October marks seven years since the United States first began providing
equipment and air support to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), and


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Smuggling Away The Future In Syria’s Northeast

 

Read Smuggling Away The Future In Syria’s Northeast by clicking here
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Smuggling Away The Future In Syria’s Northeast

By Gregory Waters

 

October marks seven years since the United States first began providing
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support to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), and later to their
umbrella organization the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in their anti-ISIS
campaign in northeast Syria. After the fall of ISIS’s so-called caliphate, the
U.S. government has continued to provide military support to these institutions
and their new political body—the Autonomous Administration of Northeast
Syria—conducting joint counter-ISIS operations in an attempt to end the ongoing
insurgency in the region. Recentreporting
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on northeast Syria has highlighted the reduction in ISIS attacks and boasted
of a “return to normalcy” thanks to these security efforts. However, such
reporting is misleading and relies on cherry-picked data that assesses ISIS’s
strength purely through the number of reported attacks and uncritically sharing
media statements from Kurdish leaders.

 

A more compressive examination of the region presents a starkly different
picture, one in which ISIS is entrenching itself among the disenfranchised
communities of internally displaced people (IDPs), retains extensive freedom of
movement across the northeast’s borders with Iraq and regime-held Syria, and
conducts widespread financing and logistical operations. Much of this
resiliency is due to the worsening economic situation in the northeast, which
has caused a steep rise in smuggling, deepened distrust between locals and the
Autonomous Administration, and left young men susceptible to ISIS recruitment.
The situation is so bad now that young men are fleeing the region en masse,
risking the deadly smuggling routes to Europe for the chance at a future.
Rather than focus on maintaining the status quo, U.S. policy should be enhanced
to better address these non-military aspects of the ISIS insurgency and
roll-back the impending crises in the northeast.

 

Sheep as the New Oil

 

The recent capture
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 of ISIS’s head of finance by Turkish forces in northwest Syria has brought
renewed attention to ISIS financial networks. But security analyst Alex Almeida
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big deal. Local cells in Iraq and Syria can mostly self-finance, and ISIS
probably has several deputies that can take over the larger international
finance networks if that’s what he was still overseeing.” This devolution of
financing to the local level is precisely what has been observed in central and
northeast Syria, and it has allowed ISIS to remain resilient and regrow its
networks.

 

The kidnapping
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 of 60 civilians in eastern Hama on April 6, 2021, while shocking in its
brazenness, underscored the growing reality of ISIS operations in this
under-studied region of central Syria. Nearly all of the civilians were
released in a quickly arranged prisoner swap that saw the family members of
local ISIS fighters freed from the nearby regime prison in Salamiyah. This
prisoner exchange further supports regime claims that most ISIS fighters who
have been operating in east Hama for the past year are locals. ISIS has taken
advantage of these cells’ local knowledge in eastern Hama to bolster its
broader insurgency across Syria.

Source: Newslines Institute for Strategy and Policy
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Based on local reporting and interviews conducted by this author, it appears
that ISIS has used its presence in eastern Hama and the area bordering southern
Raqqa and southern Aleppo to conduct widespread smuggling and fundraising
operations. Cells in these areas steal sheep from locals and either use them to
sustain themselves or smuggle them across the Euphrates River into northern
Raqqa. In areas controlled by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),
ISIS members posing as civilians sell the sheep on the open market, to the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (the U.S.-designated terrorist group affiliated
with the SDF), or smuggle them across the Iraqi border.

 

The first major signs of this financing operation came in early 2021, when a
regime officer based in eastern Hama told this author that “hundreds” of sheep
were disappearing every week. According to the officer, locals were
increasingly complaining to security forces that their flocks were being
stolen, but neither locals nor security forces were able to locate any of the
sheep.

 

Local reporting has hinted at ISIS’s operation, though not to the degree the
officer claimed. Attacks on civilians in this rural agricultural area increased
significantly in February and March 2021. Most news reports spoke of ISIS mines
intentionally laid in grazing areas and along roads that left dozens dead or
wounded every month. However, there have also been at least 23 publicly
reported attacks on shepherds in these areas since ISIS first re-emerged in
eastern Hama in mid-2020. One of the group’s first major attacks in the
governorate took place in a remote village. ISIS stole the villagers’ sheep,
killing one civilian and those animals they could not take with them. Two
months later, in September, militants killed 12 shepherds and carted away their
entire flock. In November 2020, local security forces clashed with ISIS after
coming across what they referred to as an “ISIS sheep transport” near the major
highway connecting east Hama with Raqqa.

 

On multiple occasions this year, shepherds have been found executed with
gunshots to their heads in eastern Hama, southern Aleppo, and southern Raqqa.
The situation became so bad in eastern Hama that Syrian regime security forces,
who for months had been conducting “sweeping operations” to try and dislodge
insurgents, began focusing instead on guarding shepherds. This new policy
coincided with a sharp drop in ISIS activity in the province in general. The
regime officer claims that by late June the cells active in the area had all
left, as they could no longer easily prey on the herds.

 

However, it appears that these or other cells renewed their sheep thieving
operations within weeks, this time focusing on the nearby southern Raqqa
countryside. Reports on local Facebook pages of attacks on shepherds there
began trickling in throughout July and August and then surged in September when
militants kidnapped, killed, or attacked shepherds at least once each week.

 

This activity is not confined to the regime-held parts of Syria either,
occurring at a smaller level across the SDF-held northeast as well. On two
occasions in the first week of October, locals reported online that
“unidentified militants” stole dozens of sheep from two villages outside the
city of Raqqa. Hassan, a farmer and sheep trader from Raqqa, told this author
that in such cases the stolen sheep are often either smuggled into Iraq or
south across the “border” to regime-held areas to be sold in the markets where
locals would be unaware of their illicit origins.

 

In late May, shortly after the aforementioned regime officer spoke of the
sheep thefts in Hama, a local researcher in north Raqqa told this author that
as many as 23,000 sheep had been smuggled into the SDF-held regions from
southern Raqqa during the first few months of 2021. This massive movement of
sheep came amid a surge in locals fleeing widespread ISIS activity across
southern Raqqa and eastern Hama.

 

Officials from the SDF and Asayish (the Administration’s internal security
force) in Raqqa told this author in May that ISIS militants, disguised as
civilians, are regularly using both the official and unofficial border
crossings to move between regime- and SDF-held Raqqa. Terrorizing locals in
regime areas not only allows militants to steal valuable goods, but also drives
more people from their homes, increasing the IDP flow across these
difficult-to-secure border zones and providing additional cover for ISIS
movement.

 

A United Nations Transit Point Monitoring report from January
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 2021 claimed that in a two-week period more than 16,000 people had crossed
into SDF-held north Raqqa using just the three official crossings. IDP movement
reached a six-month high in March before dropping over the summer, according to
Administration leaders in Raqqa. These numbers do not account for the plethora
of unofficial crossings regularly used by both locals and ISIS, but the
reported surge and drop in IDP movement coincides with a similar pattern of
ISIS activity in east Hama and south Raqqa.

 

All of this points to a sustained supply and fundraising operation conducted
by ISIS cells in both regime- and SDF-held Syria, exploiting the embedded
underground economy of the region. Hassan maintains that sheep smuggling does
not account for most of ISIS’s new revenue. He points instead to the group’s
extortion of businesses in Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor and the protection fees it
collects from truckers carrying oil and other goods between the northeast and
western Syria. However, throughout early 2021, sheep were selling for around
7,500 Syrian pounds in Raqqa, meaning that ISIS could easily be raising
millions of Syrian pounds every month solely through this enterprise.

An informal IDP camp housing more than 1,000 people on the southern edge of
Raqqa city, established in 2018. Picture by author.

 

Weakened Economy, Strengthened ISIS

 

Yet in conversations with this author, Hassan pointed to a larger issue beyond
the financial and logistical benefits to ISIS from stealing sheep. Hassan also
accuses the PKK of smuggling sheep out of the northeast and into Iraq, where
they sell them to factions of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Units. This
author heard the same from other locals in Raqqa in May. Meanwhile, the Syrian
regime and Iraqi Shiite militias operating in western Deir Ez Zor are also
accused of stealing sheep from locals. “During the era of Saddam Hussein, the
traders of Iraq depleted their livestock,” Hassan says. “Syria, Turkey and Iran
were the beneficiaries of that livestock, and now a reverse process has begun
from Syria back to Iraq.”

 

The depletion of sheep is exacerbated by the impact of drought
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on farmers’ ability to grow feed. All of these factors combine to paint a
devasting picture for the fate of the northeast’s herds. The loss of this
economic sector in a region which historically has relied on herding and
agriculture for employment will only further intensify grievances that could be
exploited by ISIS. According to Shadi (*not his real name), a researcher in
Raqqa, nearly 70 percent of locals there work in the agriculture sector and
have been hit hard by successive droughts and a lack of support from the
Administration. “Now the enemy is not just ISIS; hunger, ignorance, poverty,
drugs, and corruption are all against civilians,” says Hassan, referring to
financially and food insecure civilians that have become targets for ISIS and
criminal recruitment.

 

His words echo complaints this author heard on numerous occasions from both
civilians and security officials in Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor earlier this year.
ISIS has successfully exploited the worsening economic conditions of the
northeast, increasing recruitment among the approximately 630,000
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 people who live in IDP camps, and even paying local youth to carry out attacks
on security checkpoints. The connection between a poor economy and ISIS’s
endurance has been written about repeatedly in recent years. In May 2019, a
U.S. official told the International Crisis Group
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, “When people talk about the reintegration or reconciliation process with ISIS
guys, they frequently say they need jobs, livelihoods and education. If these
people come back and have nothing to do, they’ll just get up to mischief
again.” According to Almeida, since losing its caliphate, ISIS has focused its
recruitment efforts in Iraq and Syria on communities that are both struggling
economically and feeling abandoned by their governments.

 

Nearly three years after ISIS lost their last bit of territory in the
northeast, the Kurdish-run Autonomous Administration is still viewed as
outsiders in the Arab-majority regions of Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor. Building
governance legitimacy in these areas therefore rests on the Administration’s
ability to provide security and services to locals. Yet the Administration is
hemmed in on all sides by antagonistic actors: Official crossings into Iraq are
closed, it remains at war with Turkey to the north, and the Assad regime and
Russia look to exploit it at every turn.

 

The Administration is thus forced to sell the oil and gas produced in the
fields under its control to the regime, itself bankrupt and unable to pay.
Unable to sell or export its only natural resource to anyone with money, the
Administration has been bled dry (the heavy subsidization of goods and the
constant expansion of its armed forces has not helped its budget either). Local
aid organizations have also been hit hard by the economic crash while at the
same time dealing with a rise in IDPs and local needs. Aid organizations in
northeast Syria have reportedly
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 faced severe funding cuts this year and are no longer able to conduct
long-term projects. This has led to a sharp reduction in immediate aid to the
vulnerable IDP population that only continues to grow.

 

The dire economic situation reached a turning point earlier this year. On May
17, the Administration announced it would be raising fuel prices “in an attempt
to curb oil smuggling,” triggering widespread protests
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 in both Arab and Kurdish towns. Security forces fired on several of the
protests, killing
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 seven protestors. On May 19, the Administration reversed
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 its order. Less than two weeks later protests erupted again, this time in the
city of Manbij where Arab tribes took to the streets to protest
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 the worsening economic conditions and forced conscription by the SDF.
Protestors were once again met with gun fire from the U.S.-backed forces. One
civilian was killed on the first day and seven on the second day of protests.

 

Both of these events should serve as major warnings for the fate of the
northeast in the near future. Civilians will be quick to protest any subsidy
reversals again—and the SDF and Asayish have proven unable to react
non-violently to these protests. In conversation with this author, both
civilians and local researchers have made it clear that both Arab and Kurdish
civilians blame the Administration for the deteriorating economy. “Anger
towards the SDF has grown due to angers over the economy,” says Shadi*.
“Civilians blame the corruption of the Autonomous Administration. They believe
there is a lot of money coming into the Administration from the coalition and
oil trade and taxes but do not see any of it being used to help civilians.”

 

Shadi* cites the construction sector as a prime example of this corruption,
noting that the cost of steel and concrete in Raqqa is nearly twice that as in
Turkish and regime areas due to Administration-affiliated businessmen who have
monopolized the market. The high cost of these materials has slowed the once
promising progress of rebuilding the city and its countryside following the
battles against ISIS. Part of the reconstruction slow-down is also due to the
increasing difficulties acquiring building materials, as the SDF-Turkey war
prevents any trade through that country and the Administration’s relations with
the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq have deteriorated in recent months.

 

Regardless of whether or not Administration-enabled corruption is the true
reason behind the construction slow-down, the local perception of this is
enough to weaken the Administration’s legitimacy. Many specifically accuse the
PKK of siphoning off the northeast’s funds and natural resources to finance its
war against Turkey, and see the Administration as complicit in this. But
without any serious structural changes or changes in its relationship to its
neighbors, the Administration will be forced to roll back subsidies soon.

The main road from Hasakah to Raqqa, now mostly gravel and potholes after the
Administration ran out of funds to repave it late last year. Picture by author.

 

Improving U.S. Policy Outcomes

 

Throughout all of this, the U.S. and coalition forces retain a limited
presence in the northeast, purportedly focused singularly on “countering ISIS.”
Yet, as proven time and again over the past 20 years of the global war on
terror, military efforts alone are not enough to defeat an entrenched
insurgency. Economic and governance support to the northeast is crucial for
building a unified front against ISIS and preventing the terrorist group’s
infiltration into at-risk communities.

 

Basic steps, such as enabling the northeast to export oil through Iraq, and
providing financial and logistical support for basic services and non-military
employment opportunities will not only limit ISIS’s reach within local
communities, but help create a sustainable governing authority in the northeast
that can stand without long-term U.S. support.

 

Most of the jobs in Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor prior to 2011 revolved around the
agricultural sector. But war and drought have devastated this industry, and
economic hardship has left locals unable to modernize their irrigation systems
to more efficiently use their limited water supply. “We need plastic pipes with
modern sprinklers for irrigation,” says Hassan, the farmer, “and access to
loans and financing for agricultural projects might help encourage young people
in agriculture to get away from ISIS.” Shadi* echoes this, arguing that the
region “needs widespread projects supporting all farmers, like providing
fertilizer and seeds and diesel and increasing the payment for crops. Without
this the agricultural sector will not recover and will become worse every year.”

 

Technical and material support from outside Syria is crucial for rebuilding
Syria’s breadbasket. Such aid must be distributed at the local level, with U.S.
and other western organizations working directly with constituencies the
support is meant to help. This will both maximize the impact of aid programs,
as well as strengthen the relationship between the U.S.-led coalition and Arab
communities in Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor. Many Arabs there perceive the coalition
as being an ally only to the Kurds and feel alienated from both the SDF and the
coalition. Despite this, civilians in Raqqa routinely request the coalition
return to the governorate, which it abandoned in late 2019. Improved
relationships between Arab civilians and the coalition would also make it much
easier for security forces to gather accurate intelligence on ISIS operations.

 

It is important to recognize that this enhancement of current policies can
remain within the existing counter-ISIS mandate. Deeping the Coalition’s
counter-insurgency policies to include non-military aspects of instability will
help ensure that the counter-ISIS mission addresses the social and economic,
not just military, aspects of ISIS’s insurgency. Poverty and unemployment are
key risk factors for ISIS recruitment, and properly dispersed financial aid
from western organizations will help stabilize the rapidly collapsing economy
in the northeast.

 

According to local researchers, economic hardships have also led to an
increase in the number of smuggling routes between the northeast and central
Syria and Iraq. ISIS cells rely heavily on these civilian and commercial
smuggling networks to move men and supplies between its fighting fronts, but,
according to the SDF’s own commanders, the security forces remain powerless to
shut them down. The only way to reduce smuggling, and thus hamper ISIS’s
freedom of movement, is to rebuild the economy. Therefore, smart, targeted
assistance and development programs form the bedrock of any effective long-term
anti-ISIS policy.

 

Everyone this author spoke to this fall talked about the recent mass flight of
young men from the northeast looking for a better future. Shadi* warns that the
economic situation is so bad now that, “If the road to Europe became easier you
would see only 10 percent of young men remain here.” Hassan left Raqqa at the
end of September, smuggling himself and his family into Turkey. He fears a
sudden U.S. withdrawal from the country and the inevitable return of ISIS it
would precipitate, but also cited the deteriorating economic and education
situation. His final decision to leave came after his 11-year-old son showed
him the footage of Afghan civilians hanging from a plane during the evacuation
of Kabul. “He said, ‘Dad if ISIS comes back there won’t be a place for you on
the flight either.’” Hassan now faces a difficult choice, remaining in Turkey
as an illegal refugee or “returning to Raqqa, where my children will have no
future.”

 

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