[To what extent will the emerging political context of elections
in the US really allow agreements to be awakened and the tango of
relations with Cuba to be re-launched?] [[link removed]]

"IN DIFFICULT TIMES": THE TANGO OF NORMALIZATION  
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Rafael Hernandez
November 26, 2020
Cuba US People to People Partnership
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_ To what extent will the emerging political context of elections in
the US really allow agreements to be awakened and the tango of
relations with Cuba to be re-launched? _

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In a well-known 1968 poem, Heberto Padilla describes a man who is
asked to successively deliver parts and capabilities of his body. When
he has given them all up, they urge him to walk straight into the
future, "for in difficult times/this is undoubtedly the decisive
test".

Although these then-controversial verses referred to the asymmetry
between the state and the individual, their poetic allure allows us to
reread them as a metaphor for the asymmetry of powers between the US
and Cuba, and the difficult treatment between our two nations and
countries.

Now that a window for understanding between the two sides appears to
open again, as a result of the recent elections in the North, some
place the question: what will the island government do to seize this
new opportunity, on which the future of the country depends?

In English it is said "to dance the tango it takes two". Unlike rumba,
in which dancers evolve on their own, when you dance as closely as in
tango, there is no way to judge what one does without seeing (and
understanding) what the other is doing. To really appreciate it you
would have to give a little rewind to the tango of normalization.

Despite the rule of law and the balance between the three governing
powers in the United States, most of what was agreed with Cuba during
Obama's short summer did not have the stability of agreements between
states, but only between governments. That trait, by the way, is
nothing new. Almost none of the major agreements over 60 years have
been endorsed by Congress to become treaties, because understandings,
which leave it hands free, have sufficed for the Executive to change
them if it suits him. These are the cases of the 1965, 1984 and 1995
migration agreements, the 1973 hijacking of aircraft, the 1977
fisheries and maritime boundaries, and so on.

Of the 22 bilateral instruments adopted during the Obama
administration (the largest round of tango in more than half a
century), almost all had only the category of memorandums of
understanding (MOU): scheduled flights, passenger safety and commerce,
cancer health cooperation, law enforcement and enforcement; as well as
conservation and management of marine protected areas, hydrography and
geodesy for maritime safety, exchange on agriculture and related
areas, conservation of wildlife and protected areas, animal and plant
health inspection, exchange of information and research on climate and
meteorology, as well as joint response to hydrocarbon spillage in the
Gulf and Florida Strait.1

Beyond the MOU category, it was agreements that restored diplomatic
relations and the opening of permanent diplomatic missions—the first
with the Obama administration—and cooperation between Zapata Swamp
Park and the Everglades Park in animal life protection, which was the
last. It also had this category of operational cooperation to deal
with illicit trafficking in drugs and psychotropic substances.

The others consisted of "joint declarations" on immigration policy
(continuing the agreement signed in 1995) and environmental
protection; a pilot plan for direct mail; a joint programme for the
teaching of English and an "arrangement" to admit security officers on
board aircraft.

Only the treaty category reached the delimitation of the continental
shelf in the eastern part of the Gulf of Mexico, beyond 200 miles,
which reformulated the 1977 agreement. The legal existence of this
instrument is rather virtual, as it has not been submitted to Congress
for approval.

The list of understandings and agreements reflects the diplomatic
level achieved by the ongoing normalizing process under the Obama
administration. How to appreciate this tango from the "bottom" side?
To put it in a fashionable language for these lares, tended to
negotiate with the U.S. government involved Cuba investing in a joint
venture whose counterpart submitted hardly any memorandums of intent,
without providing any seed money or lines of credit or fresh capital,
or signing any contracts. It led to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
of a corporation called America Inc., which was to leave office in a
very short time, a credit that included unusual access, going beyond
the lack of reliability accumulated by that corporation in the Cuban,
regional and global market.

To conclude the idea with the same jargon, although the CEO and other
managers of America Inc. argued that they had to deal with their
shareholders at an assembly called Congress, which greatly complicated
their decisions, the Cuban Government-Party business counterpart also
had to deal with a diversity of opinions, up and down, logically
concerned about collateral risks and costs that did not have insurance
to guarantee them.

In previous texts I drew attention to the asymmetrical nature of the
process called standardization with the US. I listed unilateral
actions from Cuba, which, despite emerging negative reactions from
both sides, and occasional disagreements over tango steps, helped to
prevail the will to continue dancing until the end. The greatest of
these decisions involved discarding the choreography used by China and
Vietnam, whose full diplomatic relations with the US previously went
through commercial and financial normalization, security and
cooperation. By putting the opening of embassies ahead of the lifting
of the embargo, Cuba prioritized the start of dialogue and
negotiation, despite the risks and costs noted above.

What I have said is intended to set the milestones of this recent
story, apparently forgotten by some when they talk about "Cuba's lack
of response." I do not intend to devalue the merits and achievements
of the intense diplomacy deployed on both sides, but only to set
points on certaintíes.

The last of these points is strategic. In a framework of radical
asymmetry, such as that between Cuba and the US, a negotiating process
that fits a quid pro quo (that is, bartering – mechanics is fatal.
This mechanic is reflected in questions such as "what internal changes
will Cuba make in reciprocity to the US, after 58 years, lifting the
embargo?", or "what would Cubans give in exchange for returning
control of those 117 square kilometers of its territory occupied by
the US Navy at the entrance to Guantanamo Bay, since 1898?"

I know that for some, those questions are legitimate. And it is not
that the issues of the embargo and the naval base do not deserve to be
worked together, in conflict resolution scenarios that creatively
imagine mutually agreed dispute-overcoming mechanisms. But a Cuban
government that accepted them as part of the logical quid pro quo,
with a communicative vessel inwards, would be exposed not only to
opening a flank in its negotiating position, but above all to a loss
of legitimacy, both among its followers and among many other citizens,
on and off the island, for whom the defense of the national interest
goes through sovereignty, first and foremost.

To recap the steps of our tango, I invite you to re-select the raffle
of agreements noted above and answer some questions. To what extent do
they reflect interests on both sides? Which of these instruments were
unilateral concessions to the Cuban government on the part of the
United States? In what specific areas were achieved: economic and
commercial relations, ecology, transport, culture and education,
diplomacy, security and defense? How many and which departments like
Homeland Security, on the one hand, and MININT or MINFAR on the other?
To what extent did cooperation between these bodies fulfill national
interests on both sides, or barely benefit the bodies themselves?

As Philip Brenner of the nine main agreements or MOU has pointed out,
eight remain valid*; three have been fully implemented; four partially
or restrictedly and the only unvalidated is still respected by both
parties. So almost all 23 (including the embassy opening) are alive.
As in the Sleeping Beauty scene, in which the characters suddenly fall
into a deep sleep, the nightmare of renewed hostility during Trump's
reign failed to erase what was agreed, but rather put it into
hibernation.

In addition to taking Trump out of the White House, these elections
showed—anyone who had eyes to see beyond polls, political flip
flops, and local struggles—the enormous gravitation of conservative
populism, a substrate of Trumpism, into truly existing political
culture. How this living and collecting substrate will affect the
immediate future will be revealed in the republican opposition's
ability to raise the cost and counteract the next government's
initiatives.

Soon, many people of goodwill dream of the president-elect's ability
to heal a divided society (by Trump...) and subtract a democracy
lacerated by four years of deviation from the right path, among other
well-meaning images. In addition to the success that rectifying
negative errors and trends can achieve within that great nation, it is
very likely that the new governing team will also prioritize the
counter-reform of Trumpism in the large areas of problems of its
global foreign policy: European Union, China, Russia, Iran, Iraq,
Afghanistan, climate change, free trade agreements, etc.

It is within that real political framework that it would then make
sense to ask our question: to what extent will the emerging political
context of the US elections really allow agreements to be awakened and
the tango of relations with Cuba put into motion again?

The denial of Trumpism should logically lead to the rectification of
its brutal decisions towards Cuba. In particular, those that directly
affect Cubans on the island and in emigration. Although polls and the
campaign itself showed a not-so-luminous side of that suddenly
Trumpist emigration, some preliminary figures have revealed that his
vote was ultimately not as Republican as he foreshadowed, let alone
determining election results in Florida's most Cuban districts, which
voted blue. Remittances, travel, sales of food and medicine and, above
all, standardization of the consulate and the visa process in Havana
would respond to those interests, on both sides.

The second moment in the logic of interrupted relations would be for
the new administration to open the archives where the 22 agreements
signed with Cuba were deceived, return to the point where they were in
January 2017, and at least resume dialogue and diplomacy of meetings
around what has already been agreed, even if it did not progress
another millimeter.

Finally, I would be resizing the normalization process. No think tank
or lobby can provide a more articulate, accurate and comprehensive
strategic document for a Democratic administration than the US-Cuba
Presidential Relations Directive, produced by the Obama administration
in October 2016, and then agreed with all the state bureaucracy
involved in any relationship with Cuba. Biden was part of the
government team that generated the standardization policy in 2014 and
produced that document. It would be logical for that directive to be
retouched at some point, and to circulate on its external relations
team, perhaps with a notice of Biden's handwriting in the margin,
asking for updates and adjustments, between question marks.

But in politics, it's not enough to make sense. Neither Cuba has the
relevance it had at the peculiar juncture of an outgoing
administration in its final months; nor are we in the world of 2016
(but virtually in 2021) nor does this Democratic administration come
to power as the previous one did, as is obvious from everything noted
above.

On the other hand, in many journalistic commentary on the Cuba-USA
tango, it seems as if the two were alone on the dance floor. What
character will the triangles of both have with the European Union,
China and Russia? To what extent can the US-Venezuela-Cuba triangle
evolve? What factors, not only in Washington, but in Caracas and the
international environment, can influence it? What will happen in Latin
America and the Caribbean in 2021? In places like Bolivia, Chile,
Ecuador, Brazil...? Those who repeat the old tango of monodependence
as Cuban doom do not seem to understand the complexity of these
networks of current relationships, and their geopolitical
implications.

Four years of Trump, with high economic costs to Cuba, have not
represented qualitatively new strategic challenges, as the government
has more practice in dealing with U.S. hostility than
normalization. In the waiting period, circumstances have imposed the
urgency of the transformations of the established order, and
accelerated their implementation. Perhaps when we look back, in a few
years' time, we can discover that misfortunes like COVID-19 and Trump
helped to bring that change to a close, and to do so in a totally
disassociated manner from a negotiation with the United States.

In any case, for those who like parallels, the new administration will
meet its first 100 days in coincidence with the VIII Congress of the
PCC. In contrast to so much theatricalization of dominant network
politics, and editorials by tirios and Trojans, an equal look at those
hundred days would allow us to anticipate how the tango paints, and
its new steps, in difficult and decisive times.

Part 2

A Japanese friend told me that in her land people do not follow the
elections and avatars of US politics so closely; they are more
interested in the People's Republic of China and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, with which their own history is inserted,
including, by the way, hot immigration influences. It is not that they
and their government suffer from a colonial syndrome that puts their
destiny in the hands of others, of a mentality dependent and obsessive
with these neighbors, or anything personal, ideological or paranoid
towards them, but of a geopolitical condition, which explains a
knowledge before Marxism-Leninism.

The Japanese parallel illustrates a recurring edge in some visions of
US-Cuba relations: ethnocentrism. According to this optics, Cubans do
not look like anyone else, what happens to us is always exceptional, a
tragedy of 60 years has set out the national being, rather glued, we
are very different from other places where concord and understanding
reign, and the worst of all in the face of the goodwill of the
Americans, with whom we do not manage to understand ourselves because
we do not really want to , unlike so many others that harmonize with
them. Thus we go, always seeing the straw in our eye, like Caribbean
Jews, transitioned by diaspora, exodus and other biblical glosses.

This ethnocentrism, by the way, is also reflected in ideas such as US
presidents rising up thinking about the Cuban Revolution, that we are
the thorn on the side of the empire, that Cuban politics only responds
to ideological motivations and not to national interests, that our
allies are those who share our highest principles and values, that the
nation is confused with socialism Etc.

This ethnocentrism, from where you can hardly understand and explain
politics, gives vampires an air: they are not seen in their own
mirror. I mean, they only see the qualities they've chosen.

In an earlier text, I tried to characterize relations between Cuba and
the United States during the terms of Office of Barack Obama and Raul
Castro, map the tango they executed in just two years, show that the
two sides yielded considerably, taking into account not only the
barrier of embargo, but that of the legacy of mistrust, and the
enormous asymmetry that separates them. I also mentioned some
differences between the two, such as the risks and collateral costs
assumed, without insurance to guarantee them.

Let me take a few more steps down this often hidden verdict. When the
US government establishes agreements with Cuba, it can assume that it
will deal with the same government for a time longer than four years.
The stability factor has the advantage of allowing you to know the
Cuban leadership well, learn how you think, predict your reactions,
analyze your environment, calculate the limits of your power and the
viability of your policies, projected on five-year plans. The Cuban
side lacks that advantage. If Joe Biden now fills us with hope, we
must not forget that, as soon as 2024 arrives, the 51 polling stations
in charge can choose a Donald Trump perfectly (God forbid).

That situation pre-conditions relationships. Already, the
president-elect's team has an eye to secure the second term, as well
as to tie up a congressional election in just two years. As we know,
since the 1960 struggle between Nixon and JFK, that electoral climate,
with its high volatility, has been fatal for countries like
Cuba—generally for Latin America and the Caribbean—no matter what
we're doing or not, given the adverse effects of getting caught from
study material for their electoral battle.

On the other hand, many weather parts about US-Cuba overlook that Joe
Biden is going to be the first US president with a brand new Cuban
counterpart. If Obama went through with chips, as they would say in
dominoes, emphasizing that he was not born when the Cuban Revolution
triumphed, it's worth remembering that Diaz-Canel didn't either. He
had nothing to do with Playa Girón, the missile crisis or the
guerrillas in Latin America, nor did he take letters in the alliances
with the USSR or the Tricontinental. If Obama was 30 years younger
than his interlocutor Raul Castro, Biden could be the first U.S.
president to talk to a Cuban party's head of state and secretary 18
years younger than him and whose last name is not Castro.

Anyone would say that this circumstance is highly favorable for
progress in relationships. However, the previous experience tells us
that, with the US, the stars tilt, but they do not force. I will then
write down some political processes already underway that can align
these stars in the direction of renormalization sooner rather than
later.

Two weeks ago, I mentioned the likelihood that the new U.S. government
team would prioritize the counter-reformation of Trumpism. This would
include the large areas of problems of its global foreign policy: the
European Union, China, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, climate
change, trade agreements, etc.

As we know, Cuba is not on the agenda of major problems. But that is
precisely why it can serve as a less complicated and cautious
demonstrative effect than turning relations with China and Iran and
immigration politics. It was exactly that logic that prompted Obama
to invest his last two cents of political capital on an issue as
secondary as Cuba. Jeremy Bentham, the apostle of utilitarianism,
would interpret it as achieving maximum profit at minimal cost,
through an issue that, although small, has the applause of his allies
and the rest of the world, as already known from experience.

Comparatively, sweeping the destruction of the Republican elephant
into the glassware of our relations would not pose a major
complication. Restoring remittances, travel, food and medicine sales
and, above all, normalizing the consulate's work and the visa granting
process in Havana can only have opposition among Miami's most
bombastic Trumpists. I wonder if the experts who, from dissimilar
balconies (EFE, Granma, El Toque...) seem to agree that Washington's
policy towards Havana passes through Miami, would bet something on the
real power of these rhyming to dictate it around the aforementioned
topics.

The second requirement for change is the existence of an elaborate
strategy to deal with Cuba. Some meteorologists question the reality
of that vision, as if we were in a kind of zero-grade relationship.
Describe yourself as a double-edged knife or Trojan horse, the same
dog with another collar, or other novel metaphors... it's definitely
not an enigma. The Presidential Directive on U.S.-Cuba relations,
produced by the Obama administration in October 2016, and shared with
joe joe joe biden, sang his triumphs loud and clear, as they say in
auction, on one stick and another.

Can we have any idea where and who it's time to play that tune? We
know that security issues are not decided in Senate Foreign Relations
Committee or Florida legislature hearings, but in foreign policy
governing bodies, historically decisive in relations with Cuba. If we
give even a minimum of credit to bureaucratic policy models, to
recommend the one that will be done towards Cuba, we should start by
appreciating the communicating vessel with the Obama administration.
The appointment of figures charged with leading national security and
foreign policy from senior officials in the previous Democratic (and
other more remote) governments include the National Security Council
(Jake Sullivan), the State Department (Antony Blinken), Homeland
Security (Alejandro Mayorkas), the intelligence community (Avril
Haines) and the president's chief of office (Ron Klein).

All of them were already there between December 17, 2014 and January
20, 2017; and there is still a need to name a few more, from various
hierarchies. For example, the ambassador to the UN (with rank in the
NSC) and the president's special envoy for the climate (cabinet
member) turn out to be an expert black career diplomat in Africa
(Linda Thomas-Greenfield), and the former chancellor who opened the
embassy in Havana (John Kerry). If the continuity of normalization
had first and last names, this list would be eloquent.

On the other hand, finding a common thread for these designations
could lead to dreams of reason. Let's say, someone might think that
when Biden appoints a California lawyer born in Cuba to lead the
agency in charge of counterterrorism, border control, transportation
security, and immigration, which has negotiated and signed agreements
with the MININT and MINFAR (those blacklisted Castroist agencies by
Trump and company), he's giving a candle to Marco Rubio and Mario
Díaz-Balart on politics toward Cuba.

Finally, let's go back to geopolitical reason and the global tango
track. According to our previous history, the US-Cuba conflict has
unfolded with elements and sands that exceed strictly bilateral space.
If, instead of Miami's upside-down, a wide lens were used to look
triangularly, how would their relations with the European Union, China
and Russia intersect? To what extent could the US-Venezuela-Cuba
triangle evolve? What will happen in Latin America and the Caribbean
in 2021, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Nicaragua and Honduras? In
Argentina and Mexico? To what extent will the region's magnetic field,
for causes and chances outside the two countries, move in a
configuration conducive to the Cuba-US relationship?

To comment on these questions, with adherence to the logic of tango
and the dance floor, we would have to explain the structure of Cuban
foreign policy and its factors, within the framework of its relations
with the world, rather than simply reflecting the conflict-cooperation
with the US. What alliances, interests, convergences, partnerships and
uncoverings govern it? Where do your strengths and weaknesses lie? How
have they moved during the Trump era? What signals announce that you
are ready or not for renormalization with the US? How do these
external relations interact with domestic policy?

Understanding this interaction requires looking without polarized
lenses at the process of reforms and the matrix of transition.
Calibrating the US as a domestic factor in the transition involves
thinking about it in the context of other factors and dynamics, such
as relations between the two societies, and in no way as a negotiating
agenda between governments. Although it is said easy, to put it in the
words of Jorge Luis Borges, decipher "that new tango (...) it is a
riddle, without lacking the perplexed variants, common places and
reasoned discord of the commentators."

_Rafael Hernandez has been director of the Cuban cultural
studies magazine Temas from 1995 to the present._

_PUBLISHED IN ON CUBA IN THE ORIGINAL SPANISH AND IN THE ENGLISH
TRANSLATION._

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