Following is the October 2021 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in


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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In October 2021

 

Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In October 2021 by clicking here
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency in October 2021

By Gregory Waters

 

Following is the October 2021 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. Previous editions of ISIS Redux can be viewed through the
following links:September
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,August
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,July
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,June
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,May
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,April
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,March
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,February
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, andJanuary
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2021; and December
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,November
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,October
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,September
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,August
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,July
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,June
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,May
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, andApril
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. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including its
methodology, can also beexplored here,
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andhere
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ISIS militants carried out at least 14 confirmed attacks in October, killing
at least 13 pro-Assad regime fighters and one civilian, while wounding at least
three others in the Homs, Deir Ez Zor, Raqqa, and Aleppo governorates. ISIS
attacks dropped significantly in October from a six-month high of 36 in
September. October was the first month with no high quality* attacks and fewer
than 12 deaths since 2019. Yet more attacks occurred in in the Badia this month
than in August. The drop in both severity and quantity of attacks suggests that
while ISIS cells may have reconstituted themselves following several months of
regime operations, they are not yet choosing to or able to conduct sustained,
multi-week offensives like they were at this time last year.

 

ISIS fighters shifted their attack style throughout August and September,
adopting a more aggressive posture and relying less on improvised explosive
devices (IED) and mines and more on small arms ambushes. In October, they
appear to have reverted to their pre-August strategies. Of their 14 confirmed
attacks, at least six used mines or IEDs, while there were only three confirmed
small arms attacks. The method used in five attacks is unknown.  

ISIS’s targeting of civilians appears to have decreased this month, compared
with September, with only one reported mine attack occurring in eastern Hama.
The uptick in east Hama attacks in September that appeared to imply a return of
ISIS cells to the area did not continue into October, although ISIS did not
completely disappear from the governorate this month. Finally, after killing
six pro-regime commanders over the past four months, ISIS cells failed to kill
or attack any commanders during October.

 

Confirmed attacks in October dropped in Homs (2), Hama (2), and Raqqa (2)
while rising slightly in Deir Ez Zor (5) and southeast Aleppo (2). Despite the
decrease, activity in every governorate was at or above the levels registered
in August. This suggests that whether or not the drop in activity was imposed
on ISIS by regime operations in October, the cells are still trending in an
upward direction.

Homs

 

There were only two confirmed attacks in Homs in October, both occurring in
the Sukhnah countryside. On October 20, a Liwa al-Quds fighter from the
Palestinian camp in Sabina, Damascus, was reported killed around Sukhnah and on
October 22, a 5th Corps tank was reportedly damaged by a mine or IED east of
the city.

 

Based on the unprecedentedly high level of activity in east Homs last month
and the generally high level of activity in the governorate throughout 2021, it
seems unlikely that there were only two attacks here in October. There were
likely additional, unreported ISIS attacks in the vicinity of Wadi Doubayat and
northern Palmyra, both areas which saw sustained skirmishes during the second
half of September.

 

Deir Ez Zor

 

Confirmed ISIS activity in Deir Ez Zor continues to fluctuate, averaging about
six attacks per month after steadily dropping during the spring and early
summer this year. ISIS cell(s) continued to be active around the Shoula area
after moving there last month, with a light skirmish reported on October 4. On
October 12, a regime soldier was reported killed in the Tanf Boukamal corridor,
likely on or near the highway connecting Humaymah to Boukamal where ISIS
ambushed regime forces in September. On October 13 and 14, at least two
soldiers were reportedly killed by an ISIS mine west of the Akash oil field.
The deaths of two more soldiers were reported somewhere in the governorate on
October 17 and 23.

Map of ISIS attacks in Deir Ez Zor in October 2021 (highlighted dots). Not
included are two attacks that occurred in unspecified parts of the governorate.

 

Hama, Raqqa, and Southeast Aleppo

 

Between June 25 and September 3, ISIS only conducted one confirmed attack in
the Hama governorate—a mine hit on a regime militia likely carried out by a
cell based in northeast Homs. Multiple regime security members interviewed by
this author in July and August were adamant that the main ISIS cells had
withdrawn from the governorate. Then between September 4 and 27, ISIS cells
conducted six attacks, seemingly reasserting their presence in the governorate.
However, only two attacks on regime forces were recorded in October, despite at
least two regime sweeping operations that presented ample targets for
mines/IEDs or harassment fire. A soldier was killed by a mine in one such sweep
on October 20. On October 22, a child was killed by a mine outside his village.

 

While the four ISIS attacks in southern Raqqa in September targeted civilians,
the two attacks in October targeted military forces. On October 7, two soldiers
were killed and three wounded by a mine outside the Safwan Oil Field. On
October 15, ISIS cells attacked several regime positions near the Raqqa side of
Jabal Bishri, triggering a Russian air response.

 

ISIS conducted at least two attacks in southeast Aleppo in October after no
confirmed attacks took place in September. On October 1, a suspected ISIS cell
attacked a convoy of Liwa al-Quds fighters and oil tankers moving from southern
Raqqa to southern Aleppo, though no injuries were reported. On October 12 a
soldier’s death was reported in the Safira-Khanasir region of southeast Aleppo.
The exact cause is unknown.

Map of ISIS attacks in Hama, Raqqa, and Aleppo in October 2021 (highlighted
dots). Not included in the map is one attack that occurred on October 20 in
“east Hama.”

 

Regime Operations

 

Anti-ISIS operations continue to follow the same pattern established in
previous months. Small-to-medium sized sweeps continue on a regular basis in
the Hama, Aleppo, and Raqqa governorates while Syrian regime, Russian, and
Iranian forces redeploy units as needed across eastern Homs and Deir Ez Zor.
Russian warplanes continue to support regime forces during larger attacks on
their positions and regularly bomb pre-determined coordinates. In October, most
reports of Russia warplane activity focused on the Raqqa and Homs sides of
Jabal Bishri.

 

Looking Ahead

 

ISIS surged in September, returning to attack levels more in line with this
time in 2020. September’s escalation came after a steady decline in activity
beginning in April 2021. Confirmed activity once again dropped in October,
though remained higher than it was in August. Activity this month can be
described as sporadic but consistent with reports of one or two soldiers being
killed every few days in different areas of the Badia.

 

While overall attacks were down, October was the second month in a row that
there was at least one attack in each governorate, and the first time since
April that ISIS carried out at least two attacks in every governorate of the
Badia. Taken together, this seems to imply that ISIS is still choosing to
reduce its activity—rather than being forced to by regime operations—though
disruptions to ISIS logistical or communication lines cannot be ruled out. It
is also important to remember that September’s heightened level of activity
came as a reaction to attempted regime sweeps. As long as the regime stays out
of specific parts of the Badia, ISIS may be content with this lower level of
sustained insurgency while it focusing its resources on Iraq and northeast
Syria.

Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted dots) in October 2021. This map
does not include three attacks which did not have specific locations attributed
to them; one “Hama countryside” attack, and two “Deir Ez Zor countryside”
attacks. To view an interactive version of this map, please clickhere
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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpointss that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.

 

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