizballah - March 1

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2022 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

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