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December 17, 2021

This month's newsletter features a table containing information about
Iran’s centrifuges, as well as an update to a report estimating Iran’s
ability to make a dash to produce fuel for a small nuclear arsenal. The
centrifuge table sets out the capacity and primary materials of each of
Iran’s currently-deployed centrifuge models as well as the number of each
model installed and/or producing enriched uranium, based on the latest
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports.

The newsletter also features profiles of entities involved in procurement
for Iran's military drone program that were sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury
Department in October. Documents from the Iran Watch library include
statements by the parties negotiating a return to the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna and participating in the U.N. Security
Council meeting on resolution 2231, as well as news about Iranian advances
in uranium enrichment and IAEA monitoring of a centrifuge plant at Karaj.

[2]View the newsletter in your browser and [3]subscribe to receive it in
your inbox.

PUBLICATIONS

[4]

Image source: Tasnim News

Table | [5]Iran’s Centrifuges: Models and Status

Iran possesses thousands of gas centrifuges that are the mainstay of its
nuclear program. Gas centrifuges spin uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) to
separate uranium isotopes suitable for nuclear fuel, a process known as
uranium enrichment. The number and capacity of these machines determine
Iran’s "breakout" time: how long it would take Iran—if it decided to do
so—to produce the fuel for a small nuclear arsenal. The machines are also
key to Iran's ability to "sneakout" by producing nuclear weapon fuel at
secret sites.

This new table sets out the capacity and primary materials of each of
Iran’s currently-deployed centrifuge models, as well as the number of each
model known from publicly-available IAEA reports to be installed and/or
producing enriched uranium at Iran’s three declared enrichment sites: the
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at
Natanz and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). It will be updated
periodically as new IAEA reports are released.

[6]SEE THE TABLE

For a detailed analysis of each centrifuge model, read our [7]November
report on the implications of Iran's advanced centrifuges.

[8]

Image source: Shutterstock

Report Update | [9]Iran’s Nuclear Timetable: The Weapon Potential

Although Iran's enriched uranium stockpile contains sufficient uranium to
fuel five nuclear warheads, with further enrichment, Iran's known capacity
does not pose an imminent nuclear weapon threat. With its known capacity,
Iran cannot make a sudden dash to a nuclear arsenal within a practical
length of time. Instead, the main nuclear weapon risk comes from secret
sites. That risk will increase as Iran develops more powerful centrifuges,
allowing sites to be smaller and easier to hide. Perfecting such
centrifuges is a vital step in the long nuclear game Iran has been playing
for decades.

This update relies on data from the latest public report by the IAEA.
Because Iran has reduced its cooperation with the Agency, the IAEA is no
longer able to verify Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium. The Agency’s
reports are only able to estimate its contents. Our analysis is based on
those estimates.

[10]READ THE REPORT

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

In late October, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned several entities
linked to Iran's development and use of military drones. Some of those
entities had procured items from abroad for the research and development
wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force.

[11]Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force
Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization

Involved in Iran's ballistic missile research and flight tests; part of the
IRGC Aerospace Force. According to Iranian state media, developed and
produced the Ghadir (Qadir) radar system, which was reportedly used during
the February 2017 "Defenders of the Velayat Skies" military drill, an
exercise involving several missile systems.

[12]LEARN MORE

[13]Abdollah Mehrabi

A brigadier general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); head
of the Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization of the IRGC Aerospace Force
(IRGCASF) and co-owner of Oje Parvaz Mado Nafar Company.

[14]LEARN MORE

[15]Oje Parvaz Mado Nafar Company

An Iran-based company specialized in manufacturing unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) components; has procured UAV engines for entities linked to the IRGC,
according to the U.S. Treasury Department.

[16]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

[17]

Rafael Grossi meets with Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas
Araghchi in early 2021. Image source: IAEA Imagebank

[18]UN Watchdog Says Iran Will Allow New Cameras At Nuclear Site |
Associated Press

December 15: Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have
reached an agreement to reinstall monitoring cameras at a centrifuge
manufacturing plant in Karaj. IAEA cameras at the site were damaged in an
alleged sabotage incident in June, and Iran had subsequently refused to
allow IAEA inspectors to replace them. Tehran had alleged, without
evidence, that the IAEA cameras had been used to plan the June attack. The
IAEA denied this claim but agreed to allow Iranian "security and judiciary"
officials to inspect its equipment before it is reinstalled. Iran will
continue to withhold the cameras' footage from the IAEA until a broader
agreement is reached in ongoing negotiations to restore the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

[19]Iran Makes Nuclear Advance Despite Talks To Salvage 2015 Deal | Reuters

December 1: According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
Iran has begun enriching uranium to 20% purity using advanced centrifuges
at its underground Fordow facility. Iran is using one cascade of 166 IR-6
centrifuges to carry out the enrichment. The IAEA said it intends to step
up inspections at Fordow as a result. An Iranian statement downplayed the
report as routine, but IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi expressed
concern. Uranium enrichment at Fordow is prohibited by the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

[20]Iranian Banks Notch Win In Dispute Over Sanctions Enforcement | The
Washington Post

November 26: An international arbitration panel ruled in late November that
Bahrain's government acted improperly when it closed Future Bank in 2015.
The bank was a joint venture between Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, two
Iranian banks that have been sanctioned by the United States. Bahraini
officials argued that Future Bank had to be closed to protect investors
from alleged corruption and sanctions violations. However, The Hague-based
panel found that Bahrain's actions were not consistent with Bahrain's own
banking laws and may have had political motivations, as Iran is a regional
rival. It ordered the government of Bahrain to pay the banks more than $270
million in compensation, which Bahrain plans to appeal.

FROM THE LIBRARY

Negotiations to return Iran and the United States to compliance with the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) resumed in Vienna after a
five-month pause, while a monitoring dispute between Iran and the IAEA
continued in the background.
* Iran and the IAEA [21]reached an agreement to allow the IAEA to replace
cameras in the Karaj centrifuge manufacturing plant.
* The [22]United States and [23]France expressed frustration that Iran
had adopted a maximalist position when negotiations resumed.
* Iran [24]released a statement ahead of the Vienna talks that emphasized
removing sanctions over nuclear concessions.
* The United States [25]called for the IAEA board of directors to “break
the current pattern of Iran’s eleventh-hour attempts to undercut Board
unity” at the board’s late-November meeting.
* The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) [26]voiced grave
concern about Iran intimidating IAEA inspectors and a lack of meaningful
progress in resolving other issues.

In New York, the U.N. Security Council began a meeting to discuss
resolution 2231, the U.N. text that underpins the 2015 nuclear deal.
European countries took a firm line on Iran's recent nuclear advances.
* The E3 released a [27]joint statement declaring that Iran’s nuclear
escalation is undermining international peace and security.
* The U.K. ambassador [28]said that "in weeks, not months" Iran could be
responsible for collapsing the JCPOA if it continues to escalate its
nuclear program.
* The U.S. ambassador [29]stressed the importance of implementing
sanctions measures contained in resolution 2231's Annex B.
* In their [30]remarks, the Russian mission urged other member states to
patiently wait for the Vienna negotiations to run their course before
making “far-reaching conclusions.”

The United States sanctioned several Iranian entities for human rights
abuses and repression and announced a major forfeiture of Iranian arms
bound for regional proxies.
* The Treasury and State Departments [31]designated several institutions
and individuals associated with Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces and Basij in
connection with mistreatment of prisoners, excessive use of force, and
other human rights abuses.
* A U.S. court [32]granted the forfeiture of two shipments of Iranian
antitank and surface-to-air missiles bound for Yemen that were seized by
the U.S. Navy in 2019 and 2020.

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2021 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

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