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Two Chinese jet fighters perform a military drill in the South China Sea near Hainan Island. (STR/AFP via Getty Images)

Across the world, provocative military maneuvers have become increasingly common between great power rivals. From dangerous midair intercepts [[link removed].] to the use of paramilitary forces, the frequency of encounters has increased as China expands unsubstantiated territorial claims in the South China Sea and Russia challenges NATO's freedom-of-navigation operations across the Arctic, Baltic, and Black Sea.

In a new report, “ Reducing Russia-NATO Tensions: Codes for Unplanned Encounters at Sea [[link removed]],” Hudson visiting senior fellow Liselotte Odgaard [[link removed]] and Danish Naval Commander Sune Lund examine the use of codified protocol to prevent unplanned encounters from spiraling into unintended conflict. The analysis draws on the first-hand experiences of personnel engaged in implementing Codes for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in the South China Sea, where China’s navy and air force have become increasingly confrontational of the freedom-of-navigation operations conducted by the US and allies.

See key takeaways from the new report below, and in case you missed it, be sure to watch last week's event with U.S. Assistant Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism Ellie Cohanim [[link removed]].

Read the Report [[link removed]]

Key Takeways [[link removed]]

Highlighted takeaways from the new report, "“Reducing Russia-NATO Tensions: Codes for Unplanned Encounters at Sea.”

1. Unplanned encounters are a major component of Russia's strategy to curb NATO:

NATO’s influence is, in the Russian mindset, the continuation of a historic zero-sum game between Russia and other great powers, which concerns Russia’s core interest in ensuring a security buffer against the expansionary objectives of potentially hostile opponents.

In Moscow’s view, the Arctic Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea allow it ocean access. To prevent NATO and its partners from expanding their influence, Russia is increasing its military and paramilitary presence in these regions, improving its ability to challenge NATO’s freedom of movement in the event of a crisis. When combined with Russia’s mistrust of NATO and its willingness to confront NATO by forceful measures, the potential for the use of force due to misunderstandings is high.

2. China is broadening its use of hybrid civilian-military warfare:

China’s use of tactics that stretch the global rules on legitimate conduct include paramilitary forces concealed as civilians and the use of offensive force against the non-offensive deterrence actions of their strategic opponents. Beijing’s frequent deployment of combined civilian and paramilitary forces is seen by Washington as a challenge aimed at pushing back the U.S. alliance system, making it hard for the US and its partners to respond in a lawful and proportional manner. Moreover, these Chinese civilian and paramilitary forces tend to be backed up by regular naval forces, ensuring leverage if a situation moves in an unintended direction.

3. Joint Chinese-Russian military exercises are increasing in maritime Europe and elsewhere:

Europe is witnessing growing Chinese activity, including joint exercises and operations. China and Russia have held joint naval drills since 2012, which have taken place in the South and East China Sea, the Mediterranean and, in July 2017, the Baltic Sea. In September 2018, they conducted a large military exercise in Eastern Siberia; in July 2019 they conducted a joint strategic bomber patrol; and in December 2019 they conducted their first joint naval drill with Iran in the Gulf of Oman. These activities signal that Beijing and Moscow support each other against what they perceive as an increasingly threatening West.

4. U.S. and allied efforts to enforce the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea:

In cooperation with allies, the U.S. conducts freedom-of-navigation operations and overflights to demonstrate that it can navigate freely and unannounced up to 12 nautical miles from mainland China’s coastline, and reinforce that international waters cannot be turned into national territorial waters by means of land reclamation and historical claims. The U.S., its allies, and strategic partners consider the parts of the South China Sea not detailed as territorial water to be international waters and airspace, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

5. Russia’s recent increase in unplanned encounters:

Dangerous unplanned encounters in the air occur regularly when Russia turns off its transponders to remain unidentified, resulting in risks of air collision with commercial and military planes. In 2019, allied aircraft took to the skies 290 times in response to Russian military aircraft across Europe, with a number of high-risk or serious incidents characterizing the period since 2014. Russia’s naval forces are not a match for NATO’s fleet, so it predominantly uses its air force for testing purposes, combined with other non-kinetic activities such as cyberattacks and propaganda.

6. Paramilitary forces provide Russia with a NATO work-around:

Russia’s use of paramilitary forces in what is generally known as “hybrid warfare” continues to constitute a challenge to NATO, while such actions in its near-abroad aimed at increasing its political-strategic influence are designed to be non-attributional and below NATO’s Article 5 threshold. For example, numerous Russian surveillance vessels are paramilitary. As tension levels rise, Russia is likely to increase the use of paramilitary capabilities to avoid triggering NATO’s collective defense commitment.

7. Why Russia and NATO would benefit from CUES:

The introduction of Codes for Unplanned Encounters at Sea would reduce the risk that incidents escalate and send a clear signal that all parties realize the dangers involved in an evolving security dilemma. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) might provide the best framework for a future agreement, as the OSCE remains the only security organization in which Russia and the West meet regularly, making it the only viable forum for such discussions. Furthermore, the OSCE has historically been the organizing forum for many confidence-building measures that underpin the current regional order in Europe.

Quotes have been edited for length and clarity

Read the Report [[link removed]]

Go Deeper: China's Strategic Aspirations

Watch [[link removed]]

The Rise of China's Navy [[link removed]]

Capt. James Fanell, former director of intelligence for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, joined Hudson's Director for the Center for American Seapower Seth Cropsey for a discussion on the Chinese navy's expanding global presence. New long-range anti-ship missiles, military modernization, and the continued armament of islands in the South China Sea provide growing evidence of China’s strategic aspirations in the region.

Listen [[link removed]]

President Tsai Ing-wen on Protecting Democracy in Taiwan [[link removed]]

In this recording of a recent Hudson event, President Tsai Ing-wen and Taiwanese experts discuss China’s efforts to isolate, frighten, and threaten Taiwan’s free society, and how the U.S. and its allies must respond.

Read [[link removed]]

Double-Edged Aid: China’s Strategy to Gain Influence through Regional Assistance [[link removed]]

As China seeks to expand its global influence, its regional aid policies are driven by dual motivations – to help under assisted regions but also to serve Beijing’s political, economic, and environmental interests while undermining those of competing global powers. In this report, Hudson Visiting Senior Fellow Liselotte Odgaard outlines the origins, means, and objectives behind China’s approach to regional development.

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