CEP Research Analyst Gregory Waters On The ISIS Insurgency In Central Syria


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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In September 2020

CEP Research Analyst Gregory Waters On The ISIS Insurgency In Central Syria

Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In September 2020 by clicking
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In September 2020

By Gregory Waters

 

Following is the September installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. August’s update can be readhere
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, July’s update can be readhere
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, the June update can be readhere
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, May’s update can be readhere
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, and April’shere.
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full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including its
methodology, can be exploredhere
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andhere
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ISIS militants carried out at least 32 attacks in September, killing at least
32 pro-Assad regime fighters and 12 civilians in the Homs, Deir Ez Zor, Raqqa,
Hama, and Aleppo governorates. These attacks constitute a continuation of the
escalation in violence witnessed in August, when ISIS cells conducted their
largest number of attacks since their insurgency began. The overall number of
attacks, the number of high quality* attacks, and documented pro-government
deaths in September exceeded any prior month of ISIS’ insurgency except August.
Unlike in August, when Homs experienced the greatest number of attacks,
September saw ISIS cells concentrate again on western Deir Ez Zor (11) and
Raqqa (9), while also increasing their activity in Hama (5) and Aleppo (2), as
we predicted. September was also the first time since July that high quality
attacks were carried out in all five governorates.



ISIS has continued to focus on western Deir Ez Zor, with all 11 documented
attacks in the province occurring either just west of the town of Mayadeen (3)
or in the northwest corner of the governorate (8), stretching from Jabal Bishri
to Deir Ez Zor city. Pro-regime forces were slow to conduct their much
anticipated anti-ISISoperation
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area following the August 27 ISISambush
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many as 30 pro-regime fighters of the National Defense Forces (NDF) dead. When
government and local units did finally move into the desert west of Musarib,
they were met with well-placed mines and additional ambushes. Meanwhile, much
of the fighting in Homs occurred in the first week of the September, when
regime forces pushed into Wadi Doubayat, just south of the city of Sukhnah,
forcing ISIS out of an area it had long held. However, ISIS retook the area two
days later. Since then, no attempt has been made by the Syrian regime to wrest
back control of the area.

 

As in previous months, ISIS successfully assassinated several pro-regime
commanders in September. The NDF, increasingly bearing the brunt of the
insurgency, lost two more sector commanders. Its Eastern Sector commander was
wounded during an anti-ISIS operation west of Musarib on September 19 and would
die the following day, along with the two other fighters in his car when it was
attacked. On September 30, ISIS fighters in the city of Ma’adan, Raqqa, managed
to place an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in the car of Mohammad Shaaban,
killing him. Shaaban was a veteran NDF commander responsible for defending the
Deir Ez Zor airport during its four-year siege and later headed the recruitment
office for western Deir Ez Zor governorate before joining the Raqqa NDF
leadership a few months ago. These two men represent the 20th and 21st officers
killed by ISIS in the Badia (Syrian desert) since the start of this year, and
the third and fourth NDF commanders lost in just the past six weeks.

 

Other high-quality ISIS attacks included a September 13 ambush west of
Mayadeen in which at least six pro-regime Liwa al-Quds fighters were killed and
two of their vehicles were lost. On September 24, ISIS militants carried out
simultaneous raids on regime checkpoints near the Zakia Junction in Aleppo and
near Resafa in Raqqa. According to local sources, ISIS fighters approached the
checkpoints on motorcycles, causing the soldiers to flee. ISIS then withdrew
after collecting the equipment left behind. On September 16, separate ISIS
cells attacked security forces in several villages in northeast Hama. This
attack was followed on September 28, by a raid on a village in southeast Hama,
where ISIS militants killed 12 local civilians and stole their sheep. These
last two attacks mark the first major actions in eastern Hama since late July,
when locals began forming self-defense militias in response to frequent ISIS
raids and an absence of government security forces.

 

ISIS carried out two or more attacks on 11 days in September, with two days in
which three attacks were conducted across the Syrian desert. September
experienced three more days of multiple ISIS attacks than August, as violence
picked up significantly in the second half of the month following a much
quieter first half. ISIS’s continued ability to carry out such frequent
same-day attacks confirms that the group employs a sophisticated logistical and
strategic capability that enables cells in each province to operate
independently from each other.

 

Anti-ISIS operations appeared to slow down this month, with the only major
operation occurring in Wadi Doubayat during the first week. Local pro-regime
forces have semi-regularly probed the region west of Musarib, and a multi-day
operation was carried out from Khanasir, Aleppo south to east Hama, the second
of its kind since July. The Syrian Army’s 17th Division continued to send new
recruits to Deir Ez Zor city, although the division is reportedly refusing to
deploy alongside the pro-regime NDF north of the city due to a long-standing
political dispute between the division’s head, Major General Ghassan Mohammad,
and the commander of the Deir Ez Zor NDF, Feras Jeham. In Raqqa, the Syrian Air
Force has, according to one NDF fighter, adopted a strategy of bombing
pre-selected targets whenever ground forces are hit by mines or come under fire
from ISIS fighters. This attempt at deterrence has proven entirely ineffective.

 

Despite the assumption that ISIS would scale back its attacks following the
extremely deadly month of August, Badia cells appear to have kept a near
identical pace of activity throughout September. While ISIS did not carry out
any attacks on the scale of August’s Musarib ambush or the killing of the
Russian major general, they have effectively employed a combination of
well-placed mines, IEDs, and regular ambushes to keep the pressure on regime
forces. More concerning for the regime, the apparent inability to protect NDF
commanders puts this crucial frontline unit at risk of severe degradation. The
loss of veteran commanders combined with the already poor support the militia
receives from the army leaves its fighters increasingly vulnerable to
large-scale ISIS attacks.

 

October will likely see more commanders killed and another attempt at a large
ambush, most probably in Deir Ez Zor or Raqqa where ISIS cells appear to have
the most freedom of movement. Homs can be expected to heat up as well, at the
very least returning to the types of attacks witnessed in August, including
mines and harassment fire along the highways north of Sukhnah. East Hama and
south Aleppo remain the key fronts for further geographic expansion of ISIS’s
insurgency. ISIS clearly wants to make inroads in both of these important
regions, though it remains unclear how successful they will be at securing and
holding territory in these more urbanized areas.

Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted dots) in September. To view an
interactive version of this map, please clickhere
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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.

 

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