[1]

November 30, 2021

This month's newsletter features two publications on the status and
implications of Iran’s advanced centrifuges. From the IR-1 to the possible
fifth-generation IR-9, Iran is committed to operating centrifuge models
that can enrich greater amounts of uranium with fewer machines. Iran’s
increasing mastery of centrifuge design and manufacturing raises the risk
of a "sneakout," in which Iran could use secret sites to produce fuel for
nuclear weapons. Iran’s advances also complicate diplomacy, because they
reflect an acquisition of knowledge that cannot be reversed by a return to
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or as part of a new
agreement.

The newsletter also features profiles of Mohammad Eslami, the new head of
the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and a company formerly led
by him that has manufactured drones for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC). Documents from the Iran Watch library include
recently-released International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, joint
statements by the United States, the E3 (Britain, France, and Germany), and
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and drone-related sanctions imposed by
the United States, as well as news about the seizure and release by Iran of
a Vietnamese oil tanker in the Persian Gulf, the October drone attack on
U.S. forces stationed in Syria, and the renewed production of advanced
centrifuge parts at Iran’s Karaj plant.

[2]View the newsletter in your browser and [3]subscribe to receive it in
your inbox.

PUBLICATIONS

[4]

Image source: Mashregh News

Report | [5]Beyond the IR-1: Iran’s Advanced Centrifuges and their Lasting
Implications

As a result of illicit imports and domestic development since the late
1980s, Iran now possesses thousands of gas centrifuges, which are the
mainstay of its nuclear program. These rapidly spinning machines enable
Iran to enrich uranium to a level suitable for nuclear reactor fuel, or to
a higher level suitable for nuclear weapons. The number and capacity of
these machines determine Iran’s "breakout" time: how long it would take
Iran—if it decided to do so—to produce the fuel for a small nuclear
arsenal. The machines are also key to Iran's ability to "sneakout" by
producing nuclear weapon fuel at secret sites.

The report by Dr. Frederik Voûte and Valerie Lincy provides a technical
description of Iran’s centrifuges and estimates the contribution each is
likely to make to Iran’s ability to enrich uranium. It also reviews the
testing and production history of centrifuge models, explores possible
choke points in their continued development, and assesses the implications
of Iran’s growing mastery of centrifuge design and manufacturing.

[6]READ THE FULL REPORT

A shorter version of the report ([7]Explainer: Iran’s Centrifuges) was
first published in [8]The Iran Primer.

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

Late last month, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned several entities
linked to Iran's development and use of military drones. Several of those
entities supplied Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA), which
manufactures drones for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
HESA's former director now oversees Iran's nuclear program.

[9]Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA)

An Iranian company specializing in military and civilian aircraft and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); a subsidiary of the Iran Aviation
Industries Organization (IAIO), a state-owned enterprise subordinate to the
Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); according
to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, has provided support to the IRGC.

[10]LEARN MORE

[11]Mohammad Eslami

Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and a member of
Iran's cabinet; involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities,
according to the European Union. Has served as Deputy Defense Minister for
Research and Industry, head of the Defence Industries Training and Research
Institute, managing director of Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries
(HESA), deputy director of Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), and
deputy for engineering and development plans at Defense Industries
Organization (DIO).

[12]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

[13]

The Yasir suicide drone is unveiled in 2013. Image source: Tasnim News

[14]Strike On U.S. Base Was Iranian Response To Israeli Attack, Officials
Say | The New York Times

November 18: In October, five drones loaded with explosives dive-bombed a
U.S. military base in Al Tanf, Syria. American and Israeli officials have
now said that the attack was directed and supplied by Iran and carried out
by its proxies in the region. The attack was allegedly a retaliatory strike
in response to a series of Israeli strikes on Iranian targets in Syria
earlier in October. A Telegram channel linked to Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appeared to corroborate this
account.November 18: In October, five drones loaded with explosives
dive-bombed a U.S. military base in Al Tanf, Syria. American and Israeli
officials have now said that the attack was directed and supplied by Iran
and carried out by its proxies in the region. The attack was allegedly a
retaliatory strike in response to a series of Israeli strikes on Iranian
targets in Syria earlier in October. A Telegram channel linked to Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appeared to corroborate this
account.

[15]Iran Resumes Production Of Advanced Nuclear Program Parts, Diplomats
Say | Wall Street Journal

November 16: In late August, Iran restarted production at a centrifuge
manufacturing plant that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has
been unable to monitor since it was damaged in an alleged act of sabotage
in June. According to Western diplomats, the Karaj plant has produced parts
for at least 170 of Iran's advanced centrifuges since production resumed.
The centrifuges built with those parts have been installed at the Fordow
uranium enrichment plant, according to the diplomats.

[16]Vietnamese Oil Tanker Seized By Iran Now Free In Open Waters |
Associated Press

November 10: An oil tanker that had been seized by Iran on October 24th was
released on November 10th. The Vietnamese-flagged tanker, the MV Sothys,
had been captured by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy boats
and brought to Bandar Abbas while a U.S. Navy destroyer observed but did
not intervene. Iran drained the tanker's cargo of oil and released it
afterward. Non-governmental groups suspected that the MV Sothys had been
involved in smuggling Iranian oil, which Iranian media appeared to
corroborate when announcing the tanker's release.

FROM THE LIBRARY

The United States and its allies in Europe and the Middle East held
consultations ahead of a new round of nuclear negotiations with Iran that
began in Vienna on November 29.
* The United States, with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (E3),
released a [17]joint statement endorsing a return to full compliance with
the JCPOA.
* The United States and the GCC [18]condemned “aggressive and
dangerous” Iranian actions, including missile and drone proliferation.
* The U.S. and E3 [19]recognized the efforts of the GGC, Egypt, and
Jordan to deescalate regional tensions with Iran.
* U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin [20]said that while the United
States is committed to a diplomatic outcome to the Iranian nuclear issue,
“all options” are on the table.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi addressed the Agency’s November board
meeting, which reviewed three new verification and monitoring reports about
Iran’s nuclear program.
* Director General Grossi reported that his high-level negotiations
during a visit to Tehran proved [21]inconclusive.
* The [22]November 2021 Verification and Monitoring Report stressed that
access to the Karaj centrifuge manufacturing facility is an “essential”
part of returning to compliance with the JCPOA.
* The IAEA has [23]increased the frequency and intensity of monitoring at
the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP).
* In September, IAEA inspectors were [24]denied access to the Karaj plant
in violation of an agreement between Tehran and the Agency.

The United States sanctioned Iranian drone suppliers and computer hackers
in late October and November.
* The Treasury and State Departments [25]designated several suppliers,
companies, and IRGC officers linked to Iran's military drone program.
* The United States [26]designated six individuals and a cyber operations
company linked to the IRGC for conducting voter intimidation and
disinformation campaigns ahead of the 2020 U.S. election.
* The Department of Justice [27]indicted two individuals, alleging that
they infiltrated at least one state’s voter rolls to steal voter emails,
and then sent threatening emails to voters.

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2021 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

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