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Just because many people wanted to end the U.S.'s military presence in Afghanistan, it does not follow that the withdrawal had to be the catastrophe that is has become. U.S. intelligence grossly overestimated the Afghan army's willingness to fight. Tribal loyalties clearly trumped any loyalties to the Afghan government and nation. The failure to properly assess these factors is all the more galling given this country's experience in Iraq. The U.S. intelligence, from CIA, DOD, take your pick, on how fast the Taliban would take over was just as dismal.
The combination of these two intelligence failures has left tens of thousands of Afghans and their families, who assisted and helped the American armed forces over the last 20 years, without a way to get out of the country. For crying out loud, the State Department couldn't even process visas for these people in any meaningful numbers. Heads should roll over the incompetent way this whole deal was managed. —Derek H., Ohio
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The collapse of Afghanistan's government—or at least the speed with which it fell—seems to have taken the Biden Administration by surprise. The reality is the Taliban's return should have been no surprise at all, even if the swiftness of the onslaught was. Over the last several months, as the Taliban took over more and more Afghan territory, it became clear the group's fighters were, in fact, holding back all along—they could have been more aggressive but were merely waiting for U.S. forces to depart. It remains a puzzle why the nominally 300,000-person-strong Afghan army simply rolled over and gave up. One theory goes Afghan forces were demoralized and poorly managed. Contrast that with Taliban forces, which seemed to have all the motivation in the world to fulfill what they saw as their destiny. Another explanation could be it was all about money. Corruption was rampant in Afghanistan, and large parts of the government's forces went unpaid for months. It was easy, then, for the Taliban to offer Afghan army members money in exchange for their weapons and a quiet surrender. Yet another contributing factor could be the recent departure of contractors. Afghan forces had become reliant on U.S. contractors for everything from training to gear maintenance. Once they left, military supply chains broke down. Lastly, Washington's very involvement played a self-defeating role. Any Western-backed government necessarily lacked popular legitimacy; and when it was finally time to go, the West's departure sapped the morale of the Afghan army and wrecked its logistics. Whatever the reasons, it's clear the world underestimated the Taliban all along. —Ravi Agrawal, Editor-in-Chief, 
