New Stats on the 3.5 Million Central American Immigrants in the United States; Authoritarian Regimes Target Diasporas
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September 3, 2019

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New from MPI

How Does Immigration Fit into the Future of the U.S. Labor Market?

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Hondurans in DC Spotlight
Central American Immigrants in the United States
While much attention has been paid to recent Central American arrivals at the U.S.-Mexico border, nearly half of the approximately 3.5 million Central Americans resident in the United States in 2017 arrived before 2000. About one-third are naturalized U.S. citizens, and they tend to participate in the labor force at a higher rate than foreign- and U.S.-born adults. Discover more about this population in this data-rich article.

Haga clic aquí para leer este artículo en español.

Jamal Khashoggi Feature
A Tightening Grip Abroad: Authoritarian Regimes Target Their Emigrant and Diaspora Communities
Authoritarian states have long attempted to restrict citizens’ movement. But what happens when their reach extends beyond their borders? The October 2018 assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi brought into sharp relief the long arm of these regimes in reaching citizens abroad. This phenomenon, “transnational authoritarianism,” further shows that the relationship between migration and authoritarianism is becoming more complex.

Editor's Note

More than 820,000 Afghans, including more than 15,000 registered refugees, were returned to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan in 2018, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM). The returns are occurring even as Afghanistan remains a deeply unstable country, battered by four decades of war, civilian casualties, internal displacement, and drought. Indeed, between January-August 2019, more than 220,000 Afghans were internally displaced, according to the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

Beginning after the Soviet invasion in 1979, millions of Afghans moved to neighboring Iran and Pakistan, which have long hosted the largest numbers of Afghan refugees. Afghanistan is the source for the second-largest refugee population in the world, its 2.7 million refugees second only to Syria’s 6.7 million. Yet, despite ongoing conflict, Afghans are returning to their home country in major numbers. Over the last five years, more than 3.8 million Afghans have returned—by choice or by force. Now, the country’s ability to absorb returnees is wearing thin, and there is little support available to them. Returnees reported food insecurity and identified as among their biggest challenges the lack of shelter, job opportunities, and access to services such as receiving identification. Around half of the returnees are living in their province of origin, meaning that the other half are doubly displaced. Indeed, the situation for returnees seems more insecure than the precarious conditions many endured in Pakistan or Iran.

So, why are Afghans returning? Public sentiment against refugees in both countries—including violent police crackdowns against unauthorized Afghans in Pakistan—is a major driver. As is the economic crisis in Iran, spurred in part by reimposed U.S. sanctions. In addition, Pakistan has repeatedly affirmed that Afghans must eventually leave; the government in June ended some uncertainty around their stay, agreeing to extend refugees’ temporary legal residency for one year, until June 2020.

In addition to the challenges faced by newly returned Afghans, tensions are on the rise between returnees and internally displaced Afghans. According to Al Jazeera, internally displaced Afghans feel “abandoned” by government officials, who are preoccupied with fighting the Taliban and receiving large numbers of returnees, and further neglected by nongovernmental aid organizations operating in the country.

The fragile situation has been exacerbated by declining remittances. With an economy that has depended on migrants sending money back to Afghanistan for 40 years, the sharp increase in returns will certainly have a negative impact on the most vulnerable, who depend on remittances for basic sustenance. And in even more troubling news, drought continues to drive internal displacement and food scarcity. But with options for living abroad dwindling, returning Afghans will continue to test the country’s reintegration capacity.

Best regards,

Alexandra Vranas-Carita

Editor, Migration Information Source

[email protected]


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