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GENERATION Z IN IRAN: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE  
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Sharareh Akhavan
September 6, 2026
Socialist Project
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_ Iran’s Generation Z may constitute a significant arena of
political engagement and potential transformation, within which new
forms of political consciousness and collective agency are taking
shape. _

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More than 15,000 teenagers answered a call from Nima Tekido, an
entertainment producer and YouTube personality, to attend an event at
Iran Mall in Tehran in July 2026. Although only 4,000 tickets had been
sold, thousands more arrived hoping to participate, overwhelming the
venue. The event quickly became a social phenomenon surprising not
only Iranian sociologists and psychologists but also political
observers from across the ideological spectrum inside and outside of
Iran.

What made this gathering so remarkable was not merely its size but
what it revealed about Iran’s youngest generation. After 47 years of
strict ideological and authoritarian social control, the rulers of the
Islamic Republic appeared unable to comprehend the extent to which
Generation Z had become detached from (and in many respects, resistant
to) the values and norms the regime had sought to instill. Yet the
surprise was not limited to the ruling establishment. Reformists,
republicans, left-wing activists, and other opposition groups were
also astonished. The event exposed a profound gap between Iran’s
political elites and its youth, raising uncomfortable but essential
questions: What do we know and understand about the aspirations,
culture, and identity of the generation that will shape Iran’s
future? How can we understand the apparent paradox of Generation Z
simultaneously engaging in anti-regime demonstrations and embracing
seemingly apolitical forms of popular entertainment and leisure? Does
this coexistence indicate political apathy or instead a transformed
mode of political engagement?

Contemporary descriptions of Generation Z are dominated by two
contrasting narratives. One celebrates the generation as politically
conscious, digitally adept, and globally interconnected. The other
dismisses it as fragmented, impulsive, and apolitical. Both narratives
essentialize Generation Z by presenting its characteristics as fixed
and inherent, rather than recognizing them as products of historical
developments and broader social, cultural, and political conditions.

In this essay, I examine the characteristics of Iranian Generation Z
through the intersecting lenses of digital socialization,
neoliberalism, and mental health, thereby developing a more
contemporary understanding of the social and political conditions,
identities, and experiences that characterize this generation.

Defining Generation Z in the Iranian Context

The term Generation Z (Gen Z) is commonly used to refer to the
generation born approximately between the mid-1990s and the early
2000s and represents approximately 30% of the global population.1
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However, the precise boundaries of this generation vary across
academic and popular sources. This variation becomes particularly
relevant in the Iranian context where generational categories are
often defined according to different demographic, social, and cultural
criteria.

There is no single universally accepted definition of Iranian
Generation Z. The latest demographic data indicate that approximately
24% of Iran’s population consists of children and adolescents under
the age of 15. Additionally, 25% are young individuals aged 15 to 29,
while 44% are middle-aged, and the remaining population comprises
elderly individuals over 65.2
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Although this age range may not correspond precisely to conventional
definitions of Generation Z, it provides useful demographic context
for understanding the size and social significance of Iran’s younger
population. It should be acknowledged that this generation encompasses
individuals from diverse class and ethnic backgrounds, as well as a
range of gender identities. Therefore, it should not be understood as
a homogeneous group. This diversity is particularly significant in the
context of Iran, a country characterized by substantial class, social,
ethnic, and regional heterogeneity.

In this essay, the term Generation Z is, therefore, used as a broad
analytical category while recognizing that its exact boundaries may
differ across Iranian demographic and sociological sources.

Generation Z and Digital Socialization

Generation Z is defined as the first generation to grow up with
digital connectivity and the internet from early childhood. As the
first generation to grow up with digital connectivity, they have
developed distinctive modes of communication, learning, working,
political engagement, and social interaction. They are used to rapid
circulation of information, global cultural influences, and new forms
of networked participation. Taken together, these conditions provide
an important analytical framework for understanding Generation Z’s
political attitudes, identities, and forms of collective action in
contemporary societies. Digital connectivity constitutes central
dimensions of the generation’s social experience, shaping how young
people access information, construct identities, perceive
inequalities, and engage in political actions. At the same time,
digital connectivity may function not only as a mechanism of social
integration but even as a channel through which experiences of
inequality become more visible, collectively interpreted, and
potentially translated into political discontent and social unrest.

Iran’s Digital Landscape

Iran’s digital landscape has been constantly evolving over the
years. At the beginning of 2023, about 79% of Iran’s population were
internet users.3
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This demonstrates the remarkable growth of the internet in Iran where
it continues to play an increasingly vital role in the lives of the
Iranian Generation Z. The ITU reports
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individuals in Iran owned a mobile cellular telephone in 2024.
Importantly, ITU defines this as an individual who owns a mobile phone
with at least one active SIM for personal use. Instagram appears to be
the most popular social media platform in Iran.4
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Generation Z’s Use of Social Media and the Internet

Iranian Generation Z increasingly challenge established social norms
and participate in shaping alternative forms of social reality,
particularly through digitally mediated platforms such as social
media. Gen Z has not only challenged the norms and forms of life
imposed by governmental institutions and familial norms but also
actively resisted sociopolitical norms, including compulsory dress
codes, traditional family expectations, state monitoring, and
censorship. Gen Z helps to lay the groundwork for future political and
social change in Iran. During the Women Life Freedom movement, they
pursued this path with determination. Despite the government’s
efforts to shut down the internet and suppress protests, they bypassed
restrictions using VPNs and proxy servers and asked for transnational
support. Hashtags such as #MahsaAmini, #WomanLifeFreedom, and
#NoToCompulsoryVeil circulated widely, attracting more than 600
million views across the globe.5
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The demand to reclaim life6
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and the aspiration to live a ‘normal life’ have remained central
to recent resistance movements in Iran. Applying this lens helps
explain how Gen Z not only operates within online environments to
challenge societal norms but also translates these digital actions
into offline collective and political activities. Digital and public
spaces serve as crucial sites for the articulation, visibility, and
mobilization of young women’s resistance, enabling both individual
acts of defiance and collective forms of political expression (For
instance, Parastou Ahmadi’s concert
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2024, met with state reprisals, including fines and court-ordered
flogging).

Digital connectivity can contribute to Generation Z constructing
hybrid and multilayered identities that transcend national boundaries
and adapt global cultural products. This phenomenon is particularly
pronounced among students in urban areas and private schools, who have
greater access to global resources, educational opportunities, and
transnational networks.7
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One example is consumption of Korean popular culture.8
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Generation Z and Neoliberalism

Generation Z is called the “neoliberal generation” by some
researchers.9
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Neoliberalism as a system-stabilizing ideology is rooted in economic
and political principles. Central to this worldview are the ideals of
a free market economy, individual responsibility, and meritocracy.
This belief system implies that everyone has equal opportunities to
succeed through hard work. As a result, neoliberal ideology will lead
to the legitimization of social and economic inequality by
representing the system as fundamentally just.10
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Iran’s Neoliberal and Anfal Islamic Economical System

Iran operates as a hybrid neoliberal system11
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because the state has systematically pursued market reforms,
privatization, and deregulation since 1989. Successive administrations
have rolled back social welfare, commercialized public services like
higher education, and integrated elite paramilitary networks into
corporate capital accumulation. It also operates under _anfal_ Islamic
economy, which means a mechanism through which natural resources,
confiscated assets, and abandoned property are placed under a
supra-state clerical authority.12
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Iranian Generation Z has grown up in a social context characterized by
the coexistence of neoliberal values and significant Islamic
influences. The consequences is an increased level of poverty. More
than half of the population lives below the poverty line, and millions
of children are deprived of education and nutrition.13
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Inflation reached 50% in April 2026, according to Iran’s Central
Bank. Youth unemployment stands at 32% (three times the national
average), and that figure excludes students and those who have stopped
searching for work altogether.14
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According to recently published figures by Iran’s Statistics Center,
approximately 77%
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of Iranians between the ages of 15 to 24 are neither working, being
trained, nor studying.15
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Neoliberalism, as the dominant logic of social organization over the
past several decades, has even profoundly reshaped the Iranian
universities. It seeks to subordinate an ever-growing range of human
activities to the principles of the market, competition, and
profitability.

Within this framework, education is no longer regarded as a social
right or a public good. Instead, it is treated as an individual
investment expected to generate future economic returns. Nowadays,
more than half of the students enrolled in Iran’s leading public
universities come from the top two income deciles
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Generation Z find the prevailing social conditions as discriminatory
(particularly against women) and regard the distribution of wealth and
access to positions and offices as unjust. In their view, the absence
of meritocracy in appointments and rewards, alongside the entrenchment
of discriminatory laws and norms, constitute key roots of the status
quo. Generation Z adopts a critical stance toward social justice a
stance that influences their value orientations as well as their
individual and collective actions.16
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The Mental Health of Generation Z

Adolescents who frequently access social media are at higher risk of
experiencing poor sleep quality, which may lead to increased anxiety
and depression. There is growing documentation and concern that
internalizing mental health symptoms in Generation Z are increasing
especially in neoliberal capitalist countries.17
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Research shows that neoliberalism can also have a negative effect on
mental health of Generation Z. Neoliberal capitalism promotes
self-interest and interpersonal styles rooted in competition. It
promotes a strong desire for financial success, high levels of
consumption, and belief in the necessity of economic growth. It has
been associated with the rise of extrinsic values such as
individualism, materialism, and status-seeking. When young people
place greater emphasis on external, status-oriented values than on
personally meaningful and self-directed values, they may face a higher
risk of mental health difficulties, including anxiety and depression,
as well as lower overall well-being.18
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Iranian Generation Z, like many individuals worldwide, faces
significant mental health challenges. Adolescents, particularly girls
from low socioeconomic backgrounds, ethnic minorities, and Afghan
immigrants are at higher risk of anxiety, depression, and suicidal
behavior.19
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The major risk factors identified for poor mental health among Iranian
Generation Z are economic hardship, academic stress, cultural
pressures, and digital exposure.20
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A significant proportion of Iranian children and adolescents suffer
from mental and behavioral health issues, with estimates ranging from
about 17% to 36%.21
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Generation Z Girls and Young Women

Since the emergence of the _Woman, Life, Freedom_ movement, compliance
with Iran’s compulsory veiling regulations has declined markedly.
Visual evidence from contemporary Iran, particularly in major urban
centers, suggests that the practice of compulsory veiling has become
increasingly contested and in many public spaces appears to have
significantly diminished. Practices that challenge restrictions on
women’s mobility, appearance, and participation in public space
represent not only individual acts of defiance but also challenges to
the gendered organization of social and political life. Through
Generation Z young women’s and girls’ collective mobilization,
such everyday practices contribute to a gradual transformation of
social norms and expand the boundaries of what is considered
politically and socially possible.

The quest for authenticity is a central aspect of the psychological
and social development of female Generation Z in Tehran.22
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Despite numerous challenges, young women and girls employ various
strategies to maintain their authenticity, which significantly
enhances their well-being. Understanding the factors that influence
authenticity and supporting authentic self-expression can help foster
resilience and personal growth among Generation Z girls. The pursuit
of authenticity among young women is further manifested in their
changing attitudes toward marriage and childbearing, particularly in
their increasing willingness to challenge traditional social
expectations shaping these life choices. Iran recorded its lowest
annual number of births in seven decades in last year. The data
indicates
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that the number of marriages has declined by around 30 percent
compared to 2022-2023
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Analysts say
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that while childbearing was traditionally viewed primarily as a
cultural and family decision, it has increasingly become a long-term
financial consideration for many couples.

From a feminist perspective, the sharp decline in marriage and
childbirth in Iran reflects a conscious rejection of compulsory
traditional roles, systemic gender inequality, and state-mandated
pro-natalist policies. Educated Generation Z Iranian women are
increasingly prioritizing personal autonomy, higher education, and
career development over early marriage and motherhood.

Generation Z force for democracy and social equality or for right-Wing
populist mobilization

Taken together, this generation’s digital connectivity,
dissatisfaction with neoliberal politics and the Islamic regime,
openness to global cultural influences, economic deprivation, and
psychological distress point to a growing sense of frustration. These
conditions may also reflect an increasing demand for meaningful
political and social change in Iran.

Iran’s Generation Z can be conceptualized not simply as a
demographic cohort but as an emerging political actor shaped by the
intersection of authoritarian governance, socioeconomic inequality,
gendered restrictions, and intensified global connectivity. Their
demands for democratic participation, social justice, and a more
equitable distribution of opportunities reflect a fundamental
challenge to the political and social structures that shape everyday
life in Iran. Notably, these political demands are increasingly
articulated through transnational networks of communication, enabling
young Iranians to situate domestic struggles within wider global
discourses on democracy, equality, gender rights, and social change.
This transnational orientation may contribute to the development of
political identities that extend beyond the boundaries of the Iranian
nation-state.

Following the last decade, scientific and political articles,
literature, films, and everyday documentaries about Generation Z in
Iran indicate they are not apolitical. What distinguishes this
generation is not a lack of politics but the collapse of faith in the
institutions and rules that once gave politics, work, and adulthood a
recognizable structure.

Iranian Generation Z exhibits a markedly low willingness to
accommodate or reconcile with the Islamic Republic. Rather than
advocating incremental reform, many express a clear preference for
fundamental political transformation. They display limited confidence
in reformist actors, both within and outside the existing political
system, whom they often perceive as ineffective or lacking
credibility. Their opposition to the regime is not confined to overt
political activism but is also manifested through everyday forms of
cultural and social resistance. Participation in activities that the
state seeks to regulate or prohibit (including forms of entertainment
often dismissed as "shallow", such as Nima Tekido’s event) can
therefore be understood as acts of symbolic defiance that challenge
the regime’s moral and ideological authority.

This development presents both opportunities and challenges. On the
one hand, Iranian Generation Z demonstrate a progressive outlook,
considerable courage, and a strong determination to pursue the
complete removal of the current regime. On the other hand, the lack of
presence of organized democratic forces may pose a significant
challenge to the establishment of an effective political alternative.
In this context, where Generation Z remains largely unorganized and
where a unified democratic opposition is absent, conditions may become
conducive to the emergence of authoritarian or charismatic leaders who
portray themselves as providers of stability and decisive political
action.

This dynamic was evident during the past year, when a segment of this
generation that had participated in the _Woman, Life, Freedom_ (WLF)
movement placed its hopes for regime change in Reza Pahlavi, the son
of Iran’s former Shah, as well as in the prospect of US military
intervention. However, this populist enthusiasm has steadily waned,
especially in the aftermath of the bombing of Iranian infrastructure
and the girls’ school in Minab. These events have led many to
question the viability and political consequences of relying on
external intervention as a catalyst for domestic political change.
Despite this growing political awareness, concerns remain that the
interaction of profound resentment toward the Islamic Republic,
declining trust in political institutions, and the absence of
organized democratic alternatives may continue to generate political
opportunities for right-wing populist and authoritarian movements by
rendering segments of this generation more receptive to their appeals.

The key challenge lies in strengthening the relationship between the
Iranian socialist movement and Generation Z. Within Iran, socialist
politics has largely remained confined to academic and intellectual
circles, limiting its engagement with the broader youth population.
Bridging the gap between socialist intellectuals and the majority of
Generation Z is therefore a critical task. Achieving this requires
moving beyond outdated ideological clichés and sectarian discourse in
favor of a more accessible political language that resonates with the
lived experiences and concrete demands of young people. For Iranian
socialists, both within Iran and across the diaspora, meaningful
political engagement with Generation Z requires addressing its central
political and social aspirations, particularly its demands for
democracy, social justice, and individual freedoms. This, in turn,
calls for forms of political communication and organizational practice
that are responsive to the generation’s values, modes of expression,
and evolving patterns of political participation. This requires
adapting both the language and practices of socialist politics to the
social and cultural realities of Generation Z rather than remaining
anchored in inherited ideological frameworks and established
organizational practices.

There are emerging indications that segments of Iran’s Generation Z
are engaging with socialist ideas, particularly in relation to broader
aspirations for democracy and social justice. For instance, a recent
LinkedIn post by a young university student in southwestern Iran
characterized socialism as a potential pathway toward a democratic
Iran. While such an example cannot be taken as representative of the
generation as a whole, it illustrates how socialist ideas may be
entering the political vocabulary through which some young Iranians
articulate their aspirations for alternative social and political
arrangements.

Iran’s Generation Z may, therefore, constitute a significant arena
of political engagement and potential transformation, within which new
forms of political consciousness and collective agency are taking
shape. These emerging forms of agency may enable young Iranians to
challenge established structures of authority, inequality, and social
control, while creating new possibilities for political participation
and broader processes of social and political change. •

Endnotes

* OECD 2021, Health and Healthcare Systems
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Chart: How Gen Z employment levels compare in OECD countries. Mar 26,
2021.
* Kashani L, Akhondzadeh S. The Future of Iran’s Population:
Balancing Aging Trends and Fertility Rates. Avicenna J Med Biotechnol.
2025 Apr-Jun;17(2):82. doi: 10.18502/ajmb.v17i2.18558.
* Social Media and the Youth Activism: The Case of Generation Z in
Iran – Journal for Iranian Studies Year 7, Issue 17, June 2023.
* Social Media Stats Islamic Republic of Iran
[[link removed]]. Statcounter
Global Stats,” StatCounter Global Stats, January 1, 2022, accessed
January 1, 2023
* Statista Research Department 2022. Number of Tweets and Retweets
with the Hashtag #MahsaAmini
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Worldwide from September 16 to October 16, 2022. Sigurdardottir, H.,
Imani, M., Edalati Z. 2024. “Asking for Solidarity: Embodied
Feminist Practices in Digital Space.” Gender & Development 32
(1–2): 523–545. DOI: 10.1080/13552074.2024.2365058.
* Bayat, A. 2013. Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the
Middle East. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
* Ghaderi,S and Shamshiri Niri,M . 2026. “Futures Study of
National Identity in Generations Z and Alpha in Ardabil: An Analysis
of Continuity, Interaction, and Transformation Scenarios.” Social
Problems of Iran, 17(1), 167-202. doi: 10.61882/jspi.17.1.167.
* Yeon Koo, G. 2020. “Riding the Korean Wave in Iran:
Cyberfeminism and Pop Culture among Young Iranian Women Available to
Purchase.” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 16 (2):
144–164.
* Narin, K., Higgins, J., Sligo, J. Children of Rogernomics: A
neoliberal generation leaves school. 2012. Otago: Otago University
Press.
* Bettache, K., Chiu, C., Beattie, P. 2020. The merciless mind in a
dog-eat-dog society: neoliberalism and the indifference to social
inequality. Curr. Opin. Behav. Sci. 34, 217–222. doi:
10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.06.002 Boer, D. (2014).
* Valadbaygi, K. 2021. “Hybrid Neoliberalism: Capitalist
Development in Contemporary Iran
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Political Economy [[link removed]], Taylor
& Francis Journals, vol. 26(3), pages 313-327, May.
* Mehrdad Vahabi, 2023. “Anfal and Islamic Economics
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Springer Books [[link removed]], in:
Destructive Coordination, Anfal and Islamic Political Capitalism
[[link removed]], chapter
5, pages 145-193, Springer.
* Poverty and the Collapse of Human Dignity in Iran – Iran HRM
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* Iran’s Gen Z Faces 32% Unemployment, Record Internet Blackout
– Iran Open Data (IOD)
[[link removed]].
* Iran’s rising Generation Z at the forefront of protests –
Middle East Institute
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* Zare Shahabadi, A., Asgari,A. 2026. “Narrative of Generation
Z’s beliefs and actions towards inequality (Case of study: Citizens
of Khomeyni Shahr, Isfahan).” Social Problems of Iran, 16(2),
185-226. doi: 10.61882/jspi.16.2.185.
* Melanie S. et.al. 2022. “Structure and Trends of Externalizing
and Internalizing Psychiatric Symptoms and Gender Differences among
Adolescents in the US from 1991 to 2018
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Psychiatric Epidemiology 57, 737–8.
* Van Den Broeck, A., et.al. 2019. “I Want to Be a Billionaire:
How Do Extrinsic and Intrinsic Values Influence Youngsters’
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204–19.
* Zandi S, Oghani-Esfahani F, Ahmadi F, Sabbaghi-Dehkalani R,
Akhavan S. 2025. “Mental Health and Mental Health Care in Iran:
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1;13(23):3131. doi: 10.3390/healthcare13233131. PMID: 41373348; PMCID:
PMC12692221.
* Kamyabi Azar, S., Naeim, M., Arjmand, H. 2025. “Socio-cultural
erosion and the mental health crisis in Iranian youth: Root causes,
challenges, and culturally aligned interventions
[[link removed]],” Asian Journal of
Psychiatry, Volume 103, 104350, ISSN 1876-2018.
* Hashemi, M.S.; Yarian, E.; Bahadoran, P.; Jandaghi, J.; Khani,
M.M. 2012. “Prevalence of Mental Health Problems in Children and Its
Associated Socio-Familial Factors in Urban Population of Semnan,
Iran.” Iran. J. Pediatr. 2015, 25, e175.
*
Derakhsh, A., Seifsadat, T., & Alizadeh Damie, T., Barzgar, S. 2024.
“Generation Z Girls and the Quest for Authenticity A Psychological
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Psychology of Woman Journal, 5(1), 101 108.

 

_Sharareh Akhavan is a Docent in Public Health Sciences, University of
Gävle, Sweden._

 

_About Socialist Project: In the early 21st century, it is imperative
that the Left begin a sustained process of organizational
redevelopment, experimentation and struggle. Neither capitalism nor
neoliberalism will fade from the planet based on the momentum of their
own contradictions, or as result of new technologies. The SP is a
Toronto-based organization that supports the rebuilding of the
socialist Left in Canada and around the world. Committed to the
development of a more free, democratic, humane and sustainable society
than the one we live in, the SP opposes capitalism out of necessity
and supports the struggles of others out of solidarity. We support
struggles aligned with working class emancipation, anti-oppression,
democratic self-determination, planetary sustainability, and peace. We
do not propose a fast route out of capitalism, claim a ready
alternative to take its place or extol any one Left tendency. We
engage the concrete limits and possibilities of emerging struggles
within and against capitalism as it is today with an eye to making a
different kind of future._

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