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*Read and share online: <[link removed]>*

Dear Free Software
Supporter,

A campaign recently launched in the United Kingdom demonizes
encryption as something only a criminal would so much as *want* to
use, and the rationale behind the "Eliminating Abusive and Rampant
Neglect of Interactive Technologies" (EARN-IT) Act currently on the
floor of the US Senate is much the same. Everywhere we turn, we find
senators and talking heads claiming that governments around the world
need to hold "Big Tech accountable," and they say one important step
of that is banning end-to-end encryption. Criminals, they say,
shouldn't be given a way to secure their communications from scrutiny.
It's no surprise to hear governments pointing to crime as a way to
justify encroachments on individual freedom -- or, for that matter, to
use loaded words like "hide." Are you "hiding" when you lock the door
of your home every day, just because the government is not permitted
to enter it without a warrant? Is it "hiding" to seal the envelope of
the card you're sending your Valentine? Even if you accept that this
*is* hiding, end-to-end encryption is not only, or even primarily, for
hiding from [bulk government surveillance][1].

[1]: [link removed]

Anytime lawmakers begin to contemplate the so-called "rampant" misuse
of end-to-end encryption, they would do well to reflect on the
positive ways it's being used on a daily basis. A lot of time is
(rightly) devoted to how it has protected whistleblowers like [Edward
Snowden][2], but end-to-end encryption has vital use cases that are
much closer to home. Free, encrypted messaging, for example, helps
protect queer youth from intolerant violence (at home and abroad, as
in [Ghana][3]). At the same time, in a world where abusers can stalk
their victims solely by hiding an [AirTag][4] in their bag, end-to-end
encryption plays a direct role in helping victims out of these
relationships by enabling them to contact friends for help. There are
as many use cases for end-to-end encryption as there are people using
it. To say otherwise shows not only a paucity of imagination, but is
something that can only be spoken from a position of power and
privilege.

[2]: [link removed]
[3]: [link removed]
[4]: [link removed]

Our campaigns, and the history of the Free Software Foundation (FSF),
show that we don't just want to hold "Big Tech accountable." Looking
past that somewhat misleading term, we believe that the corporations
that comprise "Big Tech," like Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon, among
others, need to be radically remade, with respect for user freedom at
their foundations. And while we appreciate companies like Apple and
Meta are making a lot of commercials about end-to-end encryption, we
need to remember that these companies, in the bigger picture, are no
friend to user freedom. It's part of our role as activists to help
those companies see that their support of technologies like end-to-end
encryption should be expanded to support other important aspects of
software and user freedom.

With efforts like the EARN-IT Act, Congress is only going after "Big
Tech" in a highly specific sense: namely, by putting the privacy of
all computer users at serious risk. At the same time, any legal
measure regulating encryption is going to impact the implementation of
encryption in free software, and its use by free software users. Once
a backdoor is made, we don't get to specify how it's used, or by whom.
It is, by definition, a security risk.

In an "EARN-IT" world, simply *using* encryption can be used as a
strike against you in a court of law. As user freedom activists, one
response of ours should be to [normalize encryption][5] as much as
possible. Whistleblowers are important for multiple different kinds of
freedom, including user freedom, and we need to make sure the people
whistleblowing on General Public License (GPL) violations, Digital
Restrictions Management (DRM) rootkits, or any number of tech
injustices don't stand out from the crowd for their use of encryption.
The fact that people take seriously the idea that only criminals would
use encryption should give us pause: it means we've failed in our goal
to bring privacy to the majority of users, and need to do more.

[5]: [link removed]

That first step to doing more? Stopping EARN-IT in its tracks. The FSF
urges all of its supporters to contact their local congresspeople and
advise them to vote against the EARN-IT Act. No matter where you are
in the world, please stand firm in campaigning for the right for
whistleblowers and everyday people alike to secure their
communications from bulk surveillance. After all, today's everyday
person may need to become tomorrow's whistleblower.

### Take action!
*If you're not in the US, let us know your country by [updating your
profile][6] so we can send you more relevant info. In the meantime,
please also help us spread the word to your contacts in the US.*

[6]: [link removed]

Nervous? Try using the following script:

*Hello,*

*I live in CITY/STATE. I am calling to urge you to vote against the
EARN-IT Act. End-to-end encryption is vital to a free digital society,
and protects everyone's privacy, including some of society's most
vulnerable people. There are other ways of catching criminals that
won't impact the privacy and personal freedom of all American
citizens. Thank you for your time.*

**Don't know who to call?**

* To call your congressperson directly, dial (202) 224-3121 and the
switchboard will connect you.

* Alternatively, you can find contact information for both your local
senator and House representative online in the [Senate][7] and
[House][8] directories.

[7]:[link removed]
[8]:[link removed]

In solidarity,

Greg Farough
Campaigns Manager

--
* Follow us on Mastodon at <[link removed]>, GNU social at
<[link removed]>, PeerTube at <[link removed]>, and on Twitter at @fsf.
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Sent from the Free Software Foundation,

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United States


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