Heritage Senior Research Fellow Bruce Klingner writes that although the Biden administration’s policy toward North Korea has not yet been released, several aspects of it became clear from the first overseas trip by Biden Cabinet officials to Asia.
Senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Tony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, met with government officials in Tokyo and Seoul on March 16-18, signaling the importance of the region to U.S. strategic objectives.
U.S. officials emphasized the Biden administration priorities for the Indo-Pacific region, addressing regional challenges through multilateralism, affirming the importance of America’s allies, remaining committed to North Korean denuclearization, and criticizing North Korean human rights.
A dominant message throughout the trip was the importance of alliances to address the North Korean threat. Negotiations to reach an agreement of host-nation support negotiations with Seoul and Tokyo emphasized a return to traditional U.S. views of alliances as based on common values and Washington’s unwavering commitment to defend its Asian allies. Details of the agreements have not yet been formally disclosed but will remove a major source of tension within the alliances.
The Biden administration repeated its commitment to engage with North Korea, and confirmed that it had unsuccessfully attempted several times to initiate dialogue with North Korea through several channels.
During the secretaries’ trip, senior officials of the North Korean Kim Jong Un regime released statements harshly criticizing the United States and South Korea, and seemingly shut the door on dialogue and negotiations. Despite the rhetoric against engagement, Pyongyang may eventually agree to return to negotiations, either before or after yet another provocative violation of U.N. resolutions.
The Biden administration should publicly affirm its willingness to engage in talks while emphasizing that it is North Korea, not the United States, which has been the impediment to a diplomatic resolution. Privately, the Biden administration should signal to North Korea that any provocation would undermine dialogue, lead to a stronger administration policy on North Korea, and trigger an international response.
Moving forward, the basis for negotiations should be the denuclearization requirements of the U.N. resolutions as well as North Korea’s previous promises to abandon its nuclear arsenal and programs. In the meantime, Washington must maintain a policy of strong military deterrence and continue to coordinate policies with Seoul and Tokyo.
Blinken’s and Austin’s trip made important steps in doing so.