North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un at a wreath laying ceremony at the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum in Hanoi on March 2, 2019. (Jorge Silva/AFP via Getty Images)

When U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with his South Korean and Chinese counterparts this week, the separate meetings had one particular focus in common: grappling with the nuclear threat posed by Kim Jong-un's regime in North Korea. 

Denuclearizing North Korea remains the elusive foreign policy goal of every recent U.S.  administration. Is a denuclearized North Korea achievable, or are the incentives for the totalitarian regime to remain on its current path too great?

A new Hudson report, Fear and Insecurity: Addressing North Korean Threat Perceptions, examines the perspectives and instincts that guide the actions of Kim Jong-un and the ruling North Korean elite. Asia-Pacific Security Chair Dr. Patrick Cronin analyzes North Korea's seven military campaigns to illustrate the role of fear and insecurity in the regime's military and diplomatic decision making.

Download a copy of the report below, and join us next week for two events where Patrick discuss these challenges with key former military and diplomatic officials.

Key Takeaways

Key takeaways from Patrick Cronin's new report, Fear and Instability: Addressing North Korean Threat Perceptions.
 

1. Kim Jong-un is poised to strengthen his regime's nuclear security command and control systems:

North Korea’s nuclear force posture of asymmetric escalation is intentionally aggressive. Kim Jong-un’s threat of pre-emptive first use aims to make the idea of U.S. and allied military intervention “unthinkable.” Cyber, electronic warfare or a drone attack on Kim’s nuclear command and control infrastructure may be the surest way to prevent a nuclear attack from North Korea. However, far from being ready to abandon nuclear weapons, the third Kim is poised to refine them and strengthen secure communications and command and control.

2. Internal control remains a top priority for the North Korean regime:

Factionalism and political schism, a military coup d'etat, economic failure, and ideological contamination are potential challenges to Kim’s legitimacy, power, and life. The tyranny that Kim Jong-un inherited a decade ago is a system built on a family personality cult in which the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) “is the part of the state that sees and knows everything.” The OGD was central to Kim Jong-il’s consolidation of power, and it remains a vital institution for Kim Jong-un’s internal control and understanding of external threats and opportunities.

3.  Denuclearization is an unrealistic goal for U.S. diplomatic efforts:

Regime survival is the ruling Kim family’s paramount goal, and it is almost inconceivable that Kim Jong-un would peacefully relinquish nuclear weapons to deter foreign military intervention. But Kim’s other interests, such as economic power and North Korean modernization, suggest there is diplomatic opportunity to reduce the risk of war on the peninsula, if not necessarily eliminate nuclear weapons anytime soon.

A combination of security guarantees, finance and development assistance, and political measures could lead to incremental diplomatic progress with Pyongyang, perhaps even to what might in retrospect be seen as a breakthrough. But that process would be fragile and subject to disruption.

4. The Kim regime is risk-tolerant—up to a point:

Kim remains risk-tolerant—or at least is likely to continue to enjoy the perception of being less risk-averse than democratic governments in Washington and Seoul. North Korea has pursued an evolving variety of political-military campaigns involving the use or threat of force, and has learned that the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance is unlikely to impose direct military costs in response to those measures. The risk-averse nature of democracies with much to lose from a potential nuclear war is known, whereas the Kim family regime has always shown a bit more risk acceptance. But it remains bounded risk acceptance, and with that knowledge, alliance managers should be able to preserve deterrence confidently and advance diplomacy. While North Korea avoids major provocations, it still may move methodically and without major fanfare to achieve its objectives.

5. The Biden administration should prioritize stabilizing the U.S.-North Korea relationship:

Diplomacy should prioritize building a more stable relationship with North Korea rather than placing denuclearization at center stage. Second, there should be no rush to summits unless there is a lower-level agreement that would guarantee a successful leaders’ meeting. Third, horizontal cooperation on a broad agenda of shared interests beyond nuclear weapons should be pursued. However, even if the United States satisfies all other countries in Northeast Asia, U.S. diplomatic actions may be insufficient to alter North Korea’s calculus. Fourth, new exchanges for information, particularly for risk reduction and crisis management, should be created. In short, the U.S. and South Korea should engage North Korea as much as possible but take time reaching conclusions.

Quotes have been edited for length and clarity.

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