|
|
|
|
Last year, Jim Lobe noted on this website a troublesome line of thinking from Trump’s past: using war to distract the masses. Indeed, Lobe identified at least six times between late 2011 and early 2013 that Trump predicted via Twitter that President Obama was going to attack Iran as a way of diverting attention from his domestic political misfortunes. Given his impending impeachment, is Trump signaling that he’s prepared to test this particular theory?
continue reading →
|
|
We have a moral obligation and a strategic interest in ensuring that the removal of our troops and the cessation of offensive operations do not lead to unnecessary security risks and human suffering.
continue reading →
|
|
In recent days, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has visited both Iran and Saudi Arabia amid reports that he’s been asked by U.S. President Donald Trump to mediate between the two Persian Gulf rivals and, potentially, between Iran and the United States. To better understand Khan’s potential role and what it might mean for Pakistan and the Middle East-South Asia region, LobeLog turned to our South Asia expert, Fatemeh Aman, to get her thoughts.
continue reading →
|
|
To give attention to the foreign relations side of the impeachment story is not to doubt the importance of all the other sides, including the ways in which the president’s conduct has imperiled America’s own democratic institutions and repeatedly obstructed justice. But the lessons about foreign relations are also important, and they apply to problems that go well beyond Donald Trump and the question of whether he stays or goes.
continue reading →
|
|
Turkey’s actions in Syria should be seen as the first steps in the unfolding of a new era of regional competition, rivalry, and possibly even conflict. The events of the last two decades have opened new opportunities for key regional states to try expanding the spheres of their influence. Consequently, they have set in motion new rivalries for deciding the future political and possibly even geographical map of the Middle East.
continue reading →
|
|
Washington might consider waiving temporarily the terrorism listing, or some comparable measure, to allow Khartoum to get its financial house in order. That may not be ideal, but it would be hard to argue against a short-term reprieve, especially if it helps to consolidate the power-sharing administration and gives further impetus to reforms.
continue reading →
|
|
As insane as Trump’s decisions on foreign policy have been they have also shown the bankruptcy of the foreign policy establishment in Washington that set up the situations he made so much worse. That rot is bipartisan. Whatever happens in Syria now was entirely avoidable. The fault lies with Trump for lighting the match but the bomb was built by the DC foreign policy bubble that is deeply rooted in both parties.
continue reading →
|
|
For the second year in a row, Mike Pompeo chose an unusual venue in which to present new escalations in the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran during the annual United Nations General Assembly in New York--the United Against Nuclear Iran’s annual conference, where Pompeo announced the administration was expanding its pressure campaign, targeting Chinese entities believed to be transporting Iranian oil.
continue reading →
|
|
Iran’s true opposition inside the country—the reformists, religious-nationalists, secular leftists, labor groups, human rights activists, and others—and its supporters in the diaspora reject discrimination against minorities, ethnic tensions, economic sanctions, military threats, and foreign intervention. In the democratic Iran that the true opposition will eventually achieve, all Iranians, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or gender, will be equal.
continue reading →
|
|
Middle Eastern regimes and governments that for years have relied on influential members of the United States Congress to protect their interests are no longer sure that their close relations with the United States would necessarily endure. Consequently, Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey, to name a few, will emerge as powerful political players and will present themselves as more dependable partners than Washington.
continue reading →
|
|
Iran wants to see the Astana peace process (involving Iran, Russia, and Turkey) succeed in terms of resolving the Syrian crisis, thus Tehran desires a continuation of good relations with Ankara. Similarly, Moscow doesn’t want its conflicts of interests with Turkey to upset the Astana process. On the other hand, as a supporter of the Syrian government, the Islamic Republic is deeply unsettled by the fact that Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring relies so heavily on anti-Assad rebel forces from northern and/or eastern Syria.
continue reading →
|
|
Part of Hezbollah’s raison d’être is enhancing the status of Lebanon’s Shia (even if many Shia oppose it). The 2006 war with Israel, when Hezbollah fighters successfully resisted an Israeli onslaught, gave many Shia not just pride but a sense that—contrary to narratives that had portrayed them as close to ‘Persians’—they were “authentic Lebanese” or even “more Lebanese than the others.”
continue reading →
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
