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January 31, 2022

This month's newsletter features a policy brief on the U.N. Security
Council's 2231 List. When Security Council resolution 2231 was adopted in
2015, it lifted several sanctions on Iran but also extended restrictions on
a list of individuals and entities tied to military aspects of Iran’s
nuclear activities. Yet over the course of seven years the 2231 List has
fallen out of date. Our brief highlights where the 2231 List has become
outdated and the risks associated with a failure to keep it current.

The newsletter also features profiles of entities that appear on the 2231
List but have undergone changes since their designations. Documents from
the Iran Watch library include statements from Iran and European countries
relating to a recent Iranian space launch and missile tests, U.S. sanctions
enforcement actions including export violation prosecutions and maritime
interdictions, and readouts from high-level Iranian meetings with Russia,
China and South Korea, as well as news about a Russian backchannel in
nuclear negotiations with Iran, Iran-linked drone attacks, and a sanctions
ruling at the European Court of Justice.

[2]View the newsletter in your browser and [3]subscribe to receive it in
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PUBLICATIONS

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Image source: Wikimedia Commons

Policy Brief | [5]Stuck in the Past: The U.N.'s 2231 List

Almost seven years ago, the United Nations Security Council adopted
resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), the international accord subjecting Iran to restrictions on its
nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The resolution also
includes a list of 84 entities sanctioned for supporting Iran’s
proliferation activities. U.N. member states must freeze those entities'
assets and prohibit assistance to them until October 2023. Yet the total
number of entries on the list, as well as the details of the entries
themselves, has remained virtually unchanged since its inception in 2015.
Developments during this period of stasis have rendered much of the 2231
List out of date.

This policy brief analyzes the 2231 List’s current shortcomings, describes
the barriers to updating the list at the United Nations, and gives
recommendations for how individual member states can overcome these
barriers using their own sanctions programs.

[6]READ THE POLICY BRIEF

[7]

Image source: Shutterstock

Report Update | [8]Iran’s Nuclear Timetable: The Weapon Potential

Iran’s nuclear program has reached the point at which, within several
months, Iran could enrich enough uranium for five fission weapons. For that
uranium to pose a nuclear weapon threat, however, it would have to be
processed further, and the other components of a successful weapon would
have to be ready to receive the processed uranium. These additional steps,
together with the several months for enrichment, mean that Iran cannot yet
make a dash to a small nuclear arsenal within a practical length of time.

Iran's ability to enrich uranium quickly has improved alongside its
progress in the testing and deployment of more powerful centrifuge models.
Iran’s progress in operating advanced centrifuges will also increase the
risk of secret sites, allowing such sites to be smaller and easier to hide.
Perfecting advanced centrifuges is a vital step in the long nuclear game
Iran has been playing for decades.

[9]READ THE UPDATED REPORT

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

Several entries for the individuals and entities that appear on the U.N.
Security Council’s 2231 List are out of date. Iran Watch profiles for the
following U.N.-sanctioned entities describe their latest activities and
include up-to-date identifying information.

[10]Qods Aviation Industries (Light Aircraft Design and Manufacturing
Industries)

An Iranian company that designs and manufactures unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs); a subsidiary of the Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO), a
state-owned enterprise subordinate to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and
Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); according to the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, has been operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC).

[11]LEARN MORE

[12]Pouya Air (Yas Air)

An Iranian cargo airline that has been owned by Pars Aviation Services
Company (PASC), which the U.N. Security Council has identified as an entity
affiliated with the IRGC; according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury,
has transported illicit cargo to Iranian proxies in the Levant on behalf of
the IRGC Quds Force (IRGC-QF).

[13]LEARN MORE

[14]Mohammad Eslami

Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and a member of
Iran's cabinet; involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities,
according to the European Union. Has served as head of the Defence
Industries Training and Research Institute, managing director of Iran
Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA), deputy director of Aerospace
Industries Organization (AIO), and deputy for engineering and development
plans at Defense Industries Organization (DIO).

[15]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (left) and President Vladimir Putin
in a 2015 meeting with Iranian officials in Moscow. Image source: Wikimedia
Commons/President of the Russian Federation Press Service

[17]Russia Proposed Interim Nuclear Deal To Iran With U.S. Knowledge,
Sources Say | NBC News

January 22, 2022: Russia presented Iran with a draft interim nuclear
agreement as part of ongoing negotiations to restore the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) but was initially rebuffed, according
to two U.S. officials. Under the terms of the proposed agreement, if Iran
stopped enriching uranium to 60% purity and disposed of its current
stockpile, it would be allowed to access billions of dollars in oil revenue
currently frozen in offshore accounts. The draft deal would also restrict
Iran's 20% enriched uranium program and its use of advanced centrifuges for
six months, with the possibility of extension and greater sanctions relief
as time went on. The United States was aware of the proposal. Iran's
mission to the United Nations said on January 21 that Iran does not want an
interim deal.

[18]Coalition Says 2 Armed Drones Shot Down At Baghdad Airport | Associated
Press

January 3, 2022: Coalition forces stationed in Iraq shot down two
explosive-laden drones on January 3rd. According to an Iraqi security
official, the drones had targeted a base at the Baghdad airport that hosts
U.S. military advisers. A coalition official described the drones as
fixed-wing, "suicide drones." The drones were decorated with the messages
"Soleimani’s revenge" and "revenge operations for our leaders" and were
launched on the two-year anniversary of a U.S. drone strike that killed
IRGC Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani and a senior Iraqi militia
leader at the Baghdad airport.

[19]EU Firms Can Scrap Iran Deals If U.S. Sanctions Costs Too High, EU Top
Court Says | Reuters

December 21, 2021: On December 21, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
ruled that EU-based firms can terminate contracts with Iranian companies if
adhering to the contract would cause "disproportionate economic loss" due
to U.S. sanctions. The existence of a "blocking statute," which prohibits
EU companies from complying with U.S. sanctions on Iran that were
re-imposed when the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, had previously cast legal doubt on such
terminations. The lawsuit at issue involved a terminated contract between
Deutsche Telekom and Bank Melli, a U.S.-sanctioned Iranian bank. Deutsche
Telekom argued that the contract could harm its business, of which about
half comes from its operations in the United States. The ECJ remanded the
case to a court in Hamburg to determine whether such a loss will occur if
the contract is upheld.

FROM THE LIBRARY

Iran launched ballistic missiles during military exercises and
[20]unsuccessfully attempted to place satellites in orbit using a space
launch vehicle (SLV), earning criticism from France and the United Kingdom.
* Brigadier General Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC Aerospace
Force, [21]said Iran had successfully [22]ground-tested a solid-fuel SLV
engine - January 13
* France [23]condemned Iran’s SLV launch and said it violated ballistic
missile provisions in U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 - December 31,
2021
* The United Kingdom [24]condemned Iran's launch of ballistic missiles
during [25]military exercises in the Persian Gulf - December 24, 2021

The United States enforced U.S. and U.N. sanctions on Iran through multiple
maritime interdictions in the Arabian Sea and legal actions at home.
* A British national [26]pleaded guilty in U.S. court to attempting to
procure U.S.-origin microwave systems with military applications for Iran -
January 27
* U.S. Navy vessels [27]interdicted a fishing vessel carrying 40 tons of
fertilizer usable in explosives from Iran to Yemen - January 23
* The Department of Justice [28]charged a dual U.S.-Iranian national for
allegedly acquiring software and computer systems on behalf of the Central
Bank of Iran - January 14
* U.S. Cyber Command publicly [29]linked the MuddyWater hacking group to
Iran for the first time and published some of their signature intrusion
methods - January 12
* The U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet [30]seized 1,400 assault rifles and 226,000
rounds of ammunition from a fishing vessel that [31]originated in Iran and
was likely en route to Yemen - December 22

Iranian officials traveled to China, South Korea, and Russia to discuss
economic cooperation and nuclear talks.
* Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited Moscow, [32]meeting with
Russian President Vladimir Putin and [33]addressing the Russian State Duma
- January 19 and 20
* Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian [34]visited Beijing
and [35]met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi - January 14 and 17
* A senior South Korean diplomat [36]met with Iran's deputy foreign
minister in Vienna to discuss Iranian assets frozen in South Korea -
January 7

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2022 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

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