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DOES AMERICA STILL WORK?
By: Caroline Glick
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Even before the suicide bombings outside the Kabul airport on
Thursday
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the US media was acting with rare unanimity. For the first time in
memory, US media organs across the ideological and political spectrum
have been united in the view that US President Joe Biden fomented a
strategic disaster for the US and its allies with his incompetent
leadership of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some compare it to
the 1961 Bay of Pigs; others to Saigon in 1975; others to the US
embassy in Tehran in 1979. Whatever the analogy, the bottom line is
the same: Biden's surrender to the Taliban has already entered the
pantheon of American post-war defeats.
Biden is personally responsible for the humanitarian and strategic
disaster unfolding before our eyes. He is the only American leader in
history who has willfully abandoned Americans and American allies to
their fate behind enemy lines. But while Biden is solely responsible
for the decision to leave Afghanistan in the manner it is, it isn't
Biden's fault that after 20 years of war, the Taliban was still
around, stronger than it was on Sept. 11, 2001, and fully capable of
seizing control of the country. The foundations of that failure were
laid in the days, weeks and months that followed the Sept. 11 attacks.
In the aftermath of Sept. 11, then-President George W. Bush and his
national security team put together the guiding assumptions for what
came to be known as the global war on terror. In the years since then,
some of the assumptions were updated, adapted or replaced as
conditions on the ground evolved. But three of the assumptions that
stood at the foundation of America's military, intelligence and
diplomatic planning and operations since then were not revisited, save
for the final two years of the Trump administration. All three
contributed significantly to America's defeat in Afghanistan and its
failure to win the war against global terror as a whole. The first
assumption related to Pakistan, the second to Iran, and the third to
Israel.
By rights, Pakistan should have been the first domino to fall after
the Sept. 11 attacks. The Taliban were the brainchild of Pakistan's
jihad-addled ISI intelligence agency. Al-Qaida operatives also
received ISI support. But aside from a few threats and temporary
sanctions around the time of the US invasion of Afghanistan in October
2001, the US took no significant actions against Pakistan. The reason
for America's inaction is easy to understand.
In 1998 Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. By Sept. 11, 2001, Pakistan
fielded a significant nuclear arsenal. Following the attacks, Pakistan
made clear its view of nuclear war, and the connection between its
position and its sponsorship of terror.
In October and December 2001, Kashmiri terrorists sponsored by
Pakistan attacked the Jammu and Kashmir parliament and the Indian
parliament. When India accused Pakistan of responsibility and
threatened reprisals, then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf placed
the Pakistani military on alert. India began deploying troops to the
border and Pakistan followed suit.
Rather than side with India, the US pressured Delhi to stand down,
which it did in April 2002. In June 2002, Pakistani-backed terrorists
carried out suicide bombings against the wives and children of Indian
soldiers. The countdown to war began again. In June 2002, again bowing
to US pressure, India pledged it would not be the first to introduce
nuclear weapons to the conflict. Musharraf refused to follow suit.
Rather than rally behind India, the Bush administration wrested an
empty promise from Musharraf that he would stop sponsoring terrorism
and then pressured India to stand down again.
The US message was clear. By credibly threatening to use its nuclear
weapons, Pakistan deterred the Americans. Less than six months later,
North Korea expelled UN inspectors from its nuclear reactor at
Yangbyon and canceled its signature on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Iran escalated its covert nuclear activities at Isfahan and
Natanz.
The US's decision to dodge a confrontation with Pakistan following the
Sept. 11 attacks empowered the ISI to rebuild the Taliban and al-Qaida
after the US decimated both in its initial offensive. Taliban leaders
decamped to Pakistan where they rebuilt their forces and waged a war
of attrition against US, NATO forces and the Afghan army and
government they built. Osama bin Laden was living in what amounted to
a Pakistani military base when he was killed by US commandos. That war
ended with Biden's surrender and the Taliban's recapture of Kabul this
month.
This brings us to Iran. In their post-Sept. 11 deliberations, Bush and
his advisors decided not to confront Iran, but instead seek to reach
an accommodation with the mullahcracy. This wasn't a new policy. Since
the Reagan administration, the dominant view in Washington has been
that it is possible to reach an accord with the Iranian regime that
would restore the strategic alliance Washington and Tehran shared
before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Bush and his advisors were not
moved to reassess that view when they learned that Iran provided
material support to the September 11 hijackers. They didn't reconsider
their assumption after al Qaeda's leadership decamped to Tehran when
the Taliban were routed in Afghanistan. They didn't reconsider it when
Iran served as the headquarters and the arms depot for al-Qaida in
Iraq or the Shiite militias in their war against US and coalition
forces in Iraq.
Barack Obama embraced and escalated Bush's assumption on Iran.
Instead of confronting Tehran, he tried to realign the US Middle East
alliance system towards Iran and away from America's Arab allies and
Israel. He effectively handed Iran control over Iraq when he withdrew
US forces. He paved Iran's path to a nuclear arsenal with the 2015
nuclear deal.
After a prolonged fight with the Washington establishment and its
representatives in his cabinet who embraced Bush's assumptions, in his
last two years in office, Donald Trump partially abandoned the
strategic assumption that Iran could and should be appeased. Biden for
his part, is committed to reinstating and escalating Obama's policies
towards Iran.
As for Israel, in the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks,
then secretary of state Colin Powell convinced Bush to adopt two
related assumptions on Israel. First, he determined that terror
against Israel was different – and more acceptable – than terror
against everyone else. And second, Bush determined that the war
against terror would be directed at terror groups but not at
governments that sponsor terrorism, (except Iraq). As former Bush
administration official David Wurmser, who was involved in the
post-Sept. 11 deliberations recalled recently, Powell argued that
terror threatens the Arabs no less than it threatens America. This
being the case, the trick to winning them over to the US side was to
give them a payoff that would make it worth their while.
Israel was the payoff. The US would be able to bring Syria on board by
getting Israel to give the Golan Heights to the Assad regime.
Washington would bring in the Saudis and the rest of the Sunnis by
forcing Israel to give Judea, Samaria, Gaza and Jerusalem to the PLO.
Ahead of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, then-Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon tried to unravel Washington's guiding assumption
about Iran. He told Bush and his advisors that Iraq hadn't posed a
strategic threat to Israel or anyone else in the region since the 1991
Gulf War. If the US wanted to defeat global terror, Sharon explained,
the US should act against Iran. The administration ignored him.
As for the administration's assumptions about Israel, a week after the
attacks, Bush deliberately left the terror against Israel out of the
terror that the US would fight in the war against terror when he told
the joint houses of Congress that the war would be directed against
terror groups "with global reach."
Recognizing where the Americans were headed, in October 2001, Sharon
gave what became known as his "Czechoslovakia speech."
Following a deadly terror attack in Gaza, Sharon said, "I call on the
Western democracies, and primarily the leader of the free world, the
United States: Do not repeat the dreadful mistake of 1938, when
enlightened European democracies decided to sacrifice Czechoslovakia
for 'a convenient temporary solution.'
Do not try to appease the Arabs at our expense – this is
unacceptable to us. Israel will not be Czechoslovakia. Israel will
fight terrorism. There is no 'good terrorism' and 'bad terrorism,' as
there is no 'good murder' and 'bad murder.'"
The administration's response to Sharon's statement was swift and
furious. Sharon was harshly rebuked by Powell and the White House and
he beat a swift retreat.
A month later, Powell became the first senior US official to
officially endorse the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Sharon's failure to convince the Americans to rethink their false
assumptions owed to his incomprehension, and fear of Washington.
Benjamin Netanyahu, in contrast had an intimate familiarity with the
ways of Washington. As a result, his efforts to convince the Americans
to reconsider their assumptions about Iran and Israel met with
significant success. Netanyahu's first success in relation to Iran
came through the Arabs.
Netanyahu recognized that the Arab Gulf states were as threatened by
Iran – and by Obama's efforts to appease Iran – as Israel was. So
he reached out to them. Convinced by Netanyahu, Saudi Arabia led the
Arab Gulf states and Egypt in embracing Israel as their ally in their
existential struggle against Iran. Confronting Iran, the Saudis
explained, was far more important to the Arabs than helping the
Palestinians.
Israeli-Arab unity on Iran stymied Obama's efforts to win
Congressional approval for his nuclear deal. It also stood at the
foundation of Trumps' decision to abandon Obama's deal.
Netanyahu used his operational alliance with the Arabs as well in his
effort to undo the US's false assumptions about Israel, particularly
in regard to the Palestinians. He also used public diplomacy geared
towards influencing Israel's Congressional supporters and public
opinion. Netanyahu's efforts derailed Obama's plan to dictate the
terms of a "peace" settlement to Israel. Under Trump, Netanyahu's
efforts influenced Trump's decision to move the US Embassy to
Jerusalem and convinced Trump to support Israeli sovereignty over
parts of Judea and Samaria.
Distressingly, Netanyahu's successes are being swiftly undone by the
Biden administration and the Bennett-Lapid government.
There is a growing sense that Biden's catastrophic withdrawal from
Afghanistan is setting the world back 20 years. But the truth is even
more dire. In 2001, the US was far more powerful relative to its
enemies than it is today. And as has been the case for the past 20
years, the situation will only start moving in the right direction if
and when America finally abandons the false assumptions it adopted 20
years ago.
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_ACT For America is a 501c3 nonprofit organization. We do not receive
any government funding or grants so that we are not muzzled from
speaking the truth. We rely on the generosity of patriots who believe
in the importance of our work so we can continue exposing America's
enemies foreign or domestic and mobilizing Americans to stand up and
defend freedom. We would be so grateful for your support.
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