March 29, 2022
Beijing's Problem With the Truth
What comes to mind when you hear the words “lab leak theory”? Most of us would think “COVID-19,” the disease that
has so disrupted our lives for two years now.
Many would then attach a modifier to it like “discredited” or “debunked.” But those who do would be far behind the curve. Other than the fact that it came from China, the origin of COVID-19 remains an open question—even among the scientific community.
At the outset, it is important to sort out exactly what is at issue here. In an article in the Taipei Times, ASC Director Walter Lohman writes <[link removed]> that the debate is not over whether the virus was created in China and purposely released to sow biological chaos. It is not over whether it was engineered at all. It may have been. The question is whether the virus developed and spread naturally from bats in a cave in southern China to humans a thousand miles away in a Wuhan market, or whether it accidentally leaked from research facilities in Wuhan renowned for studying similar viruses.
In Viral: The Search for the Origin of COVID-19, Dr. Alina Chan from the Broad Institute at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and science writer Matt Ridley objectively lay out the cases for both theses. In making the case for natural origins, they reference the possible motivations for those promoting the lab theory. Among this crowd, they count “critics of the Chinese Communist Party… will(ing) to believe any theory that blames the Chinese state.”
The CCP’s tenuous relationship with the truth matters, not just for its impact on global public health — which should now be
obvious to everyone — but across the board.
Take its politics and military.
Last year’s “Chinese Transparency Report <[link removed]>” from The Heritage Foundation
evaluates official Chinese transparency and seeks to fill in the very wide gaps with publicly available data. On politics, there is some extraordinary privately-compiled data out there — like MacroPolo’s “The Committee” and UC San Diego’s “Data Lab: CCP Elite Portal” — that improves visibility into the Chinese decision-making apparatus. But despite all the fine work of independent researchers, no one really knows with any confidence how national security decisions are made in Beijing. All we know for sure is that their government white papers, annual reports, statements of ministries and government work reports are mere shadows representing real policy.
The information China provides regarding the development and budget of the People’s Liberation Army is also woefully insufficient to give a clear
picture. Knee-jerk defenders of Beijing may say, “Well, the US does the same thing.” Actually, no, it doesn’t. Of course, the American military keeps many things secret, but debates over its budget and efficacy are carried out in public. This requires release of an enormous amount of supporting documentation.
These things matter to international peace and security, because China’s military looms so large over the Western Pacific region. Transparency builds confidence. If China’s intentions are benign, there is no need to hide its capabilities. In the absence of transparency, it is only prudent for the rest of the world to prepare for the worst.
In particular, the combination of obscurity around decision making and military development puts Taiwan at great risk. We can make educated guesses about what China may or may not do on Taiwan, and when. But that is all they are, even the most educated among them.
This uncertainty is deeply destabilizing. On COVID-19 and other matters on which the world’s well-being depends, transparency in
China is not improving. And the international community is much worse off for it.
Don't Let Putin's War in Ukraine Damage U.S.-India Ties
Heritage Research Fellow Jeff Smith writes <[link removed]> that
Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has profoundly affected the European security order and plunged the West’s relationship with Russia to lows not seen since the Cold War. It is also having some important second-order effects, including raising some uncomfortable questions in the U.S. about India’s longstanding partnership with Russia. 
Many U.S. observers find New Delhi’s apparent neutrality toward the invasion puzzling—same for its numerous abstentions on votes to condemn Moscow at the United Nations. Isn’t the world’s largest democracy a strategic partner and a democratic counterweight to China? Why is India cozying up to Putin? Will this roil India-U.S. relations?
The truth is, India and the U.S. have never seen eye-to-eye on Russia. When Washington and New Delhi began forging a special partnership in the mid-2000s, each had existing relationships the other found problematic. America was discomfited by India’s close ties with Moscow; India was even more unsettled by America’s patronage of Islamabad. At the time, they agreed not to let these differences prevent them from acting on an undeniable convergence of interests in the Indo-Pacific India gradually came to appreciate that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was deeply troubled and not directed against India. The U.S. understood that, far from being an enthusiastic supporter of Russia’s belligerent actions abroad and repression at home, New Delhi was bound to Moscow by its dependence on the Russian military-industrial complex and a complicated Cold War legacy.
We should not allow Putin’s unfolding misadventure in Ukraine to disrupt this understanding or prevent us from concentrating on the bigger prize, where
India-U.S. cooperation matters most: the Indo-Pacific and the China challenge. 



The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 weakened the bonds
between Moscow and New Delhi, and India began to liberalize its economy and its international relationships. That effort included a budding strategic partnership with the U.S. following the 9/11 terror attacks and a slow diversification away from Russia as India’s exclusive defense supplier.
Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of India’s legacy military hardware is of Russian origin. This includes tanks, fighter aircraft, transport planes, naval platforms, and air defense systems. Unfortunately, there are reasons to believe Moscow is not shy about playing hardball with defense clients it deems to be disloyal, including in the provision of servicing, spare parts, and ammunition. This leaves India with a concerning dependency on Russian goodwill to meet its defense requirements even in the best of times. 
And, for India, this is not the best of times. Its rivalry with China is white hot. In 2020, a series of escalating crises at their disputed border culminated in the first deadly clash at the Line of Actual Control. Today, Chinese and Indian forces remain forward deployed and on high alert at several friction points along the border. 
Complicating matters further, Russia continues to sell or lease to India advanced military platforms—including nuclear submarines and advanced air defense systems—that the U.S. and others are unwilling or unable to offer. Moscow and New Delhi have also jointly developed advanced cruise missiles. Indian defense officials claim these platforms are vital to its ability to confront challenges from the People’s Liberation Army. 
India’s approach to the Ukraine crisis and its aversion to criticizing Moscow can thus be attributed principally to vital defense dependencies, and to historical loyalties to
Russia dating back to the Cold War. Additionally, India has a long history of adopting neutral diplomatic positions toward international conflicts, including past U.S. military interventions.
These realities have been lost in some of the Western press coverage of India’s approach to the Ukraine crisis and in some of the shrill, reflexively defensive conversations unfolding
in the Indian press. Viral clips reveal Indian talk show hosts and commentators berating U.S. guests when pressed on India’s perceived affinity for Russia, twisting themselves in knots to defend Putin’s actions and reciting a litany of historical grievances with U.S. policy. 
In reality, an exceedingly small minority of Indian officials and experts accept Russian propaganda that it is cleansing Ukraine of “Nazis.” A larger proportion,
however, believes the U.S. and NATO hold some responsibility for the crisis by seeking to enlarge the alliance eastward.
Most concerning for New Delhi, the invasion has further exacerbated the divide between Russia and the West while strengthening the emerging China-Russia nexus. Many Indian
commentators have long held out hope that Russia and the U.S. would set aside their legacy differences and band together with India to confront a larger shared threat: China. This fanciful aspiration has persisted despite Russia’s consistent and accelerating embrace of China over the past decade. While some Indian commentators are beginning to lose faith that Russia can be turned against China, none want to see Moscow move further into Beijing’s orbit. 
It is increasingly apparent, however, that in even the best-case scenario for Moscow, Russia will emerge from this misadventure substantially weaker economically, diplomatically, and
militarily; more at odds with the West; and more dependent on China.
The U.S. government seems to recognize that there are pragmatic motivations behind India’s desire to avoid antagonizing Moscow at a time it is locked in a border standoff with the People’s Liberation Army. To date, Washington has proved flexible, avoiding public criticism of India’s hands-off approach to the Ukraine crisis. “We know India has a relationship with Russia that is distinct from the relationship that we have with Russia. Of course, that is okay,” a State Department spokesman explained in late February.
This is the right approach. It would be inadvisable to invest excessive time and energy trying to budge India from an entrenched position on Russia when even a successful
effort is unlikely to produce more than marginal returns. Few believe stronger statements of condemnation from India would materially alter Russia’s calculation in Ukraine. Better to focus on the priority theater—the Indo-Pacific—where convergence is strong and India is consequential, than on the secondary theater where convergence is weak and India’s impact is marginal. In this case, the juice isn’t worth the squeeze.

One hopes India will use what influence it does have with Russia to privately convey the importance of ending the conflict as soon as possible. But rather than publicly condemning India for abstaining at the United Nations or imposing sanctions for its purchase of Russian military hardware or energy, the U.S. government should recognize the complex India-Russia relationship for what it is: a relic of the Cold War, under duress and showing signs of age.
April 7,
2022 @ 10:00 am EDT - The CCP’s 20th Party Congress: What to Expect and the Implications for Washington <[link removed]>
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is gearing up for its most important political event of the decade. Sometime in the second half of 2022, China’s most senior leaders will assemble at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People for the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, in which General Secretary Xi Jinping is expected to stay in office for a precedent-breaking third term. Maneuvering ahead of the event will dominate political life in China throughout 2022, and the outcomes of the congress will determine the country’s trajectory for years to come. 
Join us <[link removed]> virtually for a timely discussion featuring Boston University Professor Joseph Fewsmith, Ph.D., Jamestown Foundation Senior Fellow Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Ph.D., and Heritage Visiting Fellow Michael Cunningham about what to expect at the Party Congress, how it will influence China’s political course, and what it will mean for policymakers in Washington and other
capitals as they grapple with the China challenge.

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