As of last month, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) had built up its official reserves to $630 billion, which were double Russia’s goods imports and more than a third of Russia’s GDP last year. However, sanctions severely limiting the CBR’s ability to transact in major foreign currencies and cutting off Russian banks from SWIFT and certain transactions have effectively rendered most of the CBR’s reserves useless by prohibiting transactions in those currencies.

SOURCE: "Sanctions in Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine" by CSIS's Gerard DiPippo and Mathew Reynolds.

CSIS analysis of data on conflict termination since 1946 identified that most conflict since the end of the Second World War tends to involve counterinsurgency campaigns and proxy wars, making large-scale invasions—like what is currently happening in Ukraine—rare events. When these conflicts do occur, the average number of battlefield deaths is 25,000 while the civilian death toll is much higher, and the aftermath tends to create complex humanitarian emergencies.

SOURCE: "How Does It End? What Past Wars Tell Us about How to Save Ukraine" by Benjamin Jenson.

In 2021, China’s trade ties with Russia and Ukraine are valued at $147 billion and $19 billion, respectively. Some portion of this commerce will certainly be impacted by both the Russia-Ukraine conflict itself as well as subsequent sanctions, which will result in Chinese companies in these sectors taking a loss.

SOURCE: "China’s Economy and Ukraine: All Downside Risks" by CSIS's Scott Kennedy.

For many moderate-income countries in the MENA region, Russia’s invasion threatens food security. Egypt is the world’s largest wheat importer, relying heavily on both Russia and Ukraine. About 30 percent of Egypt’s population lives in poverty, and subsidized bread baked with imported wheat is a vital part of the social safety net.

SOURCE: "Ukraine, the Middle East, and Hedging" by CSIS's Jon Alterman.