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At Verified Voting, we often like to say that much of our work begins when Election Day ends — and the first quarter of 2021 has borne that out. From state advocacy to Verifier updates, please keep reading to learn more — and to ensure we can keep laying the groundwork for secure and accurate elections, please consider sharing this report or making a contribution.
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Acting Co-Director Mark Lindeman released a statement on legislation introduced in states across the country that actively undermines democratic participation, noting that “fair and accurate voting is the foundation of a democracy, but limiting opportunities for voters to participate does nothing to address the real threats to election security, which include: internet voting, paperless voting systems, and insufficient resources to conduct risk-limiting audits.”
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In the aftermath of the 2020 election, the Verified Voting team launched “A Spotlight on Election Officials,” a new series that shines a light on all that election officials do to safely and securely administer our elections beyond what voters see on Election Day. Although each of the election officials we interviewed brings a unique perspective, they all share a commitment to the democratic process, ensuring that voters trust that their votes are counted, and combating disinformation. Read the features: Neal Kelley (Orange County, CA’s Registrar of Voters), Kammi Foote (Inyo County, CA’s former Clerk-Recorder & Registrar of Voters), Joseph Kirk (Bartow County, GA’s Election Supervisor), and Ruth Elliott (Harper County, KS’s Clerk).
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Verified Voting’s data team continues to make valuable improvements to the Verifier. Based on feedback we’ve received from our users, we’ve added new tools, including a map of voting equipment manufacturers in the United States and a visualizations tab to highlight key data points. The team also launched the 2022 voting equipment map to continue tracking the changes jurisdictions are making to their elections systems.
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We were delighted to publish a report, The Price of Voting, on behalf of researchers at the now-shuttered Wharton Public Policy Initiative at the University of Pennsylvania. This ambitious report is a follow-up to the Business of Voting and provides “unprecedented insight” into voting system vendors. With voting equipment purchases happening right now, this is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the dynamics of the election technology industry.
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Mathematical Advisor Audrey Malagon was a panelist in a spirited discussion for the Government Blockchain Association's virtual event on blockchain and voting. Read more about our position on internet voting and blockchain on our website, and keep reading to learn more about specific actions we’re taking in states that are considering this dangerously insecure way of voting.
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The program team is monitoring election legislation in more than a dozen states and continues its ongoing outreach with election officials and advocates in priority states. Here’s a snapshot of our work:
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Our audit team spent much of January on the road in Pennsylvania helping counties complete their portions of the statewide risk-limiting audit (RLA) pilot. Preparations are already underway for the next statewide pilot of the upcoming May primary.
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We’re testifying in the Texas state legislature and providing educational material to local officials on the nuts and bolts of risk-limiting audits and voter-verifiable paper audit trails. We’re also closely monitoring voting equipment purchases in the state, because 20.4% of Texas voters still vote on machines that have no paper trail. Without paper ballots, there is no option to conduct a post-election audit, which is necessary to verify the results.
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We are continuing to connect with local advocates and coalition partners in Arizona. We recently cosigned a letter with leadership from the Brennan Center, the Carter Center, and RSM Election Solutions to Arizona State Senate President Fann urging the Senate to refrain from auditing the Maricopa County election results, noting that doing so would undermine confidence in our elections.
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We participated in planning discussions for Virginia’s first-ever statewide risk-limiting audit pilot in February and are helping to draft long-anticipated legislation to overhaul Virginia’s RLA statute to address issues such as the requirement for audits to be completed after the recount deadline, which does not allow for corrections to the results. We also worked closely to fend off Virginia’s latest effort to expand the electronic return of voted ballots over the internet.
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In Oregon, Data Scientist Stephanie Singer was named to the Secretary of State's RLA Advisory Committee. We have been providing technical guidance on improvements to updates to the Secretary of State’s office about Oregon’s audit statute and its currently deficient RLA rule, which has been circulated to other Oregon stakeholders.
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In Florida and North Carolina, we’re continuing to connect with local advocates and coalition partners to discuss election-related issues and are analyzing how to improve audit practices in both states.
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As more and more states like Maryland, Maine, and Connecticut give serious consideration to more robust, transparent auditing processes like risk-limiting audits, we’re testifying and providing written comments in support.
We’re also continuing to advocate against using insecure voting technologies. In Louisiana, the lone state still using entirely paperless voting technology, we’re advising legislators and advocates on improving their voting systems. We sent a letter to the New York State Board of Elections in opposition to the certification of an insecure voting system, which the State Board subsequently voted not to certify. We also spoke out against North Dakota’s SB 2271, which threatened to undermine the public’s trust by potentially concealing detailed presidential vote counts for more than a month after a presidential election. The language was subsequently struck from the bill.
We’re also voicing our concerns about the introduction of a bill that would allow Colorado voters with disabilities to return a ballot electronically. A majority of cybersecurity experts warn that internet voting - which includes returning a voted ballot electronically - is dangerously risky for our democracy. We’re closely monitoring this bill and continuing to speak out and provide testimony about the risks.
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We’re joining with our coalition partners in monitoring the progress of HR1/S1, the For the People Act, and have continued lifting up the provisions that will help make our elections more trustworthy and accessible for all voters. In addition to requiring the use of voter-verified paper ballots in future federal elections, the bill provides funding for states to conduct risk-limiting audits and to replace and secure voting systems and election infrastructure. We sent a letter to Congress highlighting the importance of the election security components in the bill, released a subsequent press statement when it was introduced in the Senate, and will continue monitoring the bill’s actions and push for its adoption.
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Mark Lindeman discussed how he’d like the renewed focus on election security to “lead to more investments in better, more trustworthy systems.” The piece from FiveThirtyEight also extensively referenced our voting equipment data from the Verifier.
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Listen to Mark Lindeman’s podcast interview with the Christian Science Monitor. He noted that the 2020 election was "frankly, a shockingly clean election. [But that] does not automatically translate to protecting American elections. Because the biggest threat ... is really in the American mind."
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Stateline, run by Pew Charitable Trusts, published a story interviewing Mark Lindeman about the perils of online voting.
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Board Chair Barbara Simons addressed the challenges of online voting and the potential exposure of voters’ information and lack of anonymity in an interview with Government Technology.
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You can see our Verifier data in action in this NBC News piece about voting systems that use paper ballots.
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We’re delighted that Dr. Poorvi Vora, Prof. Martin Hellman, and Neal McBurnett have joined Verified Voting’s Board of Directors. Dr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall, who has been an incredible contributing member of the Board of Directors, will be transitioning to our Board of Advisors. Also recently joining the Board of Advisors are John Hennessy, Kevin Skoglund, and John Wack (bringing our total Turing Award winners to three). Visit our “Who We Are” page to learn more about all of our new members.
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As you can see from the extensive — but by no means comprehensive — look at our work in this update, the post-election period is keeping our team busier than ever in an ever-growing list of states across the country. The decisions that will shape 2022 and 2024 are happening right now, and we’ll be there — advocating for voting systems that require paper ballots and support voter verification, giving guidance to election officials on conducting post-election risk-limiting audits to check the reported election outcomes, pushing back against disinformation, and educating the public on the nuts and bolts of voting to restore confidence in our elections.
Please reach out to us at [email protected] with any questions you have. Again, we hope you’ll share this work with your friends and colleagues, and consider a donation to support our work during this critical period between election cycles.
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2020 was a watershed year for election security — read more about our work and key takeaways in our 2020 Annual Report. We are strengthened by our supporters and the allies we’ve gained to help strengthen democracy for all voters.
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