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Servicemen from the U.S. and Ukrainian Armies line up prior to a military parade celebrating Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union on August 24, 2017 in Kyiv, Ukraine. (Pierre Crom/Getty Images)

President Biden threw into question the role of strategic deterrence this week when he remarked that U.S. sanctions were never meant to deter Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine—despite the administration’s repeated assurances to the contrary in the preceding weeks. In The Wall Street Journal, Hudson senior fellow and chief architect of the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy Nadia Schadlow [[link removed]] outlines why the White House's mishandling of deterrence has failed to alter Putin's calculations of risk and reward in Ukraine.

See key takeaways below, and join Dr. Schadlow and Hudson Distinguished Fellow and former Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo [[link removed]] on Monday for a discussion on what to expect from the Biden administration’s forthcoming National Security Strategy.

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Key Takeaways

1. America's Military Strength Hinges on Deterrence

Deterrence involves two factors: capability and will. Capability means having the military strength to deliver intolerable damage to an adversary. Will is the determination to use that strength and deliver that damage.

The U.S. spends hundreds of billions of dollars a year to strengthen its military capabilities, and they are formidable. Resolve costs nothing, but it is priceless when it comes to deterring aggression. By signaling that the U.S. had no intention of using its capabilities, the Biden administration seriously weakened their deterrent value.

2. Putin Uses Strategic Ambiguity—Biden Should, Too

Why share internal policy discussions and military deliberations with an adversary? A plausible explanation is that the White House has decided to give priority to the U.S. domestic audience, as opposed to signaling to Russia. But by openly taking options off the table, not only does the administration undercut its operational flexibility, it gives the enemy additional clarity. There is value in ambiguity—especially when Russia is a master at it.

Mr. Putin and his military are calculating American will based on what they see and hear. This is likely why they are acting as though there is little threat of resistance from any power more potent than the Ukrainian military. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the U.S. should deploy its troops to Ukraine or establish a no-fly zone by contesting Russian aircraft. The current bipartisan consensus is that such actions aren’t in the American interest. But there is no reason to broadcast our reservations and reveal the weakness of our will.

3. Russia Leverages Fear to Pursue Its Strategic Objectives

The Russians, with their vivid history of resisting better-equipped armies from imperial Sweden, France and Germany, understand the importance of will. It is a key component of their military doctrine and is expressed in their concept of “escalate to de-escalate.” That means that the Russian military has stated its willingness to increase the intensity of violence to end a war on favorable terms. Few observers doubt either Mr. Putin’s ability or willingness to do so. ...Restoring the perception of American will to deter conflict may, ironically, require an even more forceful manifestation of that will on the battlefield. In a world of diminished deterrence, the desire for peace could make conflict more certain.

Quotes may be edited for clarity and length.

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Turn Up the Economic Heat on Putin [[link removed]]

Moderate sanctions have not induced moderation from Putin on the battlefield, writes Hudson's Marshall Billingslea [[link removed]] and former ambassador Nathan Sales in The Hill. The Biden administration needs to unleash the full potential of American economic might with financial sanctions targeting Russia's banking system and key industries.

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Sanctions on Russia Pit the West Against the Rest of the World [[link removed]]

The West may be united in its desire to punish Putin for the invasion of Ukraine, but the rest of the world isn’t necessarily on board, writes Hudson's Walter Russell Mead [[link removed]] in The Wall Street Journal. Policymakers in countries such as India, Vietnam, Brazil, and South Africa worry that they will bear the brunt of the war's economic consequences in ways that won't be felt by the West.

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Virtual Event | The Future of US Energy Production: A Conversation with Sen. Bill Cassidy [[link removed]]

Oil and gas shortages are contributing to global inflation, while Russia’s war on Ukraine has caused energy prices to spike even higher. Hudson's Thomas Duesterberg [[link removed]] hosted U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, a prominent voice on the Senate’s Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, for a discussion on how the U.S. energy sector can address these challenges.

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