CEP Research Analyst Gregory Waters On The ISIS Insurgency In Central Syria


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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2020

CEP Research Analyst Gregory Waters On The ISIS Insurgency In Central Syria

Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2020 by clicking here
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2020

By Gregory Waters

 

Following is the August installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. July’s update can be readhere
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, the June update can be readhere
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, May’s update can be readhere
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, and April’shere
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full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence, including its methodology,
can be exploredhere
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andhere
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In August, ISIS militants carried out at least 35 attacks, killing at least 76
pro-Assad regime fighters in the Homs, Deir Ez Zor, Raqqa, Hama, and Aleppo
governorates. These attacks constitute a major escalation in ISIS’s insurgency.
The overall number of attacks, high quality* attacks, and reported
pro-government deaths exceeded those from any month since ISIS lost control of
this region in 2017. Homs saw the greatest number of documented attacks (12),
with Deir Ez Zor (10) and Raqqa (9) following closely.  The more than two-fold
increase in attacks compared with previous months in Raqqa is overshadowed only
by the more than three-fold increase in attacks in Deir Ez Zor.





Importantly, attacks in Deir Ez Zor were not evenly spread throughout the
governorate, but focused primarily in the western urban belt stretching from
Deir Ez Zor city along the Euphrates to Ma’adan, and secondarily in the desert
west of Mayadeen. This first geographic concentration of attacks marks a new
expansion of ISIS activity, likely from cells originating in Jabal Bishri to
the west and Raqqa to the north. These attacks culminated in an August 27ambush
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many as 30 pro-regime National Defense Fighters (NDF) dead, along with the NDF
sector commander for western Deir Ez Zor. Most of the men killed, including the
commander, hailed from the local Busaraya tribe. The massacre triggered a
massivemobilization
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members from the pro-regime Liwa al-Quds, Qaterji Forces, and NDF deploying to
the region to conduct their own anti-ISIS operations in lieu of what one tribal
fighter told this author was an abandonment by the Syrian army. The operation
began on August 30, with at least two ISIS fighters killed in the desert west
of the town of Musarib, the site of the August 27 ambush. The operation
continues as of the publishing of this post.

 

A Russian major general and two more regime commanders were also killed this
month. On August 18, ISIS militants conducted a double-improvised explosive
device (IED) attack in the Tayem Oil Field, just outside of Deir Ez Zor city,
firstkilling <[link removed]>
five NDF fighters and then killing the NDF Mayadeen Sector commander alongside
Russian Major General Vyacheslav Gladkikh. The commander of a local Liwa
al-Quds auxiliary force was killed on August 11 in a complex attack near Tabni,
Deir Ez Zor, alongside three other fighters attempting to reinforce a 4th
Division unit that had been hit by an IED nearby. And in the early morning of
August 12, ISIS ambushed a produce truck and its Military Security escort in
Deir Ez Zor, killing the truck driver and a platoon commander.

 

Other high quality ISIS attacks included a raid that struck the T4 Pumping
Station
<[link removed]'47.8%22N+37%C2%B041'48.0%22E/@34.5447123,37.6969689,15.15z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x0:0x0!8m2!3d34.546613!4d37.696661>
near Tiyas, Homs, from the north and west—a direction that indicates ISIS
cells still have considerable freedom of movement close to major regime
strategic points. On August 14, ISIS conducted a rare day-time anti-tank guided
missile (ATGM) attack west of Mayadeen, destroying a regime tank. The next day,
militants overran a Liwa al-Quds base in the same area, killing at least five
regime fighters. Also on August 15, an ISIS cell clashed with a regime patrol
east of Sukhnah, killing at least 12 soldiers before reportedly withdrawing to
the southeast. Finally, two different late August ISIS IED attacks in Homs
targeted Syrian Army buses. At least four soldiers were killed and 24 were
wounded.

 

August had eight days in which ISIS carried out two or more attacks, and three
days in which three attacks were conducted across the Syrian desert (known as
the Badia). The rate of documented attacks in August is unmatched since 2018.
ISIS’s ability to carry out such frequent same-day attacks implies that the
group has developed a robust logistical and strategic capability.

 

The Syrian regime continued to send fighters to the Badia this month, with at
least two documented batches of new recruits arriving in Deir Ez Zor city to
join the 17th Division and the fifth deployment this year of Damascus NDF
fighters to the Euphrates area. Following the August 15 attacks near Mayadeen,
the Deir Ez Zor NDF announced it was creating a string of new checkpoints and
defensive positions along the Mayadeen-Deir Ez Zor highway. Conversely,
Russia’s lackluster response to the killing of a major general speaks volumes
about its inability and lack of interest in responding to the ISIS threat. The
Russian militaryclaimed
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to have killed 327 ISIS fighters in the week following Gladkikh’s death, a
laughably outlandish number. In reality, Russia’s response involved several
isolated airstrikes and, according to a local tribal fighter, Russia has yet to
provide any military assistance to the pro-regime forces fighting ISIS in west
Deir Ez Zor.

 

ISIS attacks in the Badia have been on the rise throughout 2020, as the group
continues to expand in strength and operational capacity. While it is unlikely
that September will see the same growth or severity of  attacks as in August,
this month’s trends will likely continue—that is, Raqqa, west Deir Ez Zor, and
west Mayadeen will continue to be the hotspots for the near future. The tribal
response triggered by the August 27 massacre will most likely push ISIS cells
back onto Jabal Bishri where they will hunker down and wait out the operation.
In Homs, ISIS will continue its strategy of exerting pressure around the city
of Sukhnah, no doubt seeking some opportunity to raid the city’s warehouses,
while sending out groups to attack regime positions further west, similar to
the T4 attack. East Hama and Southeast Aleppo both experienced a decrease in
ISIS attacks this month, partially due to the formation of local defense
militias. ISIS will wants to renew its activity in these areas and may take the
opportunity to do so while pro-regime forces are so heavily focused on western
Deir Ez Zor.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted dots) in August. To view an
interactive version of this map, please clickhere
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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.

 

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