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September 29, 2021

This month’s newsletter features the latest episode of Iran Watch Listen, a
podcast by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. We speak with
Neil Watts, a former member of the U.N. Panel of Experts on North Korea,
about the evolution of missile and conventional arms cooperation between
North Korea and Iran and techniques used by both countries to evade
international sanctions. Neil also describes his experience boarding and
inspecting North Korean-linked vessels suspected of violating sanctions.

In addition, the newsletter features profiles of two aluminum companies
that have supplied Iran's uranium enrichment and ballistic missile
programs, as well as a company that operates a centrifuge manufacturing
plant in Karaj that is at the center of a dispute between Iran and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Other items in the newsletter
include documents from the Iran Watch library about the Iran-IAEA
negotiations, the U.S. and Iranian presidents' speeches to the U.N. General
Assembly, and ongoing U.S. sanctions enforcement actions, as well as news
about Germany's prosecution of an illicit procurement scheme supplying
Iran's nuclear program.

[2]View the newsletter in your browser and [3]subscribe to receive it in
your inbox.

PUBLICATIONS

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Podcast | [5]How Iran and North Korea Cooperate to Develop Missiles and
Evade Sanctions

In the latest episode of Iran Watch Listen, we speak with Neil Watts, who
served for five years as the Maritime Expert on the United Nations Panel of
Experts on North Korea. Neil describes the "close working relationship"
between Iran and North Korea on ballistic missile development, including
transfers of "leapfrog technologies" from North Korea that have allowed
Iran to qualitatively increase its missile capabilities. From earlier
transfers of complete missile systems, to more recent transfers of
subcomponents, software, test data, and technical expertise, North Korea
has helped Iran further its goal of self-sufficiency in missile
production.

Neil also describes how North Korea provides conventional arms to Iran and
uses Iran as a key facilitator to route arms to other clients in the Middle
East. These arms sales are a vital line of income for North Korea and an
opportunity for Pyongyang to forge relationships with state and non-state
actors. In addition, our discussion covers sanctions evasion methods used
by Iran and North Korea, including ship-to-ship transfers, transshipment,
splitting shipments among multiple containers and vessels, and hiding
illicit items in bulk cargo.

[6]LISTEN TO THE PODCAST

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) operates centrifuge manufacturing
plants at Natanz and Karaj. The Natanz plant suffered a damaging fire in
July 2020, and Iran’s atomic agency claimed that it thwarted an aerial
attack on the Karaj plant in June 2021. This month, however, the IAEA
[7]reported that Iran had removed four monitoring cameras from Karaj after
the June incident, and that one camera was destroyed and another severely
damaged. Iran has reportedly since prevented the IAEA from accessing the
Karaj plant.

[8]Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA)

Manufactures gas centrifuge parts; operates an assembly complex at Natanz;
involved in the production of IR-1 and IR-2M centrifuges; reportedly
identified by the British government in April 2015 as part of an active
Iranian nuclear procurement network.

[9]LEARN MORE

[10]Iran Aluminum Company (IRALCO)

An Iranian aluminum production company that accounts for approximately 75%
of Iran’s total aluminum production; has supplied TESA; has directly
supported Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and helped
designated entities violate U.N. sanctions on Iran, according to the
European Union; U.S. sanctions target Iran's aluminum sector because it
serves as a source of revenue that may be used to provide funding and
support for proliferation, terrorism, and military expansion.

[11]LEARN MORE

[12]Iran Alumina Company (IAC)

An Iran-based producer of alumina, or aluminum oxide, which is used in the
production of aluminum metal and also in solid fuel rocket propellant and
thermal control for space launch vehicles; reportedly operates a facility
that manufactures aluminum powder on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC).

[13]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

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Image source: Tasnim News Agency, CC 4.0

[15]Iran Fails to Fully Honour Agreement on Monitoring Equipment, IAEA Says
| Reuters

September 26: The International Atomic Energy Agency said in a statement on
September 26 that Iran has violated an agreement with the Agency by
continuing to block IAEA inspectors from accessing equipment at a
centrifuge manufacturing plant in Karaj. The agreement, reached two weeks
earlier, would have allowed the IAEA to service monitoring equipment and
replace memory cards. According to the IAEA, Iran allowed the Agency access
to all necessary sites except the Karaj plant. Iran's ambassador to the
IAEA claimed that access to Karaj was not part of the agreement. In June,
the Karaj plant suffered a possible sabotage event that destroyed an IAEA
camera there.

[16]Germany Arrests Man For Allegedly Assisting Iran′s Nuclear Program |
Deutsche Welle

September 14: German authorities arrested a man on suspicion of using his
company to procure items for Iran's nuclear program. The suspect,
identified as Alexander J., allegedly purchased several spectrometers and
sent them to an EU-sanctioned Iranian individual with known connections to
Iran's nuclear enrichment activities. Spectrometers can be used to analyze
radioactive material.

[17]IAEA Says Iran Increasing Stockpile of Highly Enriched Uranium |
Associated Press

September 7: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on
September 7 that, since May, Iran has increased its stockpile of 60%
high-enriched uranium (HEU) from 2.4 kilograms to 10 kilograms and its
stockpile of 20% HEU from 62.8 kilograms to 84.3 kilograms. The Agency also
said that Iran continues to block IAEA inspectors from accessing and
servicing monitoring equipment at Iranian nuclear sites, and that some of
the monitoring equipment has been destroyed or damaged. As a result, the
Agency's ability to monitor Iran's activities is declining. Finally, the
Agency reported that outstanding issues related to nuclear material stored
at four undeclared sites remain unresolved two years after they were raised
by the IAEA.

FROM THE LIBRARY

In early September, the IAEA Board of Governors released the Agency's
verification and monitoring report on Iran’s nuclear program. During the
reporting period, Iran repeatedly blocked the IAEA from accessing its
monitoring equipment, “seriously compromising” the agency’s oversight
mission. Days later, Iran agreed to let inspectors service existing
monitoring cameras and install new memory cards. Iran continues to prevent
the IAEA from accessing those cameras' footage, however, and the Agency
reportedly has accused Iran of violating the September 12 servicing
agreement by blocking its access to a centrifuge assembly plant in Karaj.
* The [18]IAEA report on Iran’s implementation of nuclear-related
commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) describes
monitoring difficulties, continued enrichment activity that violate the
JCPOA - September 7
* The IAEA’s [19]NPT safeguards report describes Iran’s failure to
cooperate with the Agency’s investigation into four undeclared nuclear
sites - September 7
* In a bilateral meeting in Tehran, [20]Iran agreed to allow IAEA
inspectors to service cameras and replace their memory cards - September 12
* IAEA Director General Grossi said in [21]remarks to the Board of
Governors that he will meet with AEOI head Mohammad Eslami again, and visit
Tehran for consultations - September 13

The 76th United Nations General Assembly took place in New York this month.
U.S. President Joe Biden and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi both addressed
nuclear negotiations in their speeches to the world body.
* Biden [22]reiterated the U.S. commitment to preventing Iran from
obtaining a nuclear weapon and said that the United States is prepared to
return to compliance with the JCPOA if Iran does the same.
* Raisi [23]claimed that fifteen IAEA reports certified Iran’s adherence
to its JCPOA commitments and said that the United States is obligated to
lift sanctions.

The United States continued to sanction and prosecute Iranian entities and
agents in September, including conspirators in overseas procurement
networks, financial facilitators for the IRGC, and intelligence officials
involved in a plot to kidnap a U.S. citizen.
* [24]The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Iranian intelligence agents
[25]for targeting an Iranian dissident living in New York - September 3
* [26]Three Florida residents were charged for running a sanctions
evasion scheme to transfer genome sequencing equipment to Iran - September
14
* [27]Iranian national Mehrdad Ansari was sentenced for his role in a
sprawling procurement network that may have moved millions of dollars in
sensitive hardware - September 14
* [28]The U.S. Treasury Department designated several financial
facilitators who laundered money for Lebanese Hizballah and the IRGC Qods
Force - September 17

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2021 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

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