The Sea Hunter, an autonomous unmanned surface vehicle developed by DARPA, gets underway on the Willamette River. (U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams/Released)

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have increasingly turned to autonomous underwater vehicles and submarines in an effort to level the playing field with U.S. and allied navies. Adversarial countries are using these unmanned platforms and submarines to threaten regional powers, signal the potential for escalation, and constrain global freedoms of navigation. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy's reliance on manned aircraft, ships, and submarines weaken the fleet's ability to find, track, and suppress enemy submarines.

"Sustaining the Undersea Advantage: Transforming Anti-Submarine Warfare Using Autonomous Systems," a new report by Hudson's Bryan Clark, Seth Cropsey and Tim Walton, provides an in-depth look at how the U.S. can use unmanned systems to implement new offensive strategies and gain the advantage in anti-submarine warfare. The report examines the evolution of undersea warfare; new strategies, concepts, and capabilities to address undersea threats using unmanned and autonomous systems; and how new anti-submarine warfare approaches could be more affordable and provide better results for U.S. and allied navies.

See the report's key takeaways below, and if you missed it, be sure to catch yesterday's event on the latest India-China standoff along the Himalayan border.

Key Takeways

Highlighted takeaways from the new report, "Sustaining the Undersea Advantage: Transforming Anti-Submarine Warfare Using Autonomous Systems."

1. The U.S. Navy's current anti-submarine warfare approach is vulnerable in a crisis:

The U.S. Navy currently relies on fixed seabed sensors such as the Sound Surveillance System and Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System ships to detect submarines. Maritime patrol aircraft and guided missile destroyers then track each adversary submarine before potentially passing it to a nuclear-powered submarine for longer-term surveillance. During a crisis, if manned platforms and expendables such as sonobuoys or torpedoes run out or are needed elsewhere, anti-submarine operations will necessarily collapse to a defensive strategy protecting high-value targets, instead of suppressing enemy submarine operations closer to the adversary’s waters.

2. Manned systems rely on chokepoints, placing a burden on defensive operations:

Today’s manned anti-submarine platforms can conduct offensive maneuvers at choke points—albeit at great cost, financially and operationally—and defensive operations near military and civilian maritime forces. They have almost no capacity for operations between an opponent’s home waters and potential targets, including US and allied homelands, commercial shipping, and naval forces. This shortcoming places a potentially insurmountable burden on defensive anti-submarine operations to defeat attack submarines up to 1,000 nautical miles away from potential targets.

3. Unmanned systems can transform anti-submarine warfare:

An unmanned approach can more effectively protect US and allied forces by expanding the areas over which anti-submarine warfare operations can be conducted. Many unmanned systems use sensors and processing capabilities that are identical, or very similar, to those employed by manned platforms and sound surveillance systems today. Perhaps more importantly, unmanned technology can lower the cost to buy and operate anti-submarine systems over their lifetime. As DoD enters a period of likely fiscal constraints, costs for time and manpower-intensive anti-submarine operations will be an increasing concern.

4. China’s expansionist approach to undersea warfare:

In contrast to Russia, the Chinese navy conducts offensive operations in support of an active defense strategy. The People’s Liberation Army relies on networks of sensors and long-range precision weapons, combined with aggressive sub-conventional or gray-zone activities, to expand China’s influence and territorial control. In addition to threatening neighbors such as Japan, the PLA’s sensor and weapons network could hinder US forces attempting to reinforce the region and thereby undermine American security assurances.

The PLAN’s fleet of sixty-five to seventy submarines is predominantly composed of relatively quiet diesel-powered SS and conventional air-independent propulsion submarines. Although the PLAN’s nuclear submarines are relatively noisy, it recently expanded its nuclear submarine construction capacity and is expected to double the size of its SSN and SSBN fleet over the coming decade.  Furthermore, the PLAN continues to expand global operations by sending naval expeditionary task forces further than the traditionally accepted norms, routinely transiting east of the Hawaiian Islands and west into the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden.

5. Russia’s offensive undersea warfare strategy:

The Russian Federation Navy’s (RFN) fleet of fifty-eight submarines is the backbone of Moscow’s maritime power. Submarines play a largely offensive role in the RFN, with surface combatants and air forces focusing on coastal and homeland defense. RFN nuclear ballistic missile submarines are used to ensure a survivable second-strike deterrent. Russia’s conventional attack submarines are employed as a complement to its hybrid operations in the Baltic and Mediterranean, threatening North Atlantic Treaty Organization naval forces, particularly those of eastern European countries that are the target of Russian military and paramilitary gray-zone engagement.

Quotes have been edited for length and clarity

Go Deeper: China's Growing Military