November 2, 2021
China Uncovered


We are excited to announce the second season of the China Uncovered podcast is now available on Acast <[link removed]>, Apple Podcasts <[link removed]>, Spotify <[link removed]>, or your favorite podcast app. In this podcast, Heritage Senior Policy Analyst Olivia Enos hosts representatives of world-class data projects to discuss how their projects are shining a spotlight on the Chinese Communist Party’s actions and emerging trends from their data.
On October 25, we released our third episode: Arms Transfers and the Increase in China's Arms Exports
featuring Siemon Wezeman <[link removed]>. Stay tuned for our next episode!
Dean Cheng Testimony

On October 21, Heritage Senior Research Fellow Dean Cheng testified <[link removed]> before the House Committee on Natural Resources on the relevance of the Republic of Marshall Islands to U.S. security. The Pacific Islands are vital to U.S. security and strategy in addressing the China challenge. Consultations are underway to get an extension for the expiring compacts—in 2023 in the cases of the Marshall Islands and Micronesia and 2024 in the case of Palau. Click here <[link removed]> to read Heritage ASC Director Walter Lohman's 2020 commentary on preserving our strategic investment in the Pacific Islands.
Olivia Enos Testimony
On October 19, Heritage Senior Policy Analyst Olivia Enos testified <[link removed]> before the Congressional-Executive Commission's hearing on
establishing humanitarian paths for Hong Kongers and Uyghurs. Click here <[link removed]> to read Olivia's commentary on ensuring U.S. is a safe haven for Hong Kongers.
U.S. Isn't Alone in Support of Taiwan
There has been an extraordinary amount of talk in policy circles recently about Taiwan and the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security—and for good reason. The Chinese are ratcheting up pressure on Taiwan to a degree unseen in at least 25—and perhaps 60—years. Heritage ASC Director Walter Lohman writes <[link removed]> that the good news is that the U.S. is not alone. It has friends and allies who also support Taiwan. The following are the five most critical:

1) Japan. Japan is Taiwan’s second-best friend in the world, after the U.S. This is true in peacetime. Look at how quickly Japan welcomed Taiwan’s application to join the successor agreement to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the 11-nation Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Building these kinds of economic equities in Taiwan’s future is important to creating the incentives for the international community to keep Beijing at bay. The challenge for Japan is with military scenarios short of outright invasion. There are any number of other paths China could take to coerce Taiwan. Taiwan is not just one island. Beijing could move to seize one of its small islands—Kinmen, for example, from which you can literally see the Chinese mainland—or Taiwan’s territory in the South China Sea.

2) Australia. Australia has a smaller military and is farther away from Taiwan than Americans sometimes imagine. What commends it most is its military’s demonstrated interoperability with U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific and its remarkably consistent record of alliance with the U.S. in international crises, from World War I to the war in Afghanistan. Topping up U.S. confidence in Australia, Canberra recently embarked with the U.S. and U.K. in a new security partnership called AUKUS that will provide Australia with new nuclear-powered submarines that will give its navy a range it has never before had. There are a lot of details to be worked out, but if it meets expectations, AUKUS will embed Australia even deeper in its alliance with the U.S. and position it to play an important role in any defense of Taiwan. 

3) The United Kingdom. This one might come as a surprise. The U.K. has not been much of a power in the Indo-Pacific for decades. Like Australia, what makes the U.K. so critical is its intensive capacity for interoperability with U.S. forces. The U.S. has no closer ally in the world. The U.K. also has real naval power. Its recent deployment to the Pacific of a carrier strike group and related joint carrier operations with the U.S. and Japan underscore this strength. It’s also just had a second carrier come online and is planning to permanently deploy two smaller ships to the Indo-Pacific in a manner that should pave the way for a larger, more durable presence. Close strategic alignment with the U.S. leaves very little doubt that if it came to blows in the Taiwan Strait, the U.K. will be with the U.S. Any doubt about the U.K. concerns its commitment to Taiwan during peacetime. Unlike the U.S., which is generally in retreat on international trade (to the detriment not only of its own economy, but also to its ability to advocate for Taiwan), the U.K. is seeking to economically entrench itself in the region.

4) France. The truth is there are only two militaries in Europe that are relevant as fighting forces in the Western Pacific. One is the U.K. The other is France. In fact, setting aside the quality of its relationships with the U.S., France is a much bigger presence in the region. It has vast sovereign territory in the Pacific, two permanent armed forces commands, military aircraft, ships, and a couple of thousand troops. And since 2014, it has regularly deployed more powerful ships to the Pacific—on average twice a year to the South China Sea. The operational drawback with France is the mirror image of the U.K.’s strength. It’s not as fully interoperable with U.S. forces. The U.S. is working on this with the French, very gradually. But one cannot assume that because we have a common command structure in NATO, and do joint missions in Africa, that the two militaries can easily do the same in the Pacific.

5) The European Union. Getting a ship to the region from the Netherlands or Germany—both of which have done so this year—is a constructive demonstration of concern for stability. And inasmuch as Taiwan sits in the most potentially instable place in the region, that’s good for Taiwan. The EU itself, however, has no navy. Its value in the Taiwan Strait is mostly economic, and to some degree, diplomatic. The EU is very broadly engaged with Taiwan across a range of economic and regulatory issues. There’s even the prospect—pushed hard by the EU Parliament—that it could enter into a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan. These non-military sources of support are important because they signal to China that it would pay a heavy price for an armed attack on Taiwan—and not just from the countries who are positioned to respond with force. On the downside, the EU is made up of 27 nations. It’s not easy for it to develop consensus, on Taiwan or anything else involving China policy, especially given a couple of Chinese-friendly members with records of obstructing consensus.

There are other countries that could be mentioned here. Singapore is by far the best peacetime partner Taiwan has in Southeast Asia. Otherwise, it holds its cards close to its chest. India has tentatively reached out to Taiwan in recent years, but its main concern is China’s presence in its own neighborhood at sea, but especially along its norther border. It’s going to shy away from anything it sees as provocative.

Taken together, the importance of the international concern for Taiwan’s security is that it helps to deter China from taking military action against Taiwan. As like-minded nations, we must work together to ensure that each day Beijing wakes up, its leadership says, “Today is not the day.”

Related: Click here <[link removed]> to read Heritage Senior Research Fellow Dean Cheng's commentary on why Xi Jinping's Taiwan saber-rattling is all about shoring up domestic power.

Related: Click here <[link removed]> to read Heritage ASC Program Coordinator and Research Assistant Justin Rhee and Heritage YLP Intern David Calhoun's commentary on ongoing cross-Strait tensions.
U.S. and France Should Double Down on Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
Heritage ASC Director writes that the inauguration the Australia–United Kingdom–United States security partnership (AUKUS) on September 15, 2021, was greeted by a furious reaction from Paris. Once tempers cool, the U.S. and France should take new stock of their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and reinvigorate it. Even as the U.S. expands its cooperation with Australia and the U.K., it should find parallel ways to do the same with France.

It is not too late. The U.S. should double down on security cooperation with France in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries share interests there, have recognized them across Administrations, and have already embarked on attempts to meet them together. The strategic imperative vis-à-vis the rise of China is too important for the two countries not to do so.

Sharing as they do common strategic visions and interests in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. and France should maximize the habits of security cooperation and interoperability that they have developed elsewhere in the world in the North Atlantic, in the Fifth Fleet area of operations, but also in the African Sahel. In order to scope the task appropriately, they should focus on where their priorities overlap most within the vast Indo-Pacific region. This means, first, the Western Pacific and Eastern Indian Ocean. Secondarily, it means an increased French presence in the Northwestern Pacific, a greater U.S. presence in the South Pacific, and closer coordination of activity in each area.

To these ends, the United States should:


- Regularize and increase the number of joint U.S.–France military exercises and selectively include France in the current schedule of multilateral exercises, including exercises with American Quad partners and with other militaries like the U.K.’s.
- Expand France’s current LNO presence at U.S. facilities.
- Explore an appropriately tailored French officer embed at USINDOPACOM.
- Complete a Department of Defense database and planning tool that can enable the U.S., France, and other non–Five Eyes members to access releasable information on matters like humanitarian military missions, donations of assets like patrol boats and minor pieces of infrastructure development, and non-governmental organization activity throughout the Pacific Islands.
- Dedicate more resources to the Pacific Quad.
- Expand and intensify the sharing of military intelligence along the lines of efforts begun after the 2015 terrorist attacks in the Paris area.



The bottom line is that France, as a resident power in the Indo-Pacific, is the most significant European military presence in the region. For the past decade, it and the U.S. have gradually been building military cooperation there. The magnitude of the strategic challenge presented by China requires an all-hands-on-deck effort, and France must be part of it.

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