August 10, 2021

China's Nuclear Forces Swell: A Tri-Polar World?

(Photo by GREG BAKER / AFP) (Photo by GREG BAKER/AFP via Getty Images)

Heritage Senior Research Fellow Dean Cheng writes that for the last three decades, the Chinese military has been undertaking a systematic modernization of the People’s Liberation Army. While the conventional force modernizations have garnered most of the attention, recent revelations of a major Chinese missile silo construction effort in the west indicate that the nuclear component of the PLA has been modernizing as well.

This enormous expansion of the Chinese ICBM force, coupled with the construction of additional ballistic missile submarines and reports of a new Chinese intercontinental bomber, suggests that China is shifting from its presumed minimal nuclear deterrent posture. That is, China’s nuclear forces are presumed to be primarily aimed at adversary population centers, as the primary means of deterring aggression—the definition of “minimal deterrent.” This posture is presumed, in part because Beijing has chosen not to build a larger nuclear force since it exploded its first fission and fusion devices in the 1960s. Like France and the UK, China has fielded only sufficient numbers of nuclear weapons to grievously damage an attacker (sufficient to “tear an arm off the bear” is how some have described the French nuclear deterrent) by attacking their cities, but not to engage in nuclear warfighting, including the conduct of counterforce strikes.

With the development of the DF-41 and a more capable seaborne deterrent, some theorized that Beijing might be shifting from a minimal deterrent to a “limited deterrent.” A limited deterrent force would provide sufficient forces to potentially engage in some counterforce strikes, or some limited, small-scale attacks in the face of conventional attacks (much as NATO planning included nuclear response options to a Soviet attack on West Germany). It would entail some increase in China’s nuclear forces, but would leave Beijing substantially behind the U.S. and Russia. The scale of China’s nuclear expansion, however, calls into question whether Beijing is interested in fielding a limited deterrent. The combination of a modern long-range bomber (the H-20), and an expanded seaborne ballistic missile force, as well as this massive inflation of the land-based ICBM component, makes China’s nuclear forces look far more like their “hegemonic” counterparts in Russia and the United States than the minimal or limited deterrent presented by French or British nuclear forces.

If the Chinese are placing ICBMs in these silos, they may be hoping to discourage any prospect of a successful disarming strike aimed at them due to the fratricidal effects of nearby detonations. But this, in turn, suggests that PLA planners are less confident of the ability of mobile ICBMs to survive. Are there fundamental shortcomings in Chinese defenses and deception techniques that they are concerned about?

China’s nuclear expansion should make clear that its previous limited numbers were not the result of some physical constraint (e.g., insufficient fissile material), but instead was a policy choice. Given Xi Jinping’s broader rejection of Deng Xiaoping’s advice to “hide one’s abilities, bide one’s time,” it may well be that this growth is part of Xi’s “China dream” of a stronger Chinese military, one able to operate openly on the world stage. If this is the case, it is important to recognize that the PRC’s view of nuclear crisis stability is not the same as that of the United States or Russia. During the Cold War, it became something of a shibboleth that nuclear-armed states do not fight each other directly. The potential for escalation in the event of such a confrontation was considered too high, especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis. This “lesson,” however, ignored the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, battles precipitated by deliberate Chinese provocations. Both sides had nuclear weapons.

It may well be time to reconsider the broader landscape of nuclear deterrence, as Washington, Beijing, and Moscow all become roughly comparable. A tri-polar nuclear balance is a very different proposition from a bipolar one, especially where two of the players are relatively closely aligned against the third. The discovery of the silo fields in western China indicates that it is well past time to start reexamining the foundations of American nuclear deterrence thinking.

Related: Click here to read Heritage Senior Research Fellow Peter Brooke's commentary on Beijing's bomb buildup.

Put on your radar: Click here to read the Heritage Foundation's 2021 China Transparency Report.

Sherman's China Visit Was a Quiet Disaster

(Photo by Li Ran/Xinhua via Getty Images)

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman met last week with senior Chinese diplomats. Heritage Senior Research Fellow Dean Cheng writes that the meeting, White House and State Department spin notwithstanding, did not go well. This seems to have been a surprise only to the U.S. side.

The visit ran into problems even before it began. The initial itinerary and announcements indicated that Sherman would be visiting South Korea, Japan, and Mongolia but not China. There was no reason why this should be problematic; after all, the Biden administration has emphasized that it would be rebuilding U.S. alliances and upgrading friendships. But reports revealed that the trip was supposed to include a visit to China. And when the State Department was visibly disappointed and miffed that the Chinese were not offering Sherman a suitable counterpart for the meeting, it became clear that the trip was as much about talking with China as it was about reassuring U.S. allies and friends.

Amid all the discussions about meeting the “right” Chinese officials, the actual substance of the meeting got shorter shrift. As with other meetings, agendas and specific topics received far less attention than pressing the Chinese for access to the right people. Exhibit A was the Anchorage summit in March, which was informally billed as a “listening opportunity.” Kurt Campbell, the White House coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, reportedly openly derided Wang and Yang, China’s top foreign-policy officials, as “nowhere near within a hundred miles” of President Xi Jinping’s inner circle. Given that Yang is the first foreign-policy official on the Politburo since 1999 (and he was appointed by Xi), such an assessment is questionable and likely seen as an insult in Beijing—prompting the next squabbles around protocol.

It should not have been surprising that Beijing exploited the opportunity for all it was worth. Despite claims that Xi was pushing for a softer approach, based largely off a misreading of a single line in one of his speeches, for the last several weeks, Beijing has been signaling that its “wolf warrior” diplomatic approach would continue. Earlier in July, Vice Foreign Minister Le declared that the United States must accept that its hegemony was “in decline.” Foreign Minister Wang, meanwhile, stated that China would have to give the United States a “tutorial” on how to treat other nations respectfully, even as Sherman and Foggy Bottom were negotiating for the visit.

When Sherman met with Xie, he took the opportunity to castigate the United States. Xie blamed Washington for the “stalemate” in relations and accused the United States of “demonizing” China. He then presented Sherman with two lists of Chinese grievances and demands—one on “U.S. wrongdoings that must stop” and the other on “key individual cases that China has concerns about.” While the contents of the lists have not been formally released by either side, Chinese reports indicate that the list of U.S. wrongdoings includes demands for the United States to unconditionally lift visa restrictions on CCP members and to stop targeting Chinese companies, media, and Confucius Institutes, as well as revoking the extradition request to Canada of Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou. The second list comprises more specific cases involving rejected student visa applications and claims of harassment of Chinese diplomatic and consular missions.

As Yang explicitly stated in Anchorage, China will no longer tolerate, much less accept, U.S. efforts to dictate the rules of the rules-based international order. This theme animates various Chinese speeches and statements, including Xi’s controversial speech commemorating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. As the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson noted, any discussion of “guardrails” or norms for U.S.-China relations “must be discussed and agreed on by both sides.” Beijing has become increasingly strident in this regard, not only to portray itself domestically as the defender of Chinese interests but also to signal to a variety of third countries that China has “stood up.” As Chinese writers have long noted, strategic communications always have three audiences: the domestic audience, the adversary’s leadership and masses, and third parties who might be influenced or shaped.

The Biden administration risks signaling to Beijing that Washington is desperate for a deal. The constant reiteration of climate change as an arena for U.S.-China cooperation, coupled with President Joe Biden’s repeated declarations that climate change poses the greatest threat to the United States (and the world), leaves little bargaining room for the United States. Beijing has already made clear, if only by its construction of more coal-fired electricity capacity than the rest of the world combined, that it will not allow concerns about climate change to shift major investments and construction. Beijing may well have been heartened by recent reports that suggest the Democratic Party is divided on whether to focus on confronting climate change or China. Thus, if the United States wants to make China change course, it will have to offer China concessions. The two lists are, in effect, China’s initial demands. The Chinese leadership is undoubtedly waiting to see how the Biden administration responds, whether it is more concerned with climate change or confronting China.

Both Anchorage and Tianjin make clear that, from the Chinese perspective, they are not in a conciliatory mood. If the United States and China are to have improved relations, or any prospect of cooperation, Beijing expects Washington to make the concessions. Chinese officials, meanwhile, have patronizingly declared that Beijing is willing to treat the United States as an “equal.” U.S. decision-makers should recognize this Chinese perspective before they go, hat in hand, to ask for another meeting with their Chinese counterparts.

Don't Be Fooled by Charm Campaign: Biden Administration Must Hold Line on Huawei

Heritage Research Fellow Dustin Carmack writes that the Chinese telecom giant Huawei has initiated a charm campaign in recent weeks to convince the Biden administration to be more accommodating toward the company. To safeguard American national security, the Biden administration must not take the bait. 

Among Huawei’s increased lobbying activities in the U.S. is the hiring of longtime Washington lobbyist Tony Podesta. It’s senior vice president, Vincent Peng, even penned a column in the Japanese-based publication Nikkei Asia, titled “Huawei to Joe Biden: Let’s Talk,” in which he implored the administration to engage with Huawei.

The fact of the matter is that Huawei continues to pose a significant national security threat to the U.S. and its allies. Despite Huawei’s claims to the contrary, it maintains extensive ties to the Chinese government. Huawei benefits from massive Chinese government ;subsidies and low-interest loans, which Chinese state banks provide to other countries to use the company’s telecom equipment. In addition, Huawei has worked closely with China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, on high-tech research projects.

Under Chinese law, Huawei would be required to assist the country’s intelligence and security services if asked to do so. Article 14 of China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law stipulates that “the state intelligence work organization shall carry out intelligence work according to law, and may require relevant organs, organizations and citizens to provide necessary support, assistance and cooperation.” Article 7 of the same law ominously states that “any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in accordance with the law.” This law essentially forces supposedly private Chinese companies such as Huawei to act as data-collecting arms of the Chinese Communist Party.

The equipment and products offered by Huawei have also been shown to contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited for nefarious purposes. In February 2020, The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. was in possession of intelligence showing that Huawei equipment allows the company to maintain unauthorized access to mobile phone networks. Similarly, the British telecom company Vodafone also previously discovered backdoors in Huawei products. Moreover, the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Centre has noted that Huawei’s products contain significant technical vulnerabilities and are of lower quality.

Huawei has also shown a complete disregard for the laws of other nations. In January 2019, the Department of Justice unsealed an indictment against Huawei and its chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, for bank fraud and violating U.S. sanctions against Iran. In February 2020, Huawei was indicted in the Eastern District of New York on charges of racketeering and conspiracy to steal trade secrets. This indictment alleged in part that Huawei engaged in intellectual property theft against six U.S. technology companies, and detailed Huawei’s business activities in both North Korea and Iran.

Although the Biden administration’s overall China and technology strategies remain unclear, it has thus far largely maintained the Trump administration’s hard-line approach toward Huawei. In March, the administration strengthened export licenses for companies that supply 5G components to Huawei. In June, President Joe Biden signed an executive order expanding prohibitions imposed by the Trump administration on U.S. investment in Chinese companies, including Huawei, that supply China’s military and sell surveillance technology. The administration has also been pressuring the United Arab Emirates to remove Huawei equipment from its networks, and is working to expand outreach to developing countries to assist in the construction of 5G networks without technology from Chinese companies.

In the coming months, it is likely that powerful and connected lobbyists working on Huawei’s behalf will attempt to woo the Biden administration. The most solemn duty of any presidential administration is to protect American national security. As such, the Biden administration must reject these lobbying efforts and hold the line on Huawei.