At a time when people need digital security more than ever, governments should support end-to-end encryption as the most effective way to ensure the personal security of billions of people and the national security of hundreds of countries around the world. However, law enforcement agencies, including the Department of Justice and the FBI in the United States, consistently call for backdoors or similar measures that would weaken encryption. Meanwhile, digital surveillance by law enforcement agencies has never been more extensive or robust; even without backdoors to encryption, law enforcement officers can already gain access to nearly any mobile device. In spite of this, the consistent calls for backdoors would create new opportunities for bad actors to access or manipulate our data, putting American citizens, our national security professionals, and our infrastructure at greater risk of harm.
The European Commission is also considering proposals to weaken encryption, but through the lens of child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Everyone should take the proliferation of CSAM seriously. However, the proposed measures to combat this material would have a serious impact upon the users of encrypted messaging applications, with implications far beyond this one issue. Remember: encryption protects everyone, including children.
Governments in the developing world are also threatening encryption. In an effort to promote prosecution of people who disseminate false information, India announced new Intermediaries Guidelines in February that include a "traceability" requirement. It would require social media intermediaries with messaging applications to be able to identify the "first originator" of information shared on their platforms. To do this with the kind of reliability that law enforcement authorities are likely to demand, the intermediary will probably need to be able to access communications content it currently cannot because of end-to-end encryption. The implications for encryption — and therefore the confidentiality of communications — are clear. The Guidelines also pose a real threat to speech, to journalists, and to advocates fighting for human rights and protections.
