Following is the January 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS...


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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In January 2022

 

Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In January 2022 by clicking here
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In January 2022

By Gregory Waters

 

Following is the January 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2021 can be foundhere
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and a full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also beexplored here
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, andhere
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ISIS militants carried out at least 18 confirmed attacks in January, killing
at least 16 pro-Assad regime fighters and three civilians, while wounding at
least 28 others in the Homs, Deir Ez Zor, Raqqa, and Hama governorates. ISIS
activity in January was the highest since September due to an uptick in attacks
in the countryside and urban centers of Deir Ez Zor. This spike was concurrent
with a large surge in attacks across northeast Syria in January as well. ISIS
carried out three high quality* attacks in central Syria and exhibited a
significantly more aggressive posture than in recent months. Attacks continued
to be very limited, however, in Hama, Raqqa, and Homs.

 

There were only five confirmed IED or mine attacks in the Badia in January,
and one attack via unknown means. Two-thirds of the attacks were conducted
using small arms, a significant increase in aggressiveness compared to ISIS’s
preferred attack methods in the second half of 2021. Nearly all of these small
arms attacks occurred in Deir Ez Zor and Raqqa, while passive mines were used
in the only two attacks in Hama. Of the small arms attacks, at least two
involved ambushes in the urban belt along the Euphrates river and one saw ISIS
fighters ambush a small regime military convoy on a highway in southeast Homs.

ISIS activity was the highest in a year in Deir Ez Zor (11) and rose slightly
in Homs (3), after both governorates saw a drop in attacks in December 2021.
Activity in Hama (2) and Raqqa (2) remained very low while the southern Aleppo
countryside remained quiet for the third month in a row.

Homs

 

There were three attacks in east Homs this month, the second fewest since
March 2020. Two of the attacks involved aggressive small arms raids on regime
forces. On January 2, ISIS militants ambushed a small military convoy in
southeast Homs, destroying a bus and killing six soldiers and wounding 20 more.
The convoy consisted of only four vehicles, a rarity since last year. The
larger convoys the regime adopted in early 2021 have all but ended ISIS’s
attacks on major highways. This attack thus suggests that cells are still
monitoring the roads in the hope of finding easier targets. While initial
reports indicated the use of “rockets”, the attack consisted only of ISIS
fighters firing on the bus with small arms.

 

On January 19, a mine south of Tiyas killed one civilian and wounded another.
This area, which marks the border of the remote Badia and the string of
villages extending east from Homs city, has seen only rare attacks over the
past year and half. However, recent reports from local security forces suggest
that one or more ISIS cells long-positioned here are now trying to infiltrate
further west, likely attempting to link up with sympathetic locals in order to
create a foothold on the edge of Homs city. This mine attack may indicate that
this cell, or cells, are now actively mining the area as part of the strategy.

 

Lastly, on January 27 ISIS militants attempted a night-time raid on a Liwa
al-Quds position near al-Kadir, on the Homs-Raqqa border north of the Kawm
Oasis. Regime forces seized Kawm and the surrounding countryside in the spring
of 2021, and attacks in this area have been extremely rare in the second half
of last year. This attack may have been a one-off event, or an indication that
cells are attempting to re-establish themselves along this important transit
route.

Map of ISIS attacks in Homs in January 2022 (highlighted dots) alongside all
other attacks in 2021 and 2022.

 

Deir Ez Zor

 

While ISIS activity in Deir Ez Zor in the last months of 2021 was focused in
the northwest of the province, January saw cells engage regularly with regime
forces farther south along the Mayadeen countryside. This region was highly
active in 2020 and was one of the security priorities for the regime and Iran
in early 2021. The return of semi-consistent ISIS activity here suggests that
cells from Iraq or other parts of the Badia have moved in recently, or that the
cells operating here in 2020 and early 2021 had simply gone to ground until now.

 

The most significant attack occurred on January 12, when ISIS fighters used
the cover of heavy fog to infiltrate the town of Kashmah, just south of
Mayadeen, attacking two regime checkpoints and raiding a small warehouse. The
militants killed four security forces and stole a truck, food and medical
supplies. Early the next morning, an ISIS cell ambushed a pro-regime National
Defense Forces (NDF) vehicle on the road south of the town, destroying it with
a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), killing three regime fighters and wounding
six others. Two weeks later, on January 28, ISIS militants attacked a regime
checkpoint in the town of Zabari, seven miles north of Mayadeen. The attack
left one solider dead and one wounded.

 

These three attacks marked the first time ISIS carried out small arms attacks
in the urban belt stretching from Boukamal to Deir Ez Zor city since 2020. The
attacks came just a month afterreports
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of possible ISIS infiltration into the ranks of local NDF forces via the
reconciliation process that began in November 2021.

 

Low-level clashes continued in the Mayadeen countryside through most of
January, with skirmishes reported on January 14 and two attacks on patrols in
the desert occurring between January 21 and January 23. Farther west, ISIS
cells operating out of the Faydat bin Muwaynah region—a long-time ISIS
stronghold in the desert—destroyed a Syrian army vehicle with an IED on January
20 and repeatedly skirmished with Syrian Arab Army (SAA) forces between January
21 and 23. In Deir Ez Zor’s northwest, ISIS cells destroyed an army water truck
with a mine on the southwest edge of Jabal Bishri on January 17 and clashed
with Iranian-backed forces west of Shoula on January 22.

Map of ISIS attacks in Deir Ez Zor in January 2022 (highlighted dots)
alongside all other attacks in 2021 and 2022.

 

Hama, Southern Raqqa, and Southeast Aleppo

 

There were no attacks in Homs, Raqqa, and Aleppo in November 2021, the first
time this has occurred since August 2019. However, limited ISIS activity
returned to both Hama and southern Raqqa in December 2021 and January 2022.

 

Unlike December’s attacks that largely targeted civilians, the two attacks in
Raqqa in January both targeted regime security forces. On January 5, ISIS
militants fired on a vehicle carrying NDF fighters near Resafa, wounding some
of them. On January 23, militants clashed with security forces near gas fields
south of Resafa. This second attack was then exaggerated by pro-opposition
media outlets, including SOHR, which claimed either that ISIS had captured
Resafa or that the regime had withdrawn from several key areas around Resafa.
This author spoke with two contacts in different regime units who were in
contact with soldiers deployed in Resafa, all of whom denied these rumors.

 

The two attacks in eastern Hama, both using mines, hit civilians, as has
become custom. The first mine, on January 3, killed a 17-year-old shepherd near
Sheikh Hilal. The second mine, on January 13, wounded a child outside his
village near Uqayribat. These mines, which were likely laid in recent months,
are intended to limit civilian travel in the countryside in order to better
protect ISIS cells that may be hiding there. However, it is still unclear if
there are currently active ISIS cells in east Hama.

 

Regime Operations

 

There continue to be no major anti-ISIS operations in central Syria. Various
pro-regime forces have continued general patrols, de-mining operations, and
training in eastern Hama while other forces, including from the Russian Wagner
Private Military Contractor, continue patrols north of Palmyra. The spate of
ISIS attacks around Mayadeen appear to have triggered increased sweeping
operations in the Mayadeen countryside, although it remains to be seen whether
this turns into a major operation.

 

Looking Ahead

 

While January’s attacks were still a far cry from the quantity and quality of
ISIS activity witnessed in the second half of 2020, they do hint at some
potentially worrying changes in central Syria. The three attacks within the
heavily urbanized Euphrates River belt in Deir Ez Zor follow a slow return of
activity to Deir Ez Zor after a sharp drop off in the first half of 2021. The
fact that ISIS cells were confident enough and able to infiltrate the towns
despite the increased number of pro-regime security forces in the governorate
and general decline in ISIS operational freedom may indicate that new cells
have entered the governorate or that existing cells have improved their
intelligence networks. Alternatively, these attacks may have been borne out of
desperation from cells that have been unable to resupply for months now due to
a lack of civilian trade in the Badia and their inability to raid regime
positions like they could in 2020. If this is the case, we may see cells acting
more boldly simply out of necessity.

 

Furthermore, the single mine attack south of Tiyas in Homs may portend a
gradual increase in activity from the cell(s) that have long been based in this
area but until now have remained quiet. Local Syrian intelligence is convinced
this cell or cells is now attempting to expand westward towards the Mheen
countryside. It may be that the ISIS fighters here have begun laying new mine
fields to protect their flanks. This is a common tactic the group has used
elsewhere in the Badia. Assuming this Syrian intelligence assessment is true,
the cell or cells are likely looking for ways to establish a gateway to attack
the numerous powerplants and refineries southeast of Homs city.

 

If the increase in ISIS activity this month is indeed indicative of a more
long-term planned increase in attacks, then this strategy will no doubt benefit
from January’s prison break in Hasakah. While the escaped prisoners, which
likely number in the hundreds, will likely wait in safehouses across the
northeast until the ramped-up security pressure dies down, there is little
doubt that they intend to eventually disperse between the northeast, the Badia,
and Iraq. This potential influx of fighters, and with them needed supplies,
would empower ISIS cells in central Syria to step up attacks against regime
targets, particularly its oil and gas infrastructure.

Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted dots) in January 2022. This map
does not include one attack in Deir Ez Zor which did not have a specific
location attributed to it. To view an interactive version of this map, please
clickhere
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.

 

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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.

 

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