from The Ripon Forum

February 2022

https://riponsociety.org/article/preventing-the-next-ukraine/

 

Preventing the Next Ukraine 

 

by MICHAEL A. HUNZEKER

 

A war in Ukraine seems more likely with each passing day. Far from a one-off episode, the storm brewing over Eastern Europe serves as yet another stark reminder that our rivals believe they can act like it is the 19^th century all over again. 

 

If anything, the unfolding crisis in Ukraine should serve as wake-up call that we are running out of time to deter aggression against an even more vulnerable partner: Taiwan. Washington should act with urgency.

 

The threat is real. The Chinese Communist Party has never equivocated about the fact that it sees Taiwan as a sacred issue over which it seeks to assert political control. Nor should we downplay the risk of war by convincing ourselves that Beijing prefers to win without fighting. No rational actor prefers otherwise. In any case, this stereotype about Chinese strategic culture is dangerously misguided.

 

China has a long and distinguished history of using violence as a foreign policy tool. Moreover, Chinese rhetoric, laws, and actions make clear that when it comes to Taiwan, force is very much still on the table. Most ominous of all, the decision to go to war increasingly rests solely in the hands of a single “paramount leader” who has proven that he is perfectly willing to use brute force at home and abroad. 

 

The unfolding crisis in Ukraine should serve as wake-up call that we are running out of time to deter aggression against an even more vulnerable partner: Taiwan. 

 

Worse yet, time is not on our side. The current and former officials in the region with whom I have spoken agree that the next six years are especially perilous. Their reasoning is straightforward: Xi Jinping is pursuing an unprecedented third term, justified in large part by a promise to solve the “Taiwan problem.” Even if Xi prefers to use diplomatic and economic pressure to bring Taipei under Beijing’s control, he may worry that his window of opportunity is closing. As a result, Xi could feel compelled to use force sooner rather than later.

 

For example, far from gravitating toward China, evolving Taiwanese identity and ham-fisted Chinese bellicosity are pushing the island further away. Xi also faces a number of looming domestic challenges.  Meanwhile, despite pouring billions into military modernization, the prospects for a swift Chinese victory could actually grow dimmer with time. Support for the island is solidifying among American voters and elites alike. The U.S. Department of Defense considers China its pacing threat. Successive presidential administrations have sought to improve Taiwan’s defenses by authorizing billions in arms sales ($32 billion since 2009 to be exact). And the Biden Administration is cajoling regional allies to take a clearer stance on the need for cross-Strait stability.

 

Fearing Taiwan’s inexorable drift could therefore lead Xi to “roll the dice” on war. Such a gamble becomes especially tempting to the degree that Xi thinks he can seize the island before the United States can intervene.

 

Deterring an attack on Taiwan therefore requires convincing Xi that a rapid victory is unlikely, which means preparing Taiwan to hold out for as long as possible.

 

Herein lies the problem. Taiwan’s military is not ready to absorb a first strike and defend the island long enough for outside forces to intercede in decisive numbers. Ironically, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense is one of the biggest impediments. Security experts and defense officials have long called on the ministry to stop wasting its finite defense budget on small numbers of outdated, but expensive, manned fighter jets, large surface ships, and main battle tanks. The problem with these “prestige” platforms is that Taiwan cannot possibly afford enough of them to go toe-to-toe with the Chinese military for very long. The recommendation is to instead buy large numbers of cheap, mobile, and lethal capabilities — things like drones, coastal defense missiles, air defenses, tiny missile boats, and naval mines — in order to wage a prolonged campaign of denial.

 

Deterring an attack on Taiwan requires convincing Xi that a rapid victory is unlikely, which means preparing Taiwan to hold out for as long as possible.

 

Cross-Cross-Strait deterrence will remain on a fragile foundation until Taiwan’s military embraces and implements these changes. Unfortunately, powerful elements within the Ministry of National Defense continue to resist these urgently needed, and long overdue, reforms.

 

If Taiwan is unwilling to do everything it can to provide for its own defense, should the United States consider abandoning it entirely?

Setting aside the moral problems with leaving a thriving liberal democracy with which the United States has a deep and enduring relationship to its fate, abandonment is a cure that will almost certainly prove worse than the disease.

 

After all, getting the Ministry of National Defense to embrace change is far from an insurmountable problem. Taiwan’s military is certainly not the first in history to resist change. Washington also has an important ally in President Tsai Ing-wen. Her administration takes the invasion threat seriously, has overseen a dramatic increase in defense spending, and is pushing for other important defense reforms. The trick is to find ways to help President Tsai impose change on her otherwise reluctant senior officers. Abandoning Taiwan instead of finding better ways to work with and through President Tsai is akin to committing suicide for fear of death.

 

Nor should Washington delude itself into thinking it can abandon Taiwan “on the cheap.” Assuming it is even possible (let alone morally defensible) to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in the pursuit of a “grand bargain” with China, nothing can stop Beijing from turning around and asking for more down the road. Nor will America’s East Asian allies stand idly by as Washington negotiates a long-term partner away. Japan, in particular, increasingly sees Taiwan’s security as intertwined with its own.

 

Abandoning Taiwan in the midst of a crisis could prove even more costly. My ongoing research suggests that failing to defend Taiwan from attack will come as a profound shock in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo. No matter how Washington tries to justify such a move, the cost in terms of American interests in East Asia will be considerable. Allies will question American credibility and seek alternative ways to provide for their own security. Nuclear proliferation is therefore likely. Nor should we expect China to stop at Taiwan. Even if winning without a fight does not embolden Beijing, Taiwan’s loss will almost certainly trigger a spiraling security situation between China and its neighbors.

 

Herein lies the problem. Taiwan’s military is not ready to absorb a first strike and defend the island long enough for outside forces to intercede in decisive numbers.

 

Working with the Tsai Administration to shore up cross-Strait deterrence is therefore an unquestionably better way forward. But the stakes and timelines are such that Washington should be ready to apply more pressure than it is accustomed to using on allies and partners.

 

In particular, Washington should insist on conditional arms sales. Congress and the Biden Administration should work together to pass and enact any of the three bills recently introduced by Senator James Risch (R-ID), Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO), and Congressman Mike Gallagher (WI-8).  All three bills condition future arms sales upon Taiwan’s willingness to undertake the painful, but overdue, changes necessary to make the island more defensible.

 

Congressional leaders and the Biden Administration should also be careful to ensure that our rhetoric does not outpace our real military capability. Although there are compelling reasons to consider embracing strategic clarity on Taiwan, Washington should avoid moving in this direction until it believes Taiwan can hold out against a worst-case scenario invasion. Deterrence suffers to the degree that symbolic gestures paint Beijing into a corner that American and Taiwanese military power is not ready to back up.

 

Finally, Washington should find ways to prioritize the fulfillment of existing foreign military sales contracts. Currently, when Washington authorizes multiple arms sales, companies like Boeing and Lockheed Martin get to decide which country’s weapons to build first. Profit and efficiency motives — not national interests or strategic priorities — therefore mean Taiwan might get its weapons after the UAE or Saudi Arabia.  This way of doing business is no longer justifiable given the speed at which cross-Strait tensions are rising.

 

These are controversial recommendations. Acting upon them will require a willingness to bear significant political and diplomatic costs. But as the unfolding tragedy in Ukraine suggests, the price tag for failing to act could prove much higher.

 

  Michael A. Hunzeker (@MichaelHunzeker) is an assistant professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, where he is also associate director of the Center for Security Policy Studies. He served in the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006.

 

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The Ripon Forum is published six times a year by The Ripon Society, a public policy organization that was founded in 1962 and takes its name from the town where the Republican Party was born in 1854 – Ripon, Wisconsin. One of the main goals of The Ripon Society is to promote the ideas and principles that have made America great and contributed to the GOP’s success. These ideas include keeping our nation secure, keeping taxes low and having a federal government that is smaller, smarter and more accountable to the people.