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CRITICAL STATE
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Your weekly foreign policy fix.
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If you read just one thing…
… read about how the US was arming the Taliban all along.
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Much of the coverage of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan focused on the weapons US forces were leaving behind and that, the stories implied, could soon form the core of the Taliban’s arsenal. As a new report from Combat Armament Research makes clear, however, the transfer of US and NATO weapons to the Taliban is not a phenomenon of the withdrawal, but rather a result of the invasion of Afghanistan itself, and has been ongoing for almost the entirety of the conflict. The US and NATO supplied huge numbers of small arms to the Afghan government, many of which found their way to Taliban stockpiles through capture or corruption. Researchers found not only US-built weapons, but also many weapons
produced in Eastern Europe and then shipped to the Afghan government by US brokers in Taliban arsenals. It turns out that the US trying to build a whole new Afghan military in the US image drove weapon transfers more than the stopping.
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assange derangement syndrome
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Your wild spy story for the week comes in the form of a longread about the Trump administration’s efforts to kidnap or assassinate Wikileaks founder Julian Assange. The story, based on interviews with over 30 US officials familiar with the case, describes a CIA completely on tilt after Wikileaks published details of the Agency’s hacking efforts in 2017. All kinds of plans were on the table.
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At one point, concerned that Assange would leave his longtime refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy in London and flee for Russia, CIA planners proposed crashing a car into the Russian car carrying Assange through London and then having a gunfight with Russian operatives to extract Assange. The plan got far enough along for the Agency to ask the British to help them with the shooting, something the British reportedly agreed to for reasons beyond understanding.
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When that plan proved unfeasible, then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo proposed just kidnapping him from the Ecuadorian embassy and then renditioning him to a third country. The UK did balk at that step, which led President Trump to ask the Agency to explore assasination option.
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Digital policy in Africa
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Outside the continent, Africa is often thought of as a digital battleground in the competition between China, the US, and Europe. According to a new survey of African countries’ laws and strategy documents about digital technology, that competition is an important policy consideration, but there are also important domestic agendas at play in determining Africa’s tech future.
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China has emerged in recent years as an important supplier of physical infrastructure for digital life in Africa, from cell towers to personal computers. Yet, the survey finds, African countries draw their digital regulatory structures much more from Europe than from China.
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When African countries list their digital priorities, however, they do not do so in the context of “great power competition.” Instead, they prioritize domestic goals like using e-learning to provide skills for their work forces or improving governance through digital outreach.
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How to train your dragoon: Part I
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Loathe though they are to admit it, militaries are, at their core, social constructions. There is nothing natural about pulling people who share nothing but a country into a highly hierarchical environment where they must subordinate their own self-preservation to the goal of killing people in a similar situation from another country. To make it happen, therefore, militaries spend a lot of time thinking about how to train people to be effective in their strange roles as cogs in the violence machine. This week and next on Deep Dive, we’ll read new research on how that training actually works.
One of the contradictions inherent in training people for military service is the need to train them to both inflict violence and restrain their infliction of violence. A soldier needs to be able to kill, but also needs to know how to be judicious in who they kill, both to avoid committing war crimes and to ensure unit discipline. Teaching people where the line is and how to walk it is difficult — indeed, some think that it is basically impossible. Yet it is one of the major goals of any form of military instruction. Recently, one political scientist decided to try and measure how it’s going.
Andrew Bell has a new article out in the Journal of Peace Research that attempts to quantify how the major officer training institutions of the US Army inculcate norms of restraint in combat. Specifically, Bell investigates whether the Army’s attempts to socialize officers into the norms of civilian protection and the rules of war. Socialization involves classroom instruction on the principles and methods of restraint, but it also encompasses the system of career punishments and rewards, which are enforced based on the extent to which officers exercise restraint. If cadets spend their time learning about restraint from people who have been promoted despite not practicing it, the lesson might
not sink in.
For Bell, the process of socialization is shaped by a set of trade-offs he calls the “combatant’s trilemma.” The trilemma is simple — when the military decides to use force, it generally can prioritize at most two of the following three values: Military effectiveness, force protection, and civilian protection. To illustrate, let’s say that a military unit learns that there is an enemy outpost next to a civilian house. Maximum military effectiveness means that the unit eliminates the enemy outpost. Maximum force protection means that no one from the unit is harmed. Maximum civilian protection means that none of the civilians are harmed.
Accomplishing all three is, at best, challenging, but accomplishing any two is fairly straightforward. If you prioritize force protection and military effectiveness, you just call in an airstrike on the enemy outpost and cross your fingers that it doesn’t hit the house. If you prioritize civilian protection and military effectiveness, you send your troops into the outpost to engage in close-quarters combat that will endanger them but will prevent violence from spilling over into the neighboring house. And if you prioritize civilian protection and force protection, you do nothing — the enemy outpost is still there, but all your troops and all the civilians are fine. One of the goals of norm socialization is to make officers include civilian protection in the priorities they balance rather than simply air-striking every outpost, no matter the neighbors.
How is the US Army doing in socializing its cadets into restraint norms? Fairly well — sort of. Bell conducted a survey of West Point and ROTC cadets, asking them their beliefs about which tradeoffs in the trilemma are justified and when. As freshmen, all of the cadets hold fairly similar views. They are more likely than not to agree that killing a civilian to save a soldier is justified, but to disagree that killing a civilian to accomplish a mission is acceptable.
After four years of intense military socialization, most of them increase their prioritization of civilian protection in the trilemma. Seniors at West Point and in ROTC programs are significantly less likely than freshman to approve of killing civilians to accomplish a mission, and West Point seniors go from being broadly in favor of killing civilians to save soldiers to being broadly opposed to it. ROTC cadets, strangely, show no change over four years in their willingness to kill civilians to save soldiers. Similarly, four years at West Point significantly raises seniors’ willingness to risk unit safety to limit risk for civilians, while that willingness is basically unchanged among ROTC cadets.
Bell also conducted the survey with civilian students, just to be sure that he wasn’t just measuring the difference between being 18 years old and 22. Civilians’ preferences stayed stable over their college careers. Therefore, Bell argues, the survey is measuring the effects of military socialization on cadets’ embrace of restraint norms. If so, the news from the survey is mixed at best. On one hand, it does seem possible to move people’s norm preferences toward civilian protection, at least early in their careers. On the other hand, maximizing that movement appears to require the most intense and expensive form of socialization the US Army has for young prospective officers: Four years on the Hudson largely disconnected from civilian life.
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Shirin Jaafari tracked the struggles of children separated from their families during the chaotic rush to flee Afghanistan as the Taliban took Kabul. Some children, including one three-year-old boy who was sent to Qatar while the rest of his family was sent to Canada, have been reunited with their families through the work of parents, governments, and advocates. At least 300 others, however, remain abroad and apart from their families, either because their parents could not escape, or were killed, or had to send them on a different route than the rest of the family. Advocates are forming a global network to serve those who remain separated.
Frank Vogl recounted the saga of Paul Rusesabagina, the Rwandan dissident and hero of the Rwandan genocide whose lifesaving actions in 1994 were dramatized in the film Hotel Rwanda. Rusesabagina is currently serving a 25-year sentence in Rwanda for what human rights activists agree was a trumped up terrorism conviction. Rusesabagina’s real crime — and the crime of many others who have been targeted by the regime — was to criticize Rwandan president Paul Kagame. Vogl argued that part of the reasons Kagame avoids international repercussions for his repressive policies are his close relationships with international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund.
Monica Campbell spoke to Afghans who work for the United Nations and are worried that their association with the international body will make them targets of the Taliban. The UN evacuated many of its international staff from Afghanistan as the Taliban took power in Kabul, but has made no move to get local staff out of the country. The safety concerns of local staff are not unfounded, especially since the Taliban have attacked UN offices as recently as July. Women who work for the UN face even greater danger, as they expect repression for working at all in addition to the exposure of being associated with the UN.
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“Soft power” is one of the most misunderstood concepts in international relations, but here’s a good way to remember it: Every time a Taliban commander has to take time out of his day to admonish his soldiersto stop doing things for the ‘gram, that’s US soft power at work.
Joey Tabula-Rasa is 38 today, and his country’s magnificent ruling establishment has ensured that he hasn’t seen a year of peacetime in his entire adult life. He’s considering a name change.
Presumably one of the birds just reminded her that she is single-handedly responsible for preventing the widespread production of lifesaving COVID-19 vaccines in the "Global South."
And they said being an anxious millennial wouldn’t prepare people for the military…
You know you’ve really become an Army legend when your most famous battle outfit is immortalized in a safe sex PSA.
If you’re an American citizen and you owe Mexican soccer legend Rafa Marquez money, it’s time to pay up!
Join us in welcoming the adorable Opal Naomi Rose to the world as the Official Baby of Critical State.
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Critical State is written by Sam Ratner and is a collaboration between The World and Inkstick Media.
The World is a weekday public radio show and podcast on global issues, news and insights from PRX and GBH.
With an online magazine and podcast featuring a diversity of expert voices, Inkstick Media is “foreign policy for the rest of us.”
Critical State is made possible in part by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
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