March 16, 2021

Engaging the Chinese, Maintaining U.S. Principles: The First China Meeting of the Biden Administration

Chinese State Councilor for Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will be meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on March 18 in Anchorage, Alaska. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

On March 18, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor (NSA) Jake Sullivan will meet with Chinese State Councilor for Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Anchorage, Alaska. Heritage Senior Research Fellow Dean Cheng writes that it will be the first high-level meeting between Chinese and American officials since President Joe Biden took office. It will be the first Chinese opportunity to not only take the measure of the new U.S. Administration, but to lay out what China expects from the Biden team. Equally important is that it will be the first opportunity for Washington to make clear its goals and priorities in its interactions with Beijing.

For the United States, as it kicks off a renewed diplomatic effort in the Indo–Pacific, it is essential that it be proactive in establishing a long-term agenda. Although still in process, Blinken and Sullivan should convey to Yang and Wang the following highlights of a long-term agenda:

• Continued commitment to key principles. Beginning with the Quad and extending to U.S. alliances and commitments in the region, there is a general support for democracy, open markets, and a rules-based order. Whether it is fellow Quad members or democracies of Southeast Asia and various parts of Oceania, there is widespread agreement that authoritarian, one-party rule runs counter to the proper international order. Secretary Blinken and NSA Sullivan need to make clear to the Chinese that these are not only American principles, but principles shared by an array of states: respect for human rights, freedom of expression, a free press, and freedom of the seas.
• Directly state U.S. concerns about Chinese behavior in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. The Administration has expressed clear concern on both of these issues. Not addressing them in person and with a sense of priority will give the Chinese the wrong impression. The truth is, as Secretary Blinken has publicly acknowledged, the Chinese regime is committing genocide against the Uyghurs. He must say so directly to Chinese officials. The Chinese will be looking for hints of any inconsistencies in U.S. policy. The same issues arise for Hong Kong. Beijing is not living up to its commitments in the 1984 Sino–British Joint Declaration. Yang and Wang can mince words about what exactly was meant by a “high degree of autonomy” for Hong Kong, and, given the messaging from the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, they probably will. But there is no denying that Hong Kong is far less autonomous than it was just two years ago. The imposition from Beijing of the National Security Law gives the lie to Xi Jinping’s commitment to “one country, two systems.” China cannot be allowed to unilaterally impose a redefinition of its formal international pledges.
• A renewed a commitment to free trade. One of the key elements that has enriched Asia over the past half century has been the open international markets, sustained by a general adherence to the rules of free trade. Indeed, the greatest challenge that China poses has arguably been its exploitation of the international trading system. The justifications for the imposition of Section 301 tariffs by the Trump Administration involved Chinese efforts to unfairly secure intellectual property through a variety of means, including state-backed economic cyber espionage. The Biden Administration must make clear that, while the U.S. remains committed to free trade, it will also continue to counter China’s predatory actions, both unilaterally and in concert with its allies, and at the World Trade Organization.
• A strong defense capability. The United States is the only nation that can hope to counter China’s increasingly capable military. China already has the largest navy and air force in Asia, the vast bulk of which are concentrated in East Asia, rather than spread worldwide the way the U.S. military is. This force of modern naval combatants, stealth fighters, modern tanks, and armored fighting vehicles is backed by space and cyber capabilities that outpace its neighbors and makes China very clearly a peer (rather than “near-peer”) competitor. China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, on the border with India, around the Senkakus, and toward Taiwan makes clear that force is not off the table as a Chinese option—a position reinforced explicitly in the case of Taiwan. Secretary Blinken and NSA Sullivan need to make clear that, as an Indo–Pacific power, the United States remains firmly committed to supporting its allies, maintaining freedom of the seas, and supporting the rules-based order in the Indo–Pacific region, with the military capabilities necessary to support those commitments.

Related: Click here to read Heritage Research Fellow Jeff Smith's commentary on why the future of the Quad is bright.

Secretaries of State and Defense Should Broach Tough Issues During Asia Trip

TOKYO, JAPAN - MARCH 16 : U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin (L), U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken (2nd L), Japan's Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi (2nd R) and Japan's Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi wear protective face masks while posing for a photograph prior to the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting in Tokyo, Japan on March 16, 2021. (Photo by Kiyoshi Ota/Bloomberg/Pool/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

This week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will meet with Japanese and South Korean counterparts to confirm U.S. security commitments to its allies and coordinate policies toward the North Korean and Chinese threats. Tokyo and Seoul perceive the first overseas trip by Biden cabinet members and the rapid resolution of military cost-sharing negotiations as signaling strong U.S. support for the alliances and prioritization of the Indo–Pacific region.

Heritage Senior Research Fellow Bruce Klingner writes that the positive public messaging, however, will mask some policy differences behind the scenes. The U.S. and Japan largely agree on the need to confront growing Chinese maritime assertiveness in the East and South China seas, as well as the increasing North Korean nuclear and missile threats. South Korea, however, is resistant to criticizing Beijing or joining coalitions seen as containing China. Seoul advocates additional incentives to encourage North Korea to return to denuclearization negotiations. Both allies may resist U.S. efforts at reconciling difficult historic issues between them that have impeded greater trilateral coordination in addressing regional threats.

Despite this apprehension, the U.S. should urge South Korea to play a larger role in the Indo–Pacific, including in ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. South Korea should be reminded that it shares values and principles with the United States and other countries that seek to redress China’s intimidating and belligerent behavior and promote a free and open Indo–Pacific.

These senior-level meetings provide an opportunity to affirm the importance of the individual alliances as well as to discuss their role in a broader Indo–Pacific strategy. The U.S. should combine strong public messaging with frank and open private discussions with Japan and South Korea.

Coordinating allied policy with Seoul and Tokyo, in conjunction with the March 12 virtual summit meeting of the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.), provides the Biden Administration with a stronger foundation for the subsequent U.S. meeting with Chinese officials in Alaska on March 18. The U.S. is stronger when aligned with allies and partners in the Indo–Pacific.

Related: Click here to read Heritage Senior Research Fellow Bruce Klingner's commentary on North Korea policy.

March 18, 2021 @ 10:00 am EDT - VIRTUAL EVENT: Understanding the Chinese Ideological Threat

As China policy takes center stage, there is growing debate over the what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) actually believes. Is the CCP truly Communist, or has it become something else? In the modern world, pinpointing the nature of CCP ideology is far from simple.

Understanding the CCP’s ideology can improve policymaking decisions and efforts to counter threats associated with China’s rise. What role does this ideology play in Chinese foreign policy today, and what is its global influence? Does it shape the response to American initiatives, and are there elements of this ideology that can impact Americans at home? Join us as two eminent scholars take on this tough question along with Heritage’s Dean Cheng.