From xxxxxx <[email protected]>
Subject Moments of Rupture: The 1930s and the Great Depression
Date November 16, 2021 1:00 AM
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[Occasionally, in politics and social-economic struggles, there
occur "moments of rupture," periods of dizzying and dramatic change
when hosts of opportunities present themselves and existing
arrangements of power are radically altered.] [[link removed]]

MOMENTS OF RUPTURE: THE 1930S AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION  
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Michael Goldfield and Cody R. Melcher
November 9, 2021
Organizing Upgrade
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_ Occasionally, in politics and social-economic struggles, there
occur "moments of rupture," periods of dizzying and dramatic change
when hosts of opportunities present themselves and existing
arrangements of power are radically altered. _

In the upsurge of the 1930s and ‘40s, steelworkers struck all over
the country. Pictured here, “United Steelworkers of America,
District 36, Universal strike (Tampa, Florida) (circa 1935-1945)”,
Penn State Special Collections Library, licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0


 

_With this article from Michael Goldfield and Cody R. Melcher we
(Organizing Upgrade) introduce our new “Moments of Rupture”
series._

_Our title comes from the well-known formulation by British scholar
Perry Anderson. __Building on ideas offered by Antonio Gramsci_
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Anderson suggests that most of the time political struggle takes place
as the “war of position,” painstaking work to make small advances
or defend what has been gained. One could argue that most radical
politics in the United States between 1975 and 2016 fit that
description.  But occasionally, politics turns to the “war of
maneuver,” in periods of dizzying and dramatic change when hosts of
opportunities present themselves._

We call these “moments of rupture,” and identify three in modern
U.S. history:

* _Radical Reconstruction (1865-1877)_
* _The Thirties/the Great Depression (1930-1945)_
* _The Long Sixties (1955-1975)_

_In each of these, the existing arrangement of power between the major
parties was radically altered, because new historical actors
intervened: a million or more enfranchised freedmen in the first
case; the organized working class, led in part by class-conscious
Marxists, in the second; a vast array of liberation movements sparked
by the Black freedom struggle in the third._

_We begin our series with this piece analyzing lessons from the
1930s._

_At the end of the article we offer suggestions for further reading
along with discussion questions and a suggested role-play exercise.
Our hope is that readers will use this material in union meetings,
study groups and classrooms to better understand and act in this
crisis- and opportunity-filled moment._

THE LABOR UPSURGE OF THE 1930S AND ’40S IN THE U.S.: LESSONS FOR
TODAY

Union growth tends to take place in huge waves. As the most astute
analysts have noted, during normal times very little seems to happen.
Then, often unexpectedly, enormous gains are made. To be sure, there
is plenty that organizers can do during the quieter times, not only to
make important, if seemingly small gains, but also to prepare for the
massive gains that will come with the next upsurge. It is our belief
that most workers want and all workers need and benefit from unions.
But what holds back union growth during normal times?

Two interrelated factors hold back the growth of unions. First, the
initial development of unions is often thwarted by strong resistance
from employers and the government. Unions historically have rarely
been accepted at first, making many workers at times rightfully
fearful that the risks of supporting a union could be severe. Second,
the effectiveness of opposition to unions is enhanced by the
structural characteristics of union organizations. As some analysts
have noted, unions are different from most other voluntary
organizations. Unions, by their nature, claim either explicitly or
implicitly to represent a large majority of the workers in a
particular unit, be it a skilled division, factory, university,
enterprise, company, or industry; they especially need an overwhelming
majority of worker support if they wish to exercise or threaten to use
their ultimate weapon, the strike.

Whatever the sentiments of their potential constituency, organizers of
new unions generally have problems breaking through these threshold
barriers. Once these barriers have been broken, that is, when takeoff
has taken place, growth often occurs more or less automatically. In
the 1930s, steelworkers, like Amazon workers in delivery and
fulfillment centers today, faced especially high barriers to takeoff,
due in good part to the power of the small number of employers in the
industry, the large size of the individual workplaces, and the immense
amount of resources and lawlessness employers were willing to expend
to keep their workforces non-union. Thus, steel workers had a
difficult time initially gathering momentum in building their unions.
In contrast, coal miners, working in much smaller workplaces, often
owned by individual companies, faced much lower barriers, engaging in
strikes and walkouts far more frequently in the early 1930s, when most
other workers were relatively quiet.

One can see this phenomenon sharply in the steel worker organizing
campaign of 1936 –1937. The steel towns along the Monongahela,
Allegheny, and Ohio Rivers near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were tightly
controlled by the steel companies, with many of the elected local
government offices held by steel company officials. Police forces were
an adjunct of the companies’ private police. In Aliquippa,
Pennsylvania, the site of the enormous steel complex of Jones and
Laughlin (J&L), there were over 10,000 registered Republicans in 1928
and only 35 registered Democrats. In 1933, J&L organized a private
group in Aliquippa armed with submachine guns to break a strike in
nearby Ambridge. The initial organizing in Aliquippa was slow and
painful, often seeming to go nowhere.

When Aliquippa workers finally rose up, achieving the threshold
required for takeoff, passivity was no longer a topic of conversation.
In spite of company loyalists and company and city police, Aliquippa
workers rose up, 100% of them striking. As a Steel Workers Organizing
Committee (SWOC) researcher wrote, “It was something of a
revolution, too. Aliquippa rose up against a tyranny that had held
them in bondage for years. For all practical purposes, the workers
took over the functions of government. They were in complete control.
Only for less than two hours were city police even in sight. The
picket lines were absolutely effective. No one got through, not even
the police who tried to force through an allegedly empty bus.” He
continued, “The strike is doing wonders for the men. Remember
Jefferson once said something about a revolution every twenty years or
so being a blessing? The same is true of a strike. There is real
solidarity now. And certainly no fear. In fact, workers go out of
their way to thumb their noses at company police by whom they had been
cowed for years . . . Thousands, yes thousands of men have joined the
union during the last few days, and especially after the strike was
called. _And they are eager to pay their dues and get their
button_.”

Other organizations (e.g., political parties, business organizations,
and neighborhood groups) may have threshold problems too, especially
in their attempt to attain initial legitimacy, but they do not have
the demands for overwhelmingly majoritarian status built into the life
and death of their organizations. Often the combustible material and
the stock of grievances accumulate over a long period of time; that
is, the underlying causes must be separated from the proximal or
immediate causes. Attempts to apply a cost/benefit analysis to the
involvement of workers in these upsurges usually fail. Equally
important is the lack of any useful indices for important factors that
affect working-class behavior, such as the intensity and discomfort of
work, and the disrespect and arbitrariness of management. Frito-Lay
workers in Topeka, Kansas struck in July 2021, not only for pay
increases, but against forced overtime, for regular days off, against
the grueling pace of work, and to be treated with more respect.
Likewise, Nabisco workers in five states struck in August and
September 2021, against forced overtime, brutal scheduling
requirements, and cutbacks in health care, while the company was
making enormous increased profits.

In addition, it is not always clear to what degree the accumulated
grievances must affect the whole potentially mobilized constituency.
It is not necessary for all to be near the point of spontaneous
ignition. Successful actions often stimulate and are imitated by
constituencies whose stock of grievances is not nearly so strong. It
is never obvious what determines whether a whole sector is ready to
ignite (as with the whole public sector in the 1960s) or whether the
upsurge will be limited to one local constituency, as with the highly
militant 1946 Buffalo, New York teachers’ strike.

The causes and contexts of these upsurges vary greatly, although
sometimes there have been dramatic breakthroughs that have sparked
other organizing.

Some of the most important waves of labor upsurge and union growth in
the United States can be noted briefly:

* What W.E.B Du Bois calls the “general strike” of four million
slaves that took place during the U.S. Civil War (1861 – 1865). This
is not traditionally regarded as a labor strike, but there is a good
argument to be made that it was.
* The enormous strike wave, and union upsurge, spurred by the
largely successful railroad workers’ strikes and subsequent Knights
of Labor organizing throughout the whole country including the U.S.
South in the 1870s and 1880s.
* The successful national coal miners’ strike of 1897, which
encouraged hundreds of thousands of other workers to strike and
organize.
* The labor upsurge during and after World War I, 1914 to 1920, when
union membership climbed from roughly two million to five million.
* The period of the 1930s and 1940s, as union membership went from
less than three million in 1933 to almost 15 million in 1945 while
strikes escalated.
* The public sector union upsurge of the 1960s and 1970s, where
government unionization went from a tiny amount to almost 40%. This
surge was influenced by and bore a complicated relationship with the
enormous social movement upsurge of the period, beginning with civil
rights and including the movements against the Vietnam War and for
women’s equality.

These periods, despite their successes, were uneven. They included
both dramatic victories and often stunning defeats. To put these
upsurges in context, it is useful to look at the types of leverage and
power different groups of workers have.

WORKERS’ POWER AND LEVERAGE

Two central questions arise: what allows workers to have power in a
capitalist society, and why do some groups of workers seem to have
more leverage than others? By “power,” we mean here the ability of
individuals, groups of workers, or a whole class to realize their
interests, either narrowly (e.g., a small wage increase or improved
working conditions), broadly, or completely.

Drawing on the seminal work of Erik Olin Wright and Beverly Silver, we
distinguish between structural and associational power. Structural
power is that power that workers have solely on the basis of their
relation to the economic system. Structural power consists of two main
types. First is that power which results strictly from the labor
market. How easily can workers be replaced? Certain highly skilled
workers are difficult to replace, at any time. This would be true of
skilled electricians and plumbers on construction projects, but also
all-star home-run hitters and pro-bowl quarterbacks. The services of
these workers become even more precious when there is competition for
their labor. Competing sports leagues, for example, at times have
created a premium for the most skilled athletes, often dramatically
raising their salaries. As the sports labor market becomes
international, this competition increases, as one can see today in
sports like soccer and to a lesser extent in hockey, basketball, and
baseball.

Even workers with lower-level skills, however, may be difficult to
replace when they stick together in full solidarity. Thus, when
then-President Richard Nixon attempted to replace striking New York
City postal workers in 1970 with National Guard troops, the
ineffectiveness of the latter in handling the mail forced the
president to capitulate. The centrality of the postal system at that
time in New York City for Wall Street, the nation’s financial
center, played an important role. The skills of coal miners are
difficult to replace, except by other miners. Thus, when large numbers
strike and experienced miners cannot be found as replacements,
strikers have a great deal of leverage. When coal miners struck during
World War II, they declared correctly that one could not mine coal
with bayonets. Less skilled workers can at times be easily replaced.
Yet when the labor market is tight—that is, when there are few
available workers due to very low unemployment (as was the case in
many industries during World Wars I and II) or as seems to be the case
today, when a rapid recovery has created uneven shortages of workers
needed to fill jobs —even these workers become difficult to replace,
and the leverage of all organized workers increases.

While not absolutely distinct from labor market leverage, the type of
leverage that workers have because of their location in the economic
system, namely their workplace bargaining power, is worth identifying.
This has several dimensions. Certain groups of workers have the
ability, when they stop work, to cause their employers or even the
whole society a great deal of grief. Manufacturing workers—for
example, those making certain products, or even those in key
departments—have the ability at times to shut down a whole employer,
or even a whole manufacturing industry. Workers at Boeing in Seattle
have had the ability to postpone the delivery of the latest aircraft,
a reason the company has developed a backup non-union facility in
South Carolina. This has also historically been true of automobile
workers making certain components that are manufactured at only one
location (sometimes brakes or engines).

Then there are workers whose broad strikes would threaten to bring the
whole economy to a standstill. In the nineteenth century, railroad
workers occasionally exercised this power. Truck drivers and airline
employees have this potential power but have never used it. Coal
miners during the 1930s and 1940s had this power (which they no longer
have today) and at times used it. At the other end of the spectrum,
university professors—though they may have highly specialized,
irreplaceable skills—have very little workplace leverage. When they
go on strike, they may shut down a university (on the off-chance they
all stick together), but the people they mainly inconvenience, at
least in the short term, are their students, themselves not powerful
economic actors.

Associational power comes from the support of various allies in
one’s struggles. These allies can be other workers and unions,
outside groups, whether racial, ethnic, or immigrant organizations,
students, community activists, political organizations, or a myriad of
other forces. All workers gain additional power from having broader
support. Some groups, however, need this outside support much more
than others. For those workers without a large amount of structural
leverage (be they easily replaced textile workers or others),
associational power is essential.

With this background, we wish to focus on some of the lessons from the
1930s and 1940s, particularly looking at what things worked well and
what things did not.

WHAT STRATEGIES HAVE WORKED – LESSONS FROM THE 1930S AND 1940S

One of the most important things that more radical activists did in
workplaces during the relatively quiet 1920s and early 1930s, before
the big upsurge took place, is commit themselves to long-term in-plant
work. More traditional, often conservative, unions and officials
tended to show up briefly, either during strikes or organizing
campaigns, collect dues money, then leave after the strikes or union
drives were defeated. This history of abandonment tended to leave
workers demoralized, and resentful of the fact that unions had
collected money from them, then absconded. Thus, many unions, when
they came back later felt it necessary to initially waive initiation
fees and dues until stable organizations were established.

Left-wing, more radical activists, in contrast, tended to remain even
after defeats took place, doing the slower, more long-term work of
building a core of in-plant activists. In auto, for example, small
groups of Communists established groups, secretly putting out in-plant
newsletters. They also visited sympathetic workers at home, much like
Amazon United workers are doing today. This activity continued
throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, even when the prospects for mass
organization and strikes seemed small. When the stock market crashed
in late 1929, these groups helped organize unemployed workers, often
engaging in mass struggles outside the plants.

As employment increased, and militancy and the desire for organization
rose in 1933 and 1934, these small groups often took the initiative in
organizing their plants. At White Motors in Cleveland, for example,
the in-plant group led by Communist Party (CP) member Windham Mortimer
successfully organized an early auto workers union. Similar activities
took place at the Briggs plant in Detroit. In Flint, Michigan, the
center of General Motors auto production, these small groups were the
core of organizing for the famous 1936–7 Flint sit-down strike which
led to the unionization of the whole company.

Similar activities took place within the nation’s steel mills, in
West Coast longshore, in meat packing and meat slaughtering, in coal,
among teamsters in trucking and warehousing, and in many other
industries.

Aside from the small in-plant groups that slowly organized and put out
newsletters, additional activities varied a great deal. In
Minneapolis, militants led by Trotskyist activists organized a local
within the Teamsters union developed close relations with militant
farmers’ organizations and worked to organize the unemployed to
support the unions. Though Minneapolis Teamsters had important
structural power—they had the ability to stop the movement of goods
throughout the region—they also used their allies, associational
power, to good effect. Farmers supported them and supplied food to the
strike kitchens, the unemployed groups discouraged strike breaking and
supplied extra picketers. They also broke with craft traditions and
organized truckers and warehouse workers together.

At International Harvester, then the dominant agricultural and
construction equipment manufacturer in the U.S., radical activists
worked inside the company’s extensive Employee Representation Plan
(ERP) throughout the company chain. Radicals did likewise in steel,
while they also formed broad caucuses with other militants in the more
conservative union, the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel
Workers. When large numbers of workers were laid off by Ford, many
from the enormous River Rouge plant outside Detroit, thousands of them
took jobs with the Works Progress Administration (WPA) designed to
hire laid-off workers. The WPA focused on public infrastructure
projects, from sidewalks to schools to bridges. Activists helped
unionize these WPA workers. When they were called back to work at
Ford, these formerly unionized workers provided some of the key troops
for the successful strike and unionization of Ford in 1941.

SOLIDARITY CRITICAL TO SUCCESS

Of special importance for the success of unions, especially during
periods of mass struggle and highly resistant managements, is
solidarity. Solidarity is perhaps easier during periods of mass
upsurge, but it is not unusual during normal periods as well.  One
can see this illustrated in a comparison of the 1970 postal strike
with that of the 1981 PATCO (Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization) strike.  Postal workers in New York City especially had
complete solidarity, no one crossing picket lines, which allowed them
to effectively utilize their important structural power.  They had
large rallies and meetings, and high-level enthusiasm.  When
then-President Richard Nixon tried to break the strike by calling in
the National Guard to sort and deliver the mail, the troops did not
have the knowledge or expertise to do so effectively.  Wall Street,
at the time, which depended on the timely delivery of mail demanded
and forced Nixon to settle with the union.

PATCO, in contrast, called a strike without the full support of its
membership. 11,000 controllers struck, while 3,000 stayed at work. 
The government then used supervisors and several thousand additional
military air traffic personnel to keep the airplanes in the sky.  So,
despite having important structural power, PATCO was not able to
utilize it. Furthermore, PATCO, assuming it did not need allies, i.e.,
associational power, had burned their bridges with most of the rest of
the labor movement, especially other airline personnel (pilots,
baggage handlers, flight attendants, and others) who could have helped
win the strike.  They were among the only national unions (out of
over 100 others) that had supported the Reagan presidency, relying on
their political contacts, rather than the support of their fellow
workers.  PATCO lost its strike and saw its members fired, while
postal workers won their demands.

Still, even during periods of mass upsurge, workers often feel
powerless and afraid. These feelings are often widespread, as we saw
with the campaign to organize Amazon workers at the Bessemer, Alabama
fulfillment center. Some organizers gamble that striking first, even
before a union representation election, could galvanize workers and
instill confidence. This happened in certain steel mills and meat
processing plants in 1935 and 1936. At the Flint, Michigan GM plant,
small groups of activists initiated the seizure of several of the auto
plants in late 1936, leading eventually to an overwhelming vote to
certify their unions. They also utilized associational power, as
thousands of workers from Michigan and elsewhere came to Flint to
support their picket lines. The broad public support that the sit-down
strikes had forced Frank Murphy, the allegedly pro-labor governor, who
was under enormous pressure from the auto companies and other
capitalists, not to call in the National Guard, evicting the strikers,
inevitably causing numerous deaths. Similarly, a strike against
Ford—a violently repressive employer—drew a range of outside
supporters, including civil rights organizations, chief among them the
National Negro Congress and the NAACP. The strike forced an election,
which the union won overwhelmingly.

The situation at International Harvester’s central McCormick Works
in Chicago was more complicated, but ultimately aided by extensive
in-plant work over many years as well as a strike. Both these
activities led to the left-wing Farm Equipment union winning a
certification election, and the government finally forcing the company
to settle with the union in 1941. The 7,000 workers at McCormick
Works, the original plant and the focus of the 1886 Haymarket affair,
were aided by the active support of the several thousand, already
unionized, workers at IH’s Tractor Works, located across the street,
providing another form of associational power. Especially important
for the success of many of the organizing campaigns of the 1930s and
1940s was this active support from important allies. In looking at
these earlier struggles, the importance of this “outside” support
may seem obvious. Yet, this is something that many unions in the
current period avoid, much to their detriment.

‘WALL TO WALL’ IN ALABAMA

Coal miners not only struggled for themselves but took a broad view of
their role and responsibilities within the labor movement as a whole.
This was certainly evident in the coal mining counties of northern
Alabama. In Walker Country, just northwest of Jefferson County (the
latter containing Birmingham), coal miners like their compatriots
elsewhere became fully organized in 1933. They then proceeded to
organize workers in virtually every other industry and occupation,
“wall to wall.” Not only coal miners but the many woodworkers,
hod-carriers, washerwomen, preachers, and schoolteachers all became
organized. According to the _Union News_, the Walker County CIO
newspaper, the county was the most highly unionized in the country,
with, at least according to one report, even school principals
unionized. What was the case in Walker Country was also so in many
other counties in northern Alabama where coal miners were organized.
Coal miners were also the strongest supporters of the Farmers’
Union, which was successful in northern Alabama in organizing Black
and white sharecroppers and renters, not merely in Walker County, but
in Bibb, Tuscaloosa, Marion, and Shelby Counties.

The coal miners in Alabama provided leadership and support for all
other workers in their struggles, using their important structural
power to provide associational power to workers who had less
structural leverage. Textile workers in Alabama were among the
earliest to organize in the South. Among southern textile workers they
were in the vanguard, if you will, of the events leading up to the
nationwide 1934 textile general strike and by far the strongest
contingent in the South. They were strengthened by their ability to
count on the ready support of the more than 23,000 organized coal
miners in the state, as well as a state government more reluctant than
many others, especially in the South, to mobilize its repressive
powers in support of textile company owners, whose political strength
they had to weigh against that of the highly unionized workforce.

Miners were also critical in many places to organizing the nation’s
steelworkers. This was clearly the case in the steel center of
Birmingham, Alabama, with its approximately 20,000 steelworkers.
First, it should be noted that the mineworkers’ union contributed
millions of dollars and scores of organizers to the overall national
campaign in steel. While miners protested many things about the union,
including its lack of democracy under the dictatorial regime of John
L. Lewis, and successfully fought against the leadership in 1936 for a
convention resolution in support of a labor party, we have found no
record of any complaints in any archive or newspaper about the use of
their dues money or paid officials to aid the organization of steel.
Mineworkers themselves were far from passive supporters. In
Pennsylvania steel towns, especially in the Pittsburgh area,
police-state conditions prevailed before 1936. Speaking in public and
calling rallies in support of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee
led at least to loss of jobs, often to arrest, and occasionally to
death. At times, armed contingents of coal miners, sometimes numbering
in the many thousands, marched into steel towns to ensure that the
rights of free speech and assembly allegedly guaranteed by the
Constitution would be peacefully respected. To an important, although
somewhat lesser degree, the UMWA also lent money and staff to the
early organizing efforts in the automobile industry.

‘WALL TO WALL’ IN THE UPPER MIDWEST

A similar phenomenon took place in the upper Midwest. The initial
spark for activity came from the several thousand workers at the main
Hormel meat plant in Austin, Minnesota. A varied array of worker
activists was involved in the early organizing there, including
Trotskyists, Wobblies, Communists, and others. In a series of
department- and plant-wide work stoppages in 1933, they organized the
plant and formed a union. When the company refused to yield on a wage
increase, the workers seized the plant and won the raise.

The Hormel workers soon organized everyone else in Austin—truckers
and warehouse workers, barbers and beauticians, waiters, waitresses
and bartenders, construction tradesmen and laborers, WPA laborers,
automobile mechanics and service station attendants, laundry and
dry-cleaning workers, retail clerks, and municipal employees. They
then branched out into other communities, even publishing a radical
newspaper called _The Unionist_, edited by Carl Nilson, a Trotskyist
from the Twin Cities. They had a drum and bugle corps, an extensive
library, strike kitchens, a theater, and education classes. They often
mobilized thousands of workers in the area to support strikes and
other labor activities; they defended workers’ rights to speak
freely and to rally in other cities.

The tactics used in more recent union successes are worth noting. The
UAW, of course, failed abysmally at the Toyota TMMK plant in
Kentucky.  Yet, construction unions there were overwhelmingly
successful.  Toyota originally tried to hire non-union construction
labor to build the plant and to do maintenance once the plant was
built.  The unions defeated these attempts and gained all union
workers in both instances.  They mobilized thousands of construction
workers to demonstrate, including disrupting Toyota events and
exposing some of their detrimental practices.  They formed alliances
with construction unions in nearby states and nationally to refuse aid
to Toyota; this aid was vital for support.  Similarly, teachers in
West Virginia mobilized their constituencies in massive
demonstrations.  In Oklahoma, thousands of teachers occupied the
state house, helping gain their demands for better pay, more staffing,
and smaller class sizes.  The successful organizing of catfish farm
workers in Mississippi emerged as civil rights struggles, mobilizing
community members (an important form of associational power) and
forcing political leaders to actively support them.  The
overwhelmingly African-American workforce at Delta Pride, the
nation’s largest producer of catfish, not only won union recognition
in 1990, but improved pay, safer working conditions, and more
respectful treatment.

So, one can conclude that today, as in the 1930s and 1940s, mass
organizing, rallies, disruptive tactics, and strikes, along with the
cultivation and mobilization of important allies, are key components
of successful organizing. Especially important in the successes of
that era are the championing of the rights and issues of all workers,
especially those who are most oppressed, be they racial, ethnic,
gender, religious, or other groups. Those organizations that did this
often had the strongest bonds of solidarity. Some of the greatest
victories took place where such solidarity was developed. The decline
of such stances is one of the major reasons why the labor movement is
weak today.

UNIONS BREAK THE COLOR LINE

The example of interracial unionization during the ‘30s and ‘40s
illustrates the continued importance of the labor movement to the
Black liberation struggle, and vice versa. In the early 20th century,
Black workers were occasionally used as strikebreakers, “imported”
from the South by employers and labor agents explicitly for that
purpose. Many white workers in the North (incorrectly) blamed Black
workers for the ultimate failure of the major strike wave during WWI,
which fed a concomitant wave of race riots throughout the industrial
North. Left-wing, union organizers in the ‘30s and ‘40s,
particularly Communists, realized the necessity of interracial
organizing and fighting white supremacy inside and outside of the
labor movement.

Especially relevant in this context is the West Coast waterfront
strike—a CP- led walkout of longshoremen in every West Coast port
that culminated in a bloody general strike in San Francisco, and,
finally, union recognition. Prior to the strike, Black workers had
only been employed on the docks as strikebreakers; only an extremely
small percentage of these Black strikebreakers worked on the
waterfront permanently (1.4% of the longshoremen in California were
Black in 1930). Both to avoid a broken strike, and to further the CP
imperative to eliminate Black oppression in the U.S., the CP played a
vital role in pushing the unions they led toward a break with white
supremacist ideology and practice. Specifically, CP leaders spoke at
Black churches and “implored Blacks to join [them] on the picket
line”; as longshore organizer Harry Bridges put it, “I went
directly to them. I said: ‘Our union means a new deal for Negroes.
Stick with us and we’ll stand for your inclusion in [the] industry.
. .Almost without exception, they stuck with us… The employers were
frustrated in their attempt to use them for scabs.”

This pattern was repeated throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The CP
(often under the auspices of the CIO) unionized industries that had
only hired Black workers as actual or potential strikebreakers by
ensuring racial inclusion in the benefits of unionization, working to
eliminate the special oppressions of African Americans, and disabusing
white workers of the efficacy of exclusionary responses. Steel, an
industry whose workers incorrectly perceived their previous
unionization attempts to have been frustrated by Black strikebreaking
(specifically during the Great Steel Strike of 1919), was organized
largely by Communists, a significant number of whom were Black members
of the left-led National Negro Congress.

Some newly organized Black and white steelworkers started their own
“civil rights revolution” by desegregating everything in sight,
from restaurants and department stores to movie theaters and swimming
pools. In meatpacking, the story is remarkably similar: Black workers
were first hired in the industry from 1916 to 1921 as strikebreakers
(especially during the national strike of 1920–1921). During the
1930s Black workers were at the forefront of organizing, largely under
the leadership of the CP and their interracial commitments. The same
pattern was also evident in auto, especially during the campaign to
organize the Ford Motor Company; electrical, especially in the South;
tobacco, cannery, and agriculture.

ROLE OF LEGISLATION DURING UPSURGES

How do working-class movements grow and where should activists be
putting their energies to facilitate and support these movements? Many
people, including most leaders of today’s labor movement, believe
that unfavorable laws hold unions back. If one could only elect more
union-friendly Democrats, especially to Congress, pass more favorable
laws (like card check, and increased penalties on employers who
violate labor laws), then union decline could be turned around, and
the working class movement would grow substantially. Yet, one lesson
from earlier periods, especially the 1930s and 1940s, is not to rely
on supposed pro-union legislation. Such legislation is almost always a
consequence of successful labor struggles, hardly ever their impetus.
While we would certainly have no objection to more favorable union
legislation, we do not think that should be a major focus of
resources.

As we have seen, the biggest increases in union membership and strikes
have not happened incrementally, but in enormous, often unforeseen
upsurges.  Tremendous union growth happened during World War I and
its aftermath, with virtually no enabling legislation.  The upsurge
in public sector union growth involving many millions of government
workers in the 1960s and 1970s took place before public sector
bargaining laws were passed. Rather, those laws were a consequence of
enormous union growth and strikes, especially by public school
teachers, led by the successful 1960-1961 New York City strike of
50,000 teachers.  At the time New York state had perhaps the most
draconian anti-public sector bargaining law in the country, the
Condon-Wadlin Act, which not only failed to stop the teachers’
strike, but which politicians were afraid to invoke given the
solidarity of the teachers.  A virtually unanimous academic
literature states that the early upsurge in the 1930s, especially that
of the coal miners was caused by the inclusion of the symbolic
pro-union Section 7(a) in the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act.
But the archival evidence is clear: coal miners were effectively
organized on the basis of a massive upsurge before the legislation was
passed. Similarly, the Wagner Act itself was largely a response to the
1934 radical-led strikes and was only finally held to be legal after
the upsurge had swept the country in 1937.

The historical lessons are simple. Unions today abandon organizing and
put huge amounts of energy and resources into electing Democrats in
what has proven to be the futile attempt to gain more favorable labor
laws. Many who call themselves socialists, unfortunately, do the same.
While we have no objections to labor unions organizing politically,
especially at the local level as an adjunct to organizing, we do not
think that should be a major focal point of resources. In order to get
favorable legislation passed, the labor movement not only diverts its
resources from organizing, but acts like any other “interest
group” and largely absconds from the larger issues of the working
class, especially the struggle for racial equality. It has sacrificed
solidarity and militancy for “respectability” and the results have
been catastrophic decline and concessions. Taking lessons from the
upsurges of the past are our greatest hope for upsurges in the future.

**

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

* What is structural power? What is associational power? Can you
think of a job you’ve held where you had either kind of power? What
would it take to develop that power?
* Thinking over some of the examples of upsurges presented in the
article, is one kind of power more important than the other?
* Do you agree with the authors’ conclusion that focusing on
reforming labor laws is a distraction from the work needed to rebuild
the labor movement? Why or why not?
* What are the tactics and strategies organizers used to spur
successful labor upsurges in the past? Which of these can you imagine
using today, in your workplace or community?

ROLE PLAY

You are members of a left organization that is debating political
priorities for the coming few years. One person should play the role
of moderator of the convention, and the rest of you should divide into
four groups. Each group takes a position to develop and present to the
whole group. Take 15 minutes to develop your proposal. The moderator
should bring everyone together, have each group present their idea,
and lead a group debate to vote on a path forward.

Group 1: Your group presents the plan to focus on building a national
campaign to change labor laws. The changes would make it easier to
form a union, increases penalties for employers who violate labor
laws, and make it possible for independent contractors and gig workers
to form unions and engage in collective bargaining.

Group 2: Your group argues for members to focus on organizing with
co-workers wherever they work: in coffee shops, in universities, at
grocery stores and so on. You know it might not be possible to form a
union everywhere, but you argue for the need to build study groups,
clubs, or any kind of workplace group possible.

Group 3: Your group argues to focus on organizing workers who work in
strategic industries, such as transport and logistics.

Group 4: Your group argues that focusing on the labor movement is a
dead end. It is not possible and/or desirable to organize unions in
the current period.

**

FURTHER READING

Dan Clawson, 2003. _The Next Upsurge_. Cornell University Press.

Dana Frank, 2012. _Women Strikers Occupy Chain Stores, Win Big: The
1937 Woolworth’s Sit-Down_. Haymarket Books.

Michael Goldfield, 2020. _The Southern Key: Class, Race, and
Radicalism in the 1930s and 1940s_. Oxford University Press.

Michael Goldfield, 1987. _The Decline of Organized Labor in the
United States_. University of Chicago Press.

Michael K. Honey, 2008. _Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike,
Martin Luther King’s Last Campaign_. W. W. Norton & Company.

Robin D.G. Kelly, 2015. _Hammer and Hoe: Hammer and Hoe: Alabama
Communists during the Great Depression_. University of North Carolina
Press.

Brandon Magner, 2021. “The PRO Act Is the Most Ambitious Labor Law
Reform Bill in Generations.” _Jacobin_.

Cody R. Melcher. 2020. “First as Tragedy, Then as Farce: WEB Du
Bois, Left-Wing Radicalism, and the Problem of Interracial Labor
Unionism.” _Critical Sociology_ 46(7-8): 1041-1055.

Mark Meinster, 2020. “How Unions Can Lay the Ground for the Next
Upsurge.” _Labor Notes_.

Priscilla Murolo, 2018. “Five Lessons from the History of Public
Sector Unions.” _Labor Notes_.

Stefan Schmalz and Klaus Dörre, “The Power Resources Approach
[[link removed]].”
Trade Unions in Transformation.

Trade Unions in Transformation website
[[link removed]].

VIDEOS/FILMS:

“Socialist Struggle in the Fight for the PRO Act, with Daniel
Dominguez and Jayanni Webster,” Frontline Dispatches interview
[[link removed]],
Organizing Upgrade.

At the River I Stand
[[link removed]]

With Babies and Banners: Story of the Women’s Emergency Brigade
[[link removed]]

_MICHAEL GOLDFIELD is Professor Emeritus of Political Science and
currently Research Fellow at the Fraser Center for the Study of
Workplace Issues at Wayne State University in Detroit. He is a former
labor agitator and the author of hundreds of articles and numerous
books on race and labor, including The Southern Key, The Color of
Politics, Race and the Mainsprings of American Politics, and The
Decline of Organized Labor in the United States._

_CODY R. MELCHER is a PhD candidate in sociology at the Graduate
Center, CUNY. His research broadly examines the intersection of class
and race, specifically the effect of economic insecurity on
redistributive, class, and racial attitudes. His work has been
published in Political Behavior, Ethnic and Racial
Studies, Critical Sociology, Labor: Studies in Working-Class
History, the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History, and
elsewhere. His current project explores the potential causal
relationship between economic insecurity and public opinion through an
original experimental survey design. He teaches in the department of
sociology at the City College of New York._

_ORGANIZING UPGRADE is a political project in support of the
movements for multi-racial democracy. We believe the moment calls for
building on many levels: a broad front against white nationalist
authoritarianism, driven by a progressive front rooted in communities
of color and working-class communities, and within that, a core of
anti-capitalist/socialist activists.  Our definition of democracy
includes the full spectrum of social, economic, and political rights
and equality. These are inextricably intertwined, with the struggle
against racism and gender/sexuality expression at the core. We are
based in movements in the United States while recognizing the
importance of solidarity with similar movements around the world. We
hope to further the work of movement building by providing a forum for
strategic thinking and analysis, reflecting on organizing experiences,
and lifting up the voices and work of people with the deepest stake in
transformative change. Click HERE
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donate. _

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