Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2021 by clicking here.
ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2021 By Gregory Wa


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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2021

 

Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2021 by clicking here
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.

 

ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2021

By Gregory Waters

 

Following is the August 2021 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. Previous editions of ISIS Redux can be viewed through the
following links:July
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,June
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,May
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,April
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,March
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,February
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, andJanuary
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2021; andDecember
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,November
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,October
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,September
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,August
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,July
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,June
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,May
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, andApril
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2020. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including
its methodology, can also be exploredhere
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andhere
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.

 

ISIS militants carried out at least 10 confirmed attacks in August, killing at
least nine pro-Assad regime fighters and two civilians, while wounding at least
three others in the Homs, Deir Ez Zor, Raqqa, and Aleppo governorates. The
number of confirmed ISIS attacks dropped to its lowest point since March 2020,
continuing a decline that began following a high of 47 attacks in January 2021.
High quality* attacks matched July’s total of three, compared to a high of 15
in January. ISIS attacks have completely ended in Hama—where militants carried
out only one attack in July—and continued to be concentrated in Deir Ez Zor for
the second month in a row.

Only one attack in August targeted civilians, compared to two in the previous
month. Both attack lethality and the number of total casualties dropped
significantly in August. Total casualties reached a level not witnessed since
November 2019. However, ISIS cells once again succeeded in killing a pro-regime
commander.

 

The increased reliance on mines and IEDs that began in May 2021 and rose
sharply in June and July shifted slightly in August. Only three confirmed
mine/IED attacks compared to four confirmed small arms attacks and three
attacks of unknown means took place during the month. This shift in attack
style may indicate the beginning of a shift in ISIS posture, as it is possible
that cells have successfully finished relocating and reestablishing themselves
in new areas of operation. However, the sample size for August is too small to
draw definitive conclusions.

 

Confirmed attacks in August in Homs (2) dropped significantly following two
months of gradual decline. While attacks in Deir Ez Zor (5) dropped slightly
from last month, activity in the governorate is still higher than it was during
spring. Meanwhile, ISIS cells continue to operate a low-level but consistent
insurgency in south Raqqa (2) and south Aleppo (1) while appearing to have
completely abandoned eastern Hama for the time being. ISIS cells conducted a
high quality attack in Raqqa for the second month in a row, as well as one high
quality attack each in south Aleppo and Deir Ez Zor.

Hama

 

There was no confirmed ISIS activity in Hama in August. The last attack in the
governorate occurred on July 8. A locally deployed regime fighter told this
author last month that both of the main ISIS cells had fully withdrawn from the
governate between June and July, and a second soldier interviewed this month
confirmed that his battalion had seen no trace of ISIS during a two week
mission across the area in the first half of August. This is the first month
without ISIS activity in Hama since March 2020, when ISIS was only just
beginning to re-establish itself in the governorate.

 

Homs

 

ISIS activity in Homs dropped significantly as regime forces continued to
expand patrols and maintain extensive garrisons across the governorate. On
August 6, regime pages reported clashes between security forces and insurgents
along the highway outside Sukhnah. On August 15, ISIS claimed it downed a
Russian Orlan drone, which according to the pro-government militia the National
Defense Forces (NDF) had been operating over Shanhas on the southeastern Kawm
front. On August 26, further activity was reported around Kawm, with militants
conducting a minor small arms attack on regime militias in the area and
attempting to down another observation drone the following day.

 

Unlike in June and July, when ISIS activity in Homs was reduced but still
occurred across the governorate, ISIS cells appeared to focus almost
exclusively on the Kawm-Sukhnah front in August. This may hint at the
importance ISIS places on opening the terrain around Kawm, which sits
strategically on the highway connecting Raqqa to Homs. However, it seems
unlikely that ISIS will dislodge regime forces here anytime soon due to the
high number of regime units deployed and constant Russian air support.

Map of ISIS attacks in Homs in August 2021 (highlighted dots).

 

Deir Ez Zor

 

As in July, Deir Ez Zor continued to see the most important developments of
the ISIS Badia insurgency. Activity here has dropped significantly since
January 2021 as regime, Russian, and Iranian forces moved to dislodge ISIS
cells first around Jabal Bishri and then in the Mayadin countryside. By June,
ISIS had reportedly moved hundreds of fighters out of the province and into
Iraq. By mid-July, regime sources claimed that new ISIS cells had entered the
governorate, triggering a notable increase in attacks. While this author
previously assumed the new fighters had returned from Iraq, it is also possible
that some of these cells consist of fighters who left east Hama in June and
early July.

 

Two notable attacks occurred in Deir Ez Zor in August. First, ISIS fighters
attacked an NDF/Syrian Arab Army (SAA) position near the town of Musarib in
west Deir Ez Zor on August 12. This area had been the scene of intense ISIS
attacks throughout the fall of 2020. While this attack was reportedly repelled,
it may portend a return of some cells to the previously “cleared” part of the
governorate. Second, on August 25, a pro-regime Liwa al-Quds commander was
killed somewhere in the governorate. His exact role is unclear. However,
pictures and posts suggest he was part of the command staff of the Deir Ez Zor
branch of Liwa al-Quds, and may have been traveling with the overall commander
of the Deir Ez Zor region at the time of his death.

 

Raqqa and Aleppo

 

Confirmed ISIS activity in south Raqqa in August continued be in the
one-to-three attacks per month range as it has all year. As in July, both
attacks in August occurred at the beginning of the month. On August 5, ISIS
fighters attacked a group of shepherds in the western part of the governorate,
killing two and kidnapping three, while also stealing their sheep. Two days
later, a local regime fighter was killed by a mine somewhere in the governorate.

 

Also on August 5, three regime soldiers were killed and one was injured when
their vehicle hit a mine/IED in southern Aleppo during sweeping operations.
This was the first attack in this area in almost two months.

 

Regime Operations

 

Anti-ISIS operations have not changed significantly in recent months. In Homs,
security forces still maintain a heavy presence around Kawm and conduct sweeps
and patrols around Palmyra and Sukhnah. The Russian-backed 25th Division
continues sweeps north of Ithriya into southern Aleppo while the Russian-backed
5th Corps conduct one-to-two week sweeps from Resafa, Raqqa through east Hama
to Salamiyah.

 

The 5th Corps sweeps are conducted by rotating battalions approximately once a
month and include mine-sweeping tanks and engineering units. According to one
soldier who participated in August’s sweep, they neither found nor were engaged
by ISIS cells at any point, and no one in the operation was hit by a mine or
IED. The soldier further told this author that Russia provides drone coverage
for the patrols, scouting the roads ahead of the convoy and hitting any
“suspicious areas” with airstrikes.

 

Looking Ahead

 

ISIS was less active in the Badia this month than they could have been. As
stated in July’s update, it seems likely that, for the time being, ISIS is
content with the current status quo in the Badia. The lack of confirmed attacks
suggests that ISIS’s training camps and transit routes between Iraq and
northeast Syria remain largely intact, as both are too crucial to ISIS’s
broader strategy for the group to allow them to be cut off by regime forces.

 

Interestingly, August was the first month since 2019 that ISIS has not
officially claimed an attack somewhere in central Syria. While ISIS has always
been reluctant to claim attacks here—only claiming around25 percent
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of all confirmed attacks since 2020—the past two months have seen fewer claims
than usual. This suggests that regime operations may have finally disrupted
communication nodes. However, the August 12 edition of ISIS’s weekly newspaper
al-Naba had an entire page devoted to praising the insurgents in central Syria,
comparing them to the original Islamic State in Iraq fighters in the mid-2000’s
and bragging about the “military bases and legal schools that have been
established in the Badia”—an under-discussed dynamic. While attacks in central
Syria may be dropping, the regional importance of the Badia remains as high as
ever.

Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted dots) in August 2021. This map does
not include four attacks which did not have specific locations attributed to
them; one “south Aleppo” attack, one “Raqqa countryside” attack, and two “Deir
Ez Zor countryside” attacks. To view an interactive version of this map, please
clickhere
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.

 

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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.

 

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