Following is the May 2021 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in cen


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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In May 2021



Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In May 2021 by clicking here
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In May 2021

By Gregory Waters

 

Following is the May 2021 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. Previous editions of ISIS Redux can be viewed through the
following links: April
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, March
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, February
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, and January 2021
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;December
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,November
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,October
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,September
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,August
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,July
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,June
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,May
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, andApril
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2020.A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including
its methodology, can also be explored here
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 and here
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.

 

ISIS militants carried out at least 23 confirmed attacks in May, killing at
least 29 pro-Assad regime fighters and two civilians, while wounding at least
73 in the Homs, Deir Ez Zor, Raqqa, Hama, and Aleppo governorates. The number
of ISIS attacks carried out dropped significantly for the second month in a
row, matching a level not seen since April 2020. Furthermore, ISIS cells only
conducted five high quality* attacks during May, a level not witnessed since
March 2020. The drop in ISIS activity in May, as in April, is largely due to
the ongoing Syrian regime, Russian, and Iranian operations across Deir Ez Zor,
Homs, and Raqqa.

 

ISIS continued to shift its focus away from civilians. All but three of May’s
attacks as well as all high quality attacks targeted security forces. Despite
the significant drop in the number of attacks, May’s attacks on average killed
and wounded more people than those of the previous four months. More Assad
regime security forces were killed in May than in March, despite ISIS
conducting16 fewer attacks. However, in a sign of improved regime operations,
May was the first in 17 months when ISIS failed to kill a regime commander.

 

ISIS cells relied on mines and improvised explosive devices (IED) for at least
10 of the 23 confirmed attacks in May, similar to April and March. Additional
use of mines and IEDs by ISIS in Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor were referenced during
interviews conducted by the author but were not recorded due to the lack of
specificity about when they occurred. ISIS commonly reverts to a heavy reliance
on indirect attacks when under heavy pressure from security forces, as has been
the case for the past three months.

Attacks in May continued at roughly April’s pace in Homs (13), south Aleppo
(1), and south Raqqa (1) while continuing their precipitous two month drop in
Hama (4) and five-month drop in Deir Ez Zor (4). As in April, despite the
overall drop in attacks on civilians, ISIS continued to heavily target them in
eastern Hama. May was also the first month since March 2020 that only one
governorate, in this case Homs, experienced high quality attacks.

Hama

 

ISIS activity in east Hama dropped for the second month in a row, with only
four documented attacks. Three of these attacks were mines hitting civilian
vehicles and workers. The only significant documented attack occurred in
northern Hama, west of Rahjan in an area that has seen a slowly expanding ISIS
presence since the start of 2021. On May 9, ISIS fighters attacked a checkpoint
near the village of Bayoud, killing one civilian and wounding a National
Defense Forces (NDF) fighter. The attack was reported by locals and claimed by
ISIS’s official media outlet Amaq, where the group stated its fighters overran
the checkpoint and captured weapons.

 

In addition to these four documented attacks, the author was informed via
interviews with local NDF members about additional, continued activity
targeting shepherds. According to an NDF fighter previously deployed to the
area and with extensive contacts in east Hama, ISIS cells have been stealing
“hundreds” of sheep each week for at least the past two months. These robberies
sometimes, but not always, involve the thieves killing shepherds. The sheep are
then moved out of the governorate and eventually sold in other parts of the
country, providing a lucrative financial stream for ISIS.

 

Homs

 

ISIS activity in Homs remained high in May, continuing the trend began in late
April. ISIS conducted 13 attacks in Homs, at least six of which involved mines
or IEDs. There was a noticeable expansion of activity outside of the usual core
area of Sukhnah, largely due to Assad regime activity southeast of Palmyra and
northeast of Sukhnah.

 

Five of the 13 attacks in Homs were high quality. On May 9, ISIS fighters
ambushed and killed at least three members of the Liwa al-Quds’ Abu Zainab
Group (a small militia formerly affiliated with the Tiger Forces) near Jabal
Amor, north of Palmyra. On the same day elsewhere in the governorate, ISIS
lured a regime convoy into a large IED ambush. According to a member of the
regime’s 5th Corps interviewed by the author, a shepherd was killed by a mine,
leading the locals to blame the army and demand they investigate. When the
military convoy entered the area, they were hit with “every explosive device”
including “standard mines, anti-armor mines, and homemade explosives.” At least
one soldier was killed and 19 were wounded.

 

The next day, another series of mines killed six and wounded 20 soldiers in
the Wadi Qatqat area northwest of Sukhnah. From approximately May 8 through May
13, ISIS and regime forces fought fierce battles east of Kawm, with at least
four NDF fighters killed and 15 wounded as the regime attempted to push into
the mountains. On May 15, ISIS released a statement claiming to have captured
and executed five soldiers in eastern Homs “in recent days.”

Map of ISIS attacks in Homs in May 2021 (highlighted dots). Not mapped are two
additional attacks that combined killed six and wounded 19 soldiers somewhere
in the Homs countryside.

 

Deir Ez Zor

 

Attacks in Deir Ez Zor dropped to their lowest level since July 2020 due to
ongoing regime and Iranian operations in the desert. Most of the four attacks
recorded in May appear to be from mines. The only attack of any significance
was an attack on a checkpoint in Salhiyah, north of Bukamal, that killed two
NDF fighters. However, the author was also told by knowledgeable regime sources
that there had been additional, intermittent mine hits throughout the month.
These were not recorded due to the lack of specificity about where and when
these occurred.

 

Raqqa and Aleppo

 

Confirmed ISIS activity in south Raqqa and Aleppo continued to fluctuate in
the one to three attacks per month range. Each governorate had one confirmed
attack, both of note. On May 17, ISIS fighters ambushed a regime patrol near
the Dubaysan Oil Field, destroying at least one vehicle. The patrol had been
searching for five soldiers kidnapped by ISIS on April 20 and believed still
alive and being held somewhere in the area. On May 20, ISIS claimed to attack a
regime outpost in the Durayhim area of southern Aleppo. NDF sources confirmed
the attack, saying three of their soldiers were wounded and none killed.

 

As in Deir Ez Zor, there were additional reports of attacks in these areas not
included in the database. A regime 5th Corps fighter whose friends are
currently deployed to Raqqa told the author that, like Deir Ez Zor, patrols
were being hit by mines every couple of days. The fighter further stated that
two opposition claims
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in the Maskanah region, on May 13 and May 18, had indeed occurred. However,
other regime soldiers interviewed by the author could neither confirm nor deny
the claims. These potential attacks should be noted, however, as ISIS and
criminal activity in the Maskanah and Aleppo-Raqqa border areas is rising.

Map of ISIS attacks in Hama, Raqqa, and Aleppo in May 2021 (highlighted dots).

 

Regime Operations

 

Syrian regime anti-ISIS operations continued at a high pace in May and are
increasingly being led by the Iranian-commanded Afghans of Liwa Fatemiyoun. As
noted in previous updates, the regime launched its first true, large scale
anti-ISIS operation in January of this year, targeting ISIS cells in Deir Ez
Zor that had pushed south from Jabal Bishri and had successfully established
themselves along the strategic Palmyra-Deir Ez Zor highway. This operation,
commanded by the regime’s Major General Nizar Khader with combined forces from
the Syrian Arab Army’s (SAA) 17th Division, 5th Corps, NDF, and Liwa
Fatemiyoun, and supported by Russian aircraft, fought fierce battles with ISIS
until about March 10. Then the active part of the operation ended, and the
regime shifted to a strategy of flooding the newly cleared areas with fresh
soldiers from the 5th Corps and 4th Division. Despite some minor clashes and
mine attacks, the area north of Shoula has remained highly secure ever since.

 

In April, the Iranians launched a second set of smaller sweeps north of Shoula
while shifting their focus south, beginning a new campaign in the Mayadin
countryside under much secrecy. Unlike the Shoula campaign, this ongoing
operation is being led by Iran and Liwa Fatemiyoun, but the foreign forces are
still supported by the Deir Ez Zor NDF and SAA, and receive Syrian Air Force
support. This Mayadin operation saw battles peak in late April, with reports of
Afghan wounded and dead arriving at the Mayadin hospital. Since the start of
May, however, the desert region of western Deir Ez Zor has been very quiet,
with only the occasional mine hitting patrols as Liwa Fatemiyoun expands its
presence.

 

Around the same time this Mayadin operation began in April, the regime started
a new push to clear the Kawm Oasis region of northeast Homs. As stated in
April’s ISIS update, this operation saw regime forces moving south from Resafa
and north from Sukhnah, attempting to secure the string of oil and gas fields
in this remote area. The ISIS-regime fighting around Kawm has historically been
marked by its ping-pong nature, with neither side taking full control. However,
the late April campaign appeared to yield more permanent progress for regime
forces. Despite initial setbacks and after significant fighting, the regime had
fully secured new positions about 5km east of the town by mid-May. Since then,
regime forces have focused on securing and widening their new holdings, rather
than attempting to push deeper into what they believe is an ISIS stronghold.

 

Elsewhere in Homs, Liwa Fatemiyoun has been assisting Syrian forces in sweeps
east of Palmyra, particularly around Arak. Meanwhile patrols continue in
southern Raqqa. The Syrian and Russian air forces continue to provide regular
air support in Homs and Raqqa, reportedly arriving within 15 to 60 minutes of
regime forces coming under attack. Of course, this leaves plenty of time for
ISIS cells to quickly ambush or harass security forces without much
consequence, and few if any insurgents have been killed in the bombing runs.
Still, the constant threat of air support, combined with the extensive presence
of ground forces, appears to have seriously hindered ISIS’s ability to operate
in the Badia. The Russians are also pursuing an independent campaign in Deir Ez
Zor of bombing suspected active and inactive ISIS hideouts in what appears to
be a strategy of denying ISIS hiding places in the Badia. The impact of the
campaign is not yet clear.

 

Looking Ahead

 

If the first three months of 2021 revealed a new willingness by Damascus to
deal with ISIS in the Badia, the past two months have proven just how serious
this decision was. Many analysts appear eager to view regime operations through
stale, outdated frameworks rooted in earlier periods of the war. But with the
frontlines frozen in the northwest, Damascus has plenty of manpower to devote
to central Syria.

 

The Assad regime’s decision in April to follow up the successful Shoula
operations with a large deployment of 4th Division troops to Homs and Deir Ez
Zor, and then the unprecedented deployment of experienced 5th Corps battalions
to Raqqa, demonstrates a shift in SAA tactical thinking. These operations
should not be viewed as just another round of the same futile actions of the
past three years, but as a serious shift in emphasis that is reaping benefits
on the ground. The new strategy has forced ISIS to reduce its activity to
levels not seen since Spring 2020, before the group’s massive expansion in the
area. Crucially, ISIS has retained the ability to conduct occasional
significant attacks on regime bases and convoys. But such actions have steadily
been reduced from once a week to once a month, and they no longer have the same
impact on regime operations as in the past.

 

The regime and Iranian operations of the past five months have been their most
successful anti-ISIS campaigns since 2017 and have unquestionably forced ISIS
onto the backfoot. The long-term success of these operations now relies on the
regime maintaining its increased troop presence in the remote areas of Raqqa,
Homs, and Deir Ez Zor, and on the Syrian and Russian air forces continuing to
improve their support to ground troops. However, even if this happens, Damascus
will still need to contend with the chaotic security environment in
southeastern Aleppo and ISIS’s suspected financial operations in east Hama.
Moreover, ISIS still operates training camps in the Badia, likely in southern
Homs where the regime has yet to conduct major operations, and is maintaining
its strength across the Euphrates in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-held areas
of Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor. ISIS’s strength on the eastern side of the river and
the ease with which its fighters can cross between the two sides means that
there is always the possibility that the group can shift resources west and
increase its focus on regime positions.

Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted dots) in May 2021. This map does
not include four attacks which did not have specific locations attributed to
them: two “Homs countryside” attacks and two “Deir Ez Zor countryside” attacks.
To view an interactive version of this map, please click here
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.

 

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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.

 

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