[To make these submarines, including Australia’s, we are talking
about commitment to a very long-term and large-scale program involving
funds, funds, and more funds.] [[link removed]]

HOW HUGE MILITARY CONTRACTORS WILL GET EVEN RICHER OFF THE AUSTRALIAN
SUBMARINE DEAL  
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Charles Tiefer
September 17, 2021
Forbes
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_ To make these submarines, including Australia’s, we are talking
about commitment to a very long-term and large-scale program involving
funds, funds, and more funds. _

Columbia Class Submarine, GAO.gov

 

Under the cloud of smoke around the Australian submarine deal, are the
unspoken aspects of the enrichment of American military contractors.
There is no public mention of which American contractors will build
the expensive parts of the expensive Australian submarines. Even more
significant, there is no public mention of how there used to be, but
will not be, debate on the hundreds of billions of dollars for a large
fleet of expensive submarines for the United States itself.

However, there is plenty to figure out on these unspoken subjects. I
was a Commissioner on the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq
and Afghanistan. I have seen military contractors in action. I have
learned one must figure things out before they tell us.

First of all, what American contractors will build the parts of the
submarine? I assume that the submarines for Australia will be
assembled at Australia’s formidable shipyards. Among other reasons,
that will buy off the Australias’ own military industry and the
associated Australian ministers and legislators. However, the big
money is in the parts rather than the assembly. Never is this more so
than with today’s nuclear submarine, for which the “parts”
include a nuclear reactor and all its associated gear.

As for the American contractors for these pricey parts, the likeliest
candidates are those who build the most advanced American nuclear
submarine. That submarine is the Columbia-class submarine, designed
to replace the Ohio-class United States submarine.  The remaining
Ohio-class submarines are being decommissioned, one per year,
beginning in 2027. Then the Columbia-class will take over. So you
see, to make these submarines, including Australia’s, we are talking
about commitment to a very long-term and large-scale program involving
funds, funds, and more funds.

The cold cash figures for the Columbia class program are hard to
believe. The total lifecycle cost of the entire Columbia class is
estimated at $347 billion. The cost to build Columbia, the lead boat
of the class, will be an estimated $6.2 billions (including planning
for the whole class).  The Navy has a goal of reducing the average
cost of the remaining 11 to a mere $4.9 billion (fiscal 2010 dollars).

The Columbia class is being designed by Electric Boat, a subdivision
of General Dynamics GD
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Newport News Shipbuilding, a subdivision of Huntington Ingalls HII
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General Dynamics and Huntington Ingalls have the only two shipyards in
the United States capable of building nuclear submarines.
Huntington’s own shipyards are in Newport News, Virginia, and
Pascagoula, Mississippi. The Congressional delegations of both areas
will always be staunch supporters, on a bipartisan basis, of costly
projects.

They are used to working together. On the Ohio-class submarines,
General Dynamics served as the prime contractor and lead design
shipyard. General Dynamics would do most of the work, including final
assembly. Huntington Ingalls served as the main subcontractor,
participating in the design and construction and performing 22 to 23
percent of the required work. Even cutting off a piece for the
Australian shipyard, the money for the two American giants will be
huge.

However, to understand the full implications for the pandemic-weary
American taxpayer, go back just a few years ago. There used to be a
quiet, but serious debate about whether or how much to buy into that
$347 billion. The nuclear submarine had been seen, since the 1960s, as
part of a “strategic triad,” to carry nuclear warheads to deter
the other side in the Cold War (or to obliterate them if it came to
that). The other two parts of the triad were the strategic bomber, and
the intercontinental ballistic missile. These had been aging and there
had to be new components for the triad. But, did we really need full
numbers of all three? There were arguments for having all three, but
given the cost, it was still in debate.

The debate has quieted a little. China’s aggressive military
buildup has returned American thinking to old Cold War lines. However,
there could still be time to adapt. The number of nuclear submarines
can be rationalized, but could be considered at some future time. Who
knows what both the China and the United States might do to save money
as climate change become really fierce in years to come.

Going back to the source of this piece, Australia’s commitment to
the American submarine could be, but, will not be, considered as a way
to reduce the number of Columbia-class American submarines. After all,
we will be treated to a major multi-national chorus of how, when it
comes to submarines facing off China, we stand shoulder to shoulder
with submarines. So why not take Australia’s projected numbers and
use them for prudent consideration of America’s numbers? If that is
not done, maybe it is in part due to the appetites of the huge
military contractors.

_Charles Tiefer [[link removed]]_

_I am Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where I
focus on government contracting and Congressional legislating. I
served as Commissioner on the Congressionally-chartered Commission on
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which I did three
missions to Iraq and Afghanistan, and over 20 televised hearings. My
chief published work on government contracting is a leading 750 page
legal casebook, Government Contracting Law in the Twenty-First
Century. I have testified before Congressional committees as an expert
many times about Government contracting, problem departments, and
government personnel. I was General Counsel (Acting) of the House of
Representatives, serving15 years in that office and its Senate
counterpart, and published a 1000 page treatise, Congressional
Practice and Procedure. I am publishing with University Press of
America a new book, The Polarized Congress: The Post-Traditional
Procedure of its Current Struggles. I graduated from Columbia College
with a B.A. summa cum laude and from Harvard Law School with a J.D.
magna cum laude, and served on the Harvard Law Review._

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