March 30, 2021

Ideas Matter: The Fight Against the Ideology of the Chinese Regime

As the Biden Administration forms its policy on Asia, China will unquestionably be an area of focus. There is a great need for a nuanced understanding of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) motives. It is evident that great-power competition is alive and well in the region, and that China operates from a desire to maintain power and stability within its borders and in the region writ large.

It is also clear that there are some ways in which China’s actions and activities in the region are ideologically motivated. Tackling these challenges requires a clear-eyed view by the U.S. government of the delicate balance between ideological and great-power competition in the region today. In this report, Heritage Senior Research Fellow Dean Cheng and Heritage Senior Policy Analyst Olivia Enos look into the CCP's ideology and where it does, and does not, play a role in China's actions.

The U.S. government must devise a strategy that recognizes that China acts based on a myriad of interests. Some actions are motivated—like those of any other state—by a desire to maintain power. Other decisions are based on the specific model and ideology that the CCP embraces. Understanding that these two forces are both at work prepares U.S. policymakers to respond to challenges as they arise. Eschewing one understanding in favor of the other hamstrings U.S. policy. In fact, policy efforts are better when they combine values components and security components.

The U.S. will continue to act in its own interests in Asia, but it can only benefit the U.S. to understand Chinese motivations and to craft policies that address challenges inherent in the CCP’s system.

Dive deeper: Click here to watch the March 18, 2021 virtual event on understanding the Chinese ideological threat, featuring eminent scholars Andrew J. Nathan and Aaron L. Friedberg.

Related: Click here to read Heritage ASC Director Walter Lohman's commentary on why Congress should legislate accordingly if it is serious about China.

Biden's Korea Policy Faces Its First Test

On March 25, Pyongyang launched two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), the first ballistic missile test since President Joe Biden took office. Heritage Senior Research Fellow Bruce Klingner writes that North Korea’s resumption of missile launches after a one-year hiatus puts the United States and its allies back on the well-trodden path of provocations, debating regime intentions, and scrambling for a proper policy response.

Pyongyang’s launch of short-range ballistic missiles was a violation of U.N. resolutions and requires a U.S. response, but isn’t a “crisis” nor “major challenge” to Washington. However, the Biden administration should brace itself for higher end provocations that Kim Jong-un likely already has planned for the coming months.

The next North Korean provocation is always a question of when, not if. But gauging the type and severity of Pyongyang’s actions are important in determining a proper U.S. response. While Washington does not need to respond to every regime statement or low-level activity, the ballistic missile firings necessitate a U.S. reaction. The Biden administration should denounce this violation of U.N. resolutions rather than dismissing them as the Trump administration did with the 26 ballistic missile launches in 2019 (a record number in a year) and the nine launches in March 2020 (a record number in a month).

The Biden administration should consult with allies South Korea and Japan to coordinate a common response in the United Nations such as a condemnatory statement warning that additional and more escalatory violations will further undermine the potential for negotiations and lead to further actions.

As it completes its North Korea policy review, the Biden administration should signal its continued willingness to engage in dialogue and negotiations with Pyongyang while concurrently affirming the United States’ strong alliances with South Korea and Japan, exploring missile defense options for the United States and its allies, and responding firmly to any violations of UN resolutions.

The Biden administration should not abandon denuclearization as a long-term objective nor offer concessions simply to induce Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. Washington should implement long-stalled sanctions against North Korean, Chinese, and other nations’ entities violating U.S. laws and U.N. resolutions.

While we can stand down from this missile “crisis,” other North Korean actions will indeed challenge the Biden administration, and likely sooner rather than later.

Europe and Strategic Ambiguity

In an article in Taipei Times, Heritage ASC Director Walter Lohman writes that there is an interesting dispute brewing in Paris over Taiwan. The controversial and acerbic Chinese Ambassador there is objecting to the next visit to Taiwan by the French Senate’s Taiwan Caucus. So far, the president of the caucus, former Minister of Defense Alain Richard, is sticking by his guns.

This is good news. A legislative delegation from France — or from most other countries in the world — is largely symbolic. As symbols go, however, it is powerful. On the other hand, canceling the trip at the demands of the Chinese — who claim to have simply stumbled across it in the minutes of a meeting posted on the caucus’ website — would be a blow to Taiwan’s international profile.

The health of that profile is crucial to Taiwan’s security.

In a October 30, 2020 commentary, Heritage ASC Director Walter Lohman and Mansfield Foundation President Frank Jannuzi defended the American concept of “strategic ambiguity” in cross-straits policy. They made arguments about the sufficiency and track record of that policy. They also suggested, however, that any alternative to scrapping “strategic ambiguity” must include vigorous diplomatic support for Taiwan from other capitals — particularly in Europe.

European countries are already making their presence felt. It is happening no faster or slower than the general European awakening to the China challenge that began in 2016, and accelerated in 2019 with Brussels’ designation of China as a “systemic rival.” But it is happening nevertheless.