June 29, 2021

This month’s newsletter features testimony by Valerie Lincy, the Executive
Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, on China’s role
in the proliferation of missile and nuclear technologies. The testimony
explores contributions from entities in China to Iran’s nuclear program and
development of ballistic missiles.

The newsletter also features a profile of the Iranian military’s defense
production organization for aircraft and drones, as well as profiles of two
aviation companies linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
In addition, the newsletter includes documents from the Iran Watch library
related to the the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s board of
governors meeting, some U.S. measures that have eased financial pressure on
Iran, and reported incidents at nuclear facilities in Bushehr and Karaj, as
well as news about Iran’s efforts to equip Iraqi militias with drones, its
planned purchase of a surveillance satellite from Russia, and Iran’s recent
failed attempt to launch a satellite of its own.

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PUBLICATIONS

[3]

Testimony | [4]Hearing on “China’s Nuclear Forces”

On June 10th, Valerie Lincy, the Executive Director of the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control, testified before the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission to discuss China’s role in the proliferation
of missile and nuclear technologies around the world. Her testimony
summarized the contribution of Chinese entities to Iran’s nuclear and
missile programs, including support for uranium mines and transfers of
controlled items to Iranian missile producers, and offered insight into the
nature of ongoing Chinese support to those programs, with a focus on the
shifting roles of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private actors.

[5]READ THE FULL TESTIMONY

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

State-owned entities subordinate to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and
Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and ostensibly private companies controlled
by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) produce and maintain
Iran’s fleet of aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These firms
and their subsidiaries have also played a role in supporting Iran’s proxies
overseas.

[6]Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO)

A subsidiary of MODAFL; involved in developing light aircraft and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs); reportedly manufactured Shahed-278 and Shahed-285
military helicopters for the IRGC Ground Forces; reportedly manufactures
the Hemase reconnaissance UAV, the Kosar fighter and training jet, the
Qaher 313 stealth fighter jet, and the Yasin training jet.

[7]LEARN MORE

[8]Pars Aviation Services Company (PASC)

An Iranian aircraft supply and repair company that the U.N. Security
Council has identified as an entity affiliated with the IRGC; reportedly
owned by Bonyad Taavon Sepah on behalf of the IRGC Aerospace Force
(IRGC-AF); clients have included the IRGC-AF and the IRGC Navy; has
reportedly maintained the IRGC-AF’s fleet of transport and combat aircraft.

[9]LEARN MORE

[10]Pouya Air (Yas Air)

An Iranian cargo airline that has been owned by PASC; according to the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, has transported illicit cargo to Iranian
proxies in the Levant on behalf of the IRGC Quds Force (IRGC-QF); according
to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, has transported IRGC-QF personnel
and weapons disguised as humanitarian aid.

[11]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

[12]

[13]Iran’s Proxies in Iraq Threaten U.S. with More Sophisticated Weapons |
The New York Times

June 4: Unnamed U.S. officials allege that Iranian-backed militias in Iraq
have used dive-bombing drones to launch at least three attacks against
Iraqi military bases used by the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S.
Special Operations Forces in the last two months. The episodes included an
April 14 strike on a covert CIA hangar at an airport in Erbil, a May 8
attack on the Ayn al-Asad air base in Anbar Province, and a May 11 strike
on an airfield in Harir used by U.S. special forces. Analysis of the
drones' debris indicated that they could carry 10-60 pounds of explosives
and that they used technology similar to that provided by Iran to Houthi
rebels in Yemen. The attacks went unclaimed and caused no injuries;
according to Iraqi and U.S. officials, Iran engineered the operations to
minimize casualties. The drones flew low enough to evade U.S. defenses
designed to counter artillery, mortars, and rockets. U.S. analysts have
speculated that the militias were targeting U.S. facilities housing
surveillance aircraft and U.S. MQ-9 Reaper combat drones.

[14]Russia Is Preparing to Supply Iran with an Advanced Satellite System
That Will Boost Tehran's Ability to Surveil Military Targets, Officials Say
| The Washington Post

June 10: Unnamed current and former Middle Eastern and U.S. officials
allege that Russia is taking steps to sell the Kanopus-V spy satellite to
Iran. The officials said that the Kanopus-V could be launched from Russia
within months and that its high-resolution camera would enable Iran to
continuously surveil sites such as military sites in Israel, oil refineries
in the Persian Gulf, and bases used by U.S. soldiers in Iraq. The officials
added that leaders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
traveled to Russia several times since 2018 to negotiate Iran's acquisition
of the spy satellite and that Russian specialists made a trip to Iran to
train Iranian ground crews to operate the satellite from a new facility in
Karaj. According to a Middle Eastern official, Iran can use the Kanopus-V
to maintain "an accurate target bank" for potential missile and drone
strikes. Last year, Iran launched its own, allegedly less-capable Noor-1
military satellite following earlier failures.

[15]Pentagon Tracked Failed Iranian Satellite Launch and New Images Reveal
Tehran Is Set to Try Again | CNN

June 23: According to U.S. defense officials, the U.S. Defense Department
monitored a failed attempt by Iran to launch a satellite on June 12. The
officials said that they had yet to determine why and at what stage the
launch failed. Analysts concluded that Iran likely used a two-stage Simorgh
space launch vehicle, which employs engines based on North Korean designs.
Meanwhile, commercial satellite images taken on June 20 show indications
that Iran is making preparations for a second launch. Some analysts believe
that Iran can repurpose technology from its space program for use in the
development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

FROM THE LIBRARY

In early June, the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) convened in Vienna for its quarterly meeting. Discussions
focused on unresolved questions about several nuclear sites that Iran
failed to declare to the IAEA, as well as Iran’s ongoing violations of the
nuclear limitations contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA).
* [16]The IAEA highlights Iran’s failure to explain the presence of
uranium at undeclared nuclear sites – June 7
* [17]The European Union urges Iran to return to compliance with the
JCPOA – June 8
* [18]The United States criticizes Iran’s lack cooperation with the IAEA
– June 8
* [19]France, Germany, and the United Kingdom “remain deeply concerned”
over Iran’s escalations of its nuclear program – June 9
* [20]Iran derides foreign criticism as “unfounded allegations” – June 10
* [21]China calls the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposition of
economic sanctions “the root causes of the Iranian nuclear crisis” – June
11

Discussions to facilitate Iran and the United States’ return to compliance
with the JCPOA continue in Vienna. At the same time, the United States has
taken some steps that have eased financial pressure on Iran. The European
Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have supported the
ongoing diplomacy.
* [22]The United States designates a network accused of financing
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen but simultaneously lifts sanctions on
several Iranian officials – June 10
* [23]NATO praises the JCPOA negotiations while calling on Iran to halt
“all ballistic missile activities inconsistent with” U.N. restrictions –
June 14
* [24]The European Union and the United States reemphasize their support
for the JCPOA – June 15
* [25]The United States issues a general license enabling the provision
of COVID-19 relief to Iran – June 17
* [26]The United States reports “serious differences” with Iran during
JCPOA negotiations – June 24

Iran has reported incidents at nuclear sites in Bushehr and Karaj. These
follow two sabotage attacks on Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility and the
assassination of the country’s top nuclear scientist, which took place over
the last year.
* [27]The IAEA reports a shutdown at Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant
– June 21
* [28]The AEOI blames the Bushehr shutdown on a “technical problem”
involving “the electrical generator of the plant” – June 22
* [29]AEOI specialists continue work to reconnect the Bushehr plant to
the national grid – June 23
* [30]Iran claims to have thwarted an attack on an AEOI facility in Karaj
– June 23

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2021 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

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