In the most recent data from the EDD, California paid out a total of $148.1 billion in benefits under all the UI programs since the week of March 7, 2020. The most current estimate is that up to $31 billion of unemployment benefits was paid out to fraudulent claims, consisting of $11 billion in known fraud and up to $20 billion in suspected fraud.
The most recent data from the US Department of Labor indicates California’s outstanding loans as of May 26 from the Federal Unemployment Account rose to $21.1 billion. The most recent projections from EDD contained in the May Revise expect the total to reach $24.3 billion by the end of the year. This amount is more than twice the peak of about $11 billion reached during the previous recession that began in 2008. That debt took 10 years to pay off through higher employment taxes imposed on businesses. Once the debt was retired, continuing benefit payments came close to revenues into the fund due primarily to the policy decisions discussed below. California consequently entered the current downturn with few reserves to cover the promised unemployment
benefits. Just prior to the pandemic in their January 2020 rankings, US Department of Labor determined California’s trust fund solvency status came nearly dead last, ranking above only the Virgin Islands.
The May Revise proposes using only $1.1 billion ARPA funds to offset the current debt. The recently released legislative framework for the budget increases this amount to $2 billion, but applies it over 10 years—thereby leaving it open to legislative reductions under future budgets—and limits the tax relief to an as-yet undetermined subset of small businesses. Both ensure a major tax increase making it more costly for employers to rebuild the jobs lost in the current crisis.
Recent LAO analysis indicates this debt requires payments over the next 8-9 years, but only under their unemployment, inflation, and economic cycle (i.e., no downturn in this period) assumptions and at a cost of $17 to $20 billion in higher taxes that will be imposed on California employers.
Under the LAO analysis, this $17 to $20 billion tax increase embodied in the May Revise will be in place until around 2030. The proposed $1.1 billion debt payment consequently comes into play at the end of the period by potentially shortening the tax increase period by only a small amount. The LAO numbers, however, are based on a $20 billion debt and not the EDD projections of $24.3 billion. The May Revise reliance on a substantial tax increase to pay down the debt also means the UI Fund will continue running a negative balance throughout this period—just as it did in the decade following the 2008 recession—and thereby retain a reliance on federal funding for this critical safety net program.
The condition of the state unemployment insurance fund even prior to the pandemic derives largely from key policy decisions that were made with minimal involvement of the employers responsible for funding this program:
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SB 40 (2001, Alarcon) more than doubled unemployment benefits over the objections of employers, both private and public. As was the case with the public employment pension increases also adopted at this time with little consideration for long-term fiscal effects, benefits were assumed to be covered by a continuation of the then-high reserves in the unemployment insurance fund. Subsequent legislative actions have continued to increase the level of benefits. Three economic downturns since then have undermined the reserves.
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SB 3 (2016, Leno) enacted the current process for ongoing annual increases in the minimum wage. Because unemployment benefits are tied to wage levels, this factor means available balances in the fund will be drawn down much more quickly in each succeeding economic downturn as minimum wage rises and as these levels affect the next tranches through wage compaction adjustments as well. This process was already at play prior to the current crisis, with the fund never regaining solvency even after a period of higher rates over 12 years.
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In the current crisis, the state’s response relied on a more extensive shut-down of business activities than used in many other states. Many higher-wage industries and even many service industries were able to adjust to these restrictions through new work arrangements and new sales channel options, but these adjustments were often not available to a large number of generally lower-wage service businesses including restaurants, tourism, personal service, smaller retail, and related businesses most heavily affected by this approach.
California already has by far the highest unemployment insurance rate, at 4.14% of taxable wages in 2020 compared to the US average of 1.78%. Measured instead against total wages, California ranks somewhat better at the 18th highest rate (0.56% vs. US average of 0.45%), but the first measure is more relevant given the greater employment effect of this tax on lower wage jobs and distributional effect on total wages coming from the tech and other higher wage industries in the state.
Many employers in the state will be struggling to achieve recovery over the coming years—both small businesses as well as many larger employers in the tourism and population-serving industries that saw their sales essentially vanish under the state’s policies in the pandemic period and costs rise under emergency measures that are now being proposed for expansion. This major tax increase embodied in the May Revise will further increase the cost of bringing workers back to their jobs.
The economic projections underlying the revenue and expenditure projections for the May Revise already expect a pronounced split in the state’s recovery, intensifying the two-tier economy already in development even prior to the current downturn. In fact, three industries are not expected to return to pre-COVID job levels until the end of the projection period in 2024, and three are expected to still have fewer jobs at that point.
The unemployment insurance rates are already structured to have their greatest employment impact on distressed businesses, and the parts of the state’s economy that were most heavily affected by the state’s strategies are expected to remain in distressed circumstances for some time to come. The health of the unemployment fund and more critically the long-term wage and income prospects for the workers now relying on these benefits depends on rebuilding jobs as quickly as possible. The tax increase now looming over this goal makes it more difficult and costly to achieve.
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