June 29, 2021
Biden's Trip to Europe and the Future of Transatlantic Cooperation on China
Heritage ASC Director Walter Lohman writes <[link removed]> that the G-7, NATO, and U.S.-EU summits two weeks ago elicited predictable diplomatic protests from Beijing. Also predictable was the regime’s military incursion into Taiwan’s ADIZ in the days following. That sort of thing that has come to be expected anytime there is a major international demonstration of support for Taiwan, and the G-7 statement’s mention of Taiwan was definitely that. To all appearances, the world’s most powerful democracies are uniting against China’s bullying. This is a good thing. It is important, however, to keep in mind some context.

First, the U.S. accords the Pacific much higher priority than the Europeans do. In fact, during the Obama years, the Europeans fretted over just this. The French are the only ones with significant territorial interests in the region. Like the US, they service these interests, in part, with military assets based in the Pacific — albeit far fewer than the U.S., without treaty allies, and very far from China. Similarly, the Brits—steadfast and active regional allies as they are—have a military that is stretched thin among global interests.

Second, both the U.S. and Europe continue to have enormous economic interests in their relationships with China. Lost in the headlines of U.S.-China rivalry is the fact that U.S. trade with China increased in 2020 and is on record pace for 2021. Europe’s trade with China is increasing, too. Both remain major investors in China. Europe is its largest. Is it any wonder, then, that the U.S. and the EU have come up with flexible descriptions of their strategies? The U.S. calls its relationship with China “competitive, collaborative and adversarial.” For the EU, China is a “partner, competitor and rival.”

Third, on both sides of the Atlantic, geostrategy contends with politics. There is nothing mystical about geopolitics. Governments determine policy outcomes, and in the U.S. and Europe, elections determine governments.

Finally, there is China’s own behavior. It could change in ways that would complicate transatlantic cooperative efforts to manage it. The EU Parliament was very specific about its principal concern with CAI: Chinese sanctions on its members. Europe’s fundamental interests in that agreement have not changed. A deal that facilitates lifting the sanctions and reinstating CAI’s economic benefits cannot be ruled out. That, in turn, will once again change the environment around transatlantic cooperation.

The bottom line is that the U.S. and Europe are finding common cause on China. No doubt. Even as we celebrate this, however, staying on task requires proponents of this cooperation to recognize its potential limitations.
Related: Click here <[link removed]> to view the Heritage Foundation's China Transparency Project. Check out <[link removed]> the China Uncovered podcast, season two coming soon!
North Korea Slams the Door on Dialogue - For Now
In an article in TheHill, Heritage Senior Research Fellow Bruce Klingner writes <[link removed]> that Pyongyang has dashed the hopes of experts who had interpreted Kim Jong Un’s “dialogue or confrontation” statement last week as portending a return to negotiations. Two senior North Korean officials dismissed speculation that the regime was interested in dialogue, though atypically they refrained from adding threats of impending provocation.

Pyongyang may eventually ratchet up tensions designed to garner concessions from the United States. For now, however, the regime seems focused on addressing dire domestic economic conditions and food shortages.

The path to dialogue with North Korea often first runs through an escalation of tensions and subsequent regime offers to return to the status quo ante…for a price. Early in a new U.S. or South Korean administration, Pyongyang typically conducts a major provocative action – such as a nuclear or long-range missile test – because the regime believes it gives them leverage.

The Biden administration – in conjunction with the G7 nations, NATO and allies South Korea and Japan – has correctly affirmed the necessity of maintaining denuclearization as an end goal, though implemented incrementally and in return for negotiated reciprocal measures. Washington should continue affirming its desire for dialogue and negotiations. Pyongyang’s repeated refusals even for diplomatic contact merely confirm that it remains the impediment to a diplomatic resolution of the long-standing nuclear issue.

In the meantime, the Biden administration must take steps to uphold allied deterrence and defense capabilities, including resumption of military exercises on the Korean Peninsula when COVID-19 conditions allow. Washington should also implement long-stalled sanctions against North Korean, Chinese and other nations’ entities violating U.S. laws and U.N. resolutions. Dialogue and deterrence are not mutually exclusive.

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